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Abstract 
Firms are often embedded in a technology ecosystem comprised of complementary 
technologies that span multiple product markets. In this dissertation, I examine how 
complementarity between the firm’s technologies influences its strategies to create and 
appropriate value in the ecosystem. I investigate this overarching question in two contexts: 
firm’s participation in compatibility standards and how it designs products for a new market.  
 
In Chapter 2 and 3, I explore how complementarity within the firm’s technology portfolio 
affects how and where it creates and appropriates value from intellectual property disclosures 
to major compatibility standards. In Chapter 2, I theorize as to how a portfolio of 
complementary technologies allows the firm to create value from its technological position in 
an industry standard. I empirically test my prediction using data on major compatibility 
standards in the information and communications technology industry. I find that firms 
generate positive returns from disclosure only when they own complementary technologies. In 
Chapter 3, I extend this argument to study value appropriation. I find that firms focus their 
appropriation strategy around their complementary technologies.  
 
Chapter 4 examines how product complementarities influence product strategy in a new 
market. I propose that firms with complementary products will enter markets with products 
that exhibit lower technical performance than firms without complementary products. I also 
argue that firms choose features that function with their complementary products and will 
tradeoff non-complementary features when necessary. Examining entry into the nascent 
smartphone market using a rich set of data on smartphone product technology and features, I 
find strong support for these conclusions. I identify complementarities within the firm’s 
product portfolio as an important driver of firm’s product strategy.  
 
Through this dissertation, I demonstrate the benefit of a more systemic view of the firm’s 
portfolio, one that appreciates the relationships between the firm’s various technologies and 
products, and how these relationships influence the firm’s technology strategy. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Introduction 
 
How firms create and capture value from innovation has long been a central topic 
in strategic management (Schumpeter, 1934; Penrose, 1959; Nelson and Winter, 1982; 
Teece, 1986). Complementarities across different resources within the firm play an 
important role in value creation and appropriation strategies, and have been the focus of 
several streams of research.1  
Research on technological search and invention investigates the role that different 
knowledge inputs play in increasing the combinatorial possibilities that can lead to a value 
creating innovation (Arora and Gambardella, 1990; Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Ahuja and 
Lampert, 2001; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Hess and Rothaermel, 2011). Work in this 
stream tends to focus on evaluating whether knowledge acquisition strategies, such as 
mergers, alliances, human capital mobility, or licensing, can give rise to complementarities. 
The emphasis is on determining under what conditions certain knowledge elements 
function well together. For instance, external knowledge acquisition can complement 
internal research efforts when firms focus on basic research (Cassiman and Veugelers, 
2006) or when external and internal knowledge are moderately related (Ahuja and Katila, 
2001).  
Past literature also demonstrates that complementarities perform a vital role in 
appropriating returns from innovation. Complementary assets2 provide an advantage in 
                                                 
1 It is worth noting the importance complementarity plays in demand theory (Allen 1934, Hicks and Allen, 
1934a; 1934b). See Samuelson (1974) for a good overview. 
2 For example, distribution and product service capabilities.  
  2 
market competition and thus support the firm’s ability to profit from an innovation (Teece, 
1986; Rothaermel, 2001). Complementary assets also buffer the firm from technological 
change (Tripsas, 1997; Rothaermel and Hill, 2005) because many downstream assets retain 
their value under various technology regimes.  
Complementary assets also influence a firm’s incentive to innovate and the 
direction of this innovation (Levin et al., 1987 Cohen et al., 2000; Arora and Ceccagnoli, 
2006; Ceccagnoli, Graph, Higgins, and Lee, 2010; Hess and Rothaermel, 2011; Wu, Wan, 
and Levinthal, 2013). Resources that enhance the ability to profit from innovation, in turn, 
spur the firm to increase its innovative effort. Firms tend to align their innovation strategies 
with their complementary assets.3 Complementary assets can even influence the firm’s 
technology trajectory (Wu et al., 2013). 
 This literature demonstrates the importance of complementarities in influencing 
firms’ technology strategy and innovative performance. However, the focus is often on 
creating or supporting a single innovation. For example, the literature on complementary 
downstream assets typically assumes that the firm has an innovation and then examines the 
role of complementary assets in appropriating value from this innovation. Likewise, 
research on technology search investigates how different knowledge elements combine to 
create a single innovation. 
 From extant literature, it is less clear how firms strategize around a set of 
technologies or products, or how complementarities between technologies or products 
                                                 
3 For example, pharmaceutical firms enter into research and development (R&D) alliances with new 
entrants when they can exploit knowledge through complementary assets (Rothaermel, 2001). These same 
firms avoid licensing technology that does not fit with their complementary assets (Ceccagnoli et al., 
2010). 
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influence strategy. This limits our ability to apply the theory of complementarities to 
sufficiently answer more complex questions. For example, why did Google enter the 
mobile phone operating system market and do so by providing the operating system for 
free? Understanding the focal technology (e.g., the operating system) only partially reveals 
how it was used in Google’s value creation and capture strategy. Why did Merrill Lynch, 
a firm with vast financial and technological resources enter the online brokerage market 
well behind the technological frontier? Focusing on only the new product (e.g. online 
trading) obscures how Merrill Lynch could still provide value to clients in other ways (e.g. 
investment research). Why would firms be willing to spend millions of dollars to develop 
technology that runs mobile browsing standards just to freely license the IP to anyone 
adopting the standard? Focusing on the disclosed IP alone does not reveal its role in the 
broader role in the firm’s value creation and capture strategy.  
To approach such questions with sufficient rigor, I take a more systemic perspective 
of the firm’s portfolio of technologies. To do this I utilize the concept of a technology 
ecosystem (also known as an innovation ecosystem or product ecosystem) (Adner and 
Kapoor, 2010). Technology ecosystems consist of multiple interrelated technologies, and 
the structure of and interaction between them influence the value proposition of the 
ecosystem.4 The concept is similar to business ecosystems, where to understand how value 
can materialize, one needs to understand the alignment structure of various parties that 
                                                 
4 Prior literature demonstrates the importance of analyzing the structure of and interaction for 
understanding firms’ technology strategy (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Baldwin, 2000; Ethiraj, 2007). For 
example, Ethiraj (2007) finds that slower technological advancement of one component in the system can 
reduce the value of technological advancement of other interacting technological components, which 
changes the R&D incentives for firms that own the more advanced components. 
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comprise the ecosystem (Adner, 2017). However, unlike business ecosystem research that 
tends to emphasize cross-firm relationships, I focus on cross-technology or cross-product 
relationships. These products and technologies do not necessarily need to be owned by 
different firms. I focus on the case when the firm itself owns the different technologies or 
products.  
In this dissertation, I focus on the complementarity between technologies and how 
the position of one in the ecosystem can affect the value of the other. Two technologies are 
complementary when they are compatible (i.e. co-function together) and when both are 
functioning, can create more value together than they do alone (Milgrom and Roberts, 
1990; 1995; Toh and Miller, 2017). The extent to which the co-created value is of 
significance to the firm will depend on the technologies’ positons in the ecosystem. I utilize 
this concept to help understand how a firm’s incentives, and thus its technology strategies, 
will differ based on whether it can benefit from complementarities.  
To better understand this concept, take for example two compatible technologies: 
technology A and technology B. If A takes an important position in the ecosystem, such as 
inside a major industry standard, then not only does the value of A rise, the value of B may 
as well. A firm that owns both A and B can benefit from this complementary value. 
Focusing only on A provides an incomplete picture of the value created from its position 
in the ecosystem because it ignores the complementarity it has with B.  
  5 
Take the following simple example from Qualcomm. Qualcomm developed the 
baseband processing technology5 used in CDMA-based wireless networks. Revenue is 
generated as base station producers license the technology from Qualcomm. However, the 
benefit to Qualcomm does not stop there. Qualcomm strategically designed its Radio 
Frequency component of its chipsets, which power mobile phones, to optimally 
interoperate with the baseband processing technology.6 Doing so, Qualcomm could offer 
users superior reception and power management capabilities, which led to Qualcomm’s 
dominance in the CDMA-based chipset market.  
To help link the concept of complementary to the demand side of the equation, I 
draw on the concept of network externalities that are commonly used in the literature on 
platforms. A portfolio of complementary technologies can create positive network 
externalities that the firm can capture—as demand for one technology increases, the 
demand for others will likely increase as well. Therefore, a strategy implemented on one 
can impact the value of the other. Firms with portfolios subject to such effects will have 
different incentives and will likely employ different strategies than firms that do not.  
 
Structure of the Dissertation 
The objective of my dissertation is to examine how complementarities within the 
firm’s portfolio of technologies and products influence its technology strategy. Through 
                                                 
5 In a wireless network, a baseband unit will process the transmission and reception of voice signals sent to 
handsets and received by the mobile unit. Baseband refers to the frequency range of transmission signal 
prior to modulation.  
6 For example, see Qualcomm press release, February 8, 1999 
https://www.qualcomm.com/news/releases/1999/02/08/qualcomm-introduces-next-generation-cdma-rf-
and-analog-chipsets [Last accessed April 30, 2017]. 
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three essays (Chapters 2-4), I highlight the influential role that complementarities play in 
several important settings. My arguments and findings demonstrate the value of adopting 
a systemic perspective on the firm’s technology portfolio. I discuss each briefly below.  
In Chapter 2 (coauthored with Puay Khoon Toh), we investigate if and how firms 
create value from supplying technology and intellectual property (IP) to compatibility 
standards. Compatibility standards define how component technologies in a system 
function together, and lie at the core of technology ecosystems in industries where 
interoperability between products and services is needed to create value for consumers. 
Prior research assumes that firms generate most of their reward from supplying IP to the 
standard through licensing this essential technology to adopters of the standard (Bekkers, 
Bongard, and Nuvolari, 2011; Pohlmann, Neuhausler, and Blind, 2015). Yet, there are 
reasons to believe that licensing standard essential technology may not fully compensate 
the firm for the costs of its disclosure (Updegrove, 2007).  
We argue that a firm generates more value from disclosing technology to a standard 
when it owns non-disclosed complementary technologies. These non-disclosed 
technologies, by virtue of being complementary to the disclosed, standard essential 
technology, become compatible to and complementary with the standard. We propose that 
as the disclosed technologies take a prominent place in the ecosystem (i.e. inside the 
standard), the value of their complementary technologies rise, which increases the firm’s 
return from disclosure.  
To test how the firm benefits from disclosure, we conduct a stock market event 
study using data on disclosures to major compatibility standards in the information and 
  7 
communications technology (ICT) industry between 1988 and 2010. To test how value 
changes at the technology level, we trace how patent citations increase once a technology 
becomes complementary to technologies in the standard. 
We find that on average, firms generate negative cumulative abnormal returns from 
disclosing technology alone. Returns are positive only when the firm owns complementary 
technologies. Results at the patent level demonstrate that the complementary patents 
experience a significant increase in citations once the firm discloses the other, standard 
essential patents.  
In Chapter 3, I study how firms appropriate returns in cooperative settings. In many 
contexts, such as compatibility standards, firms need to reveal IP to others to create value, 
but doing so reduces the firm’s ability to appropriate returns (Arrow, 1962; Henkel, 
Scholeberl, and Alexy, 2014). Disclosing IP reduces appropriability because the firm 
relinquishes secrecy and often, its ability to enforce legal rights on others. So how do firms 
capture value in such a setting?  
To answer this question, I trace firms’ patent litigation suits in the context of 
compatibility standards. I predict that firms will focus their appropriation efforts on 
technology complementary to standard essential technology. Therefore, I expect to observe 
higher litigation rates among complementary patents than in a sample of similar, but non-
complementary patents. 
I test my argument using data on patent litigation and ICT standards between 1988 
and 2010. Relative to similar patents in the firm’s portfolio, complementary patents have 
similar litigation rates prior to the standard, but experience a significantly higher rate of 
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litigation post-standard. Comparing the patent’s own litigation history, complementary 
patents experience an increase in the number of lawsuits and the likelihood of future 
litigation after the firm discloses to the standard.   
In Chapter 4, I examine the role that product complementarities play in the firms’ 
product design strategy at they enter a new market. While market entry has long been a 
central topic in strategic management, literature typically focuses on the antecedents of 
entry, predicting if and when a firm enters. We know much less about product strategies 
firms use upon entry, even though they play a vital role in post-entry success (Brown and 
Eisenhardt, 1995; Krishnan and Ulrich, 2001). Evidence also suggests that firms can differ 
quite widely on their post-entry design strategy in nascent markets, even when they have 
similar capabilities or access to technology (Benner and Tripsas, 2012). For example, there 
are puzzling cases where firms with strong technological resources enter a new high-
technology market with seemingly inferior technology.  
To explore this issue, I study firms’ product strategy in the nascent stage of a new 
product market. I begin with the observation that in many high-technology industries, new 
product markets form in the context of a larger innovation ecosystem consisting of 
multiple, potentially complementary product markets. Firms often operate in many of these 
product markets, and in some instances, offer existing products that are complementary to 
the new market. I consider how complementarities in the firm’s product portfolio influence 
its product strategy as it enters a new market. I propose that firms with complementary 
products will be more likely to enter, but will enter with products that exhibit lower 
technical performance than firms without complementary products. I also argue that firms 
  9 
choose features that function with their complementary products and tradeoff features that 
do not function with them.   
I test my predictions using detailed product information from the nascent stage of 
the global smartphone market. Firms with complementary products are more likely to enter 
the smartphone market, and enter with smartphones that exhibit significantly lower 
technical performance as compared to firms without complementary products. 
Complementarity influences feature choice, with firms more likely to include product 
features that correspond to their complementary products and more likely to exclude 
features that do not function with their complementary products. I also find that 
complementary products positively influence market share.  
 At the heart of this dissertation is the notation of a firm embedded in an ecosystem 
of complementary technologies and products, some of which the it owns. How the firm 
operates in this ecosystem, including how it collaborates with other firms, how it designs 
products, and how it executes other strategic actions, will all be influenced by the 
complementarities in its own portfolio. Through these three essays, I advance our 
knowledge of the role of complementarities in technology strategy.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Complementary Technologies and Firm Value in Disclosure During Standard 
Setting  
 
(With Puay Khoon Toh) 
 
 
Abstract Compatibility standards play an important role in many product markets by allowing 
technologies supplied by many independent parties to work together. Despite being a significant 
source of value creation in technology ecosystems, the extent to which individual firms capture 
value from their contribution to standards remains unclear. We assess how firms’ benefit from 
technology disclosures to major standards using a stock market event study. We predict and find 
that firms that own technologies that are complementary to their disclosed technologies gain more 
from disclosure than firms that do not own complementary technologies. Patents that become 
complementary to the standard also increase in value. The findings stress the importance of taking 
a systemic view of the firm’s technology portfolio. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Standard setting facilitates development of different firms’ technologies that need 
to be interoperable within an industry (Leiponen, 2008; Lerner and Tirole, 2015). Often, a 
technological system, such as the mobile communication network, consists of multiple 
complementary technologies, i.e. ones whose values are superadditive in combination 
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1995) and whose operations rely on the functioning of each other 
(Toh and Miller, 2017). When these technologies are distributed across firms without clear 
presence of a ‘platform leader’ (Bresnahan and Greenstein, 1999), coordination becomes 
crucial in their development, without which the system risks ‘forking’ and suffers 
incompatibility problems (Rosenkopf and Tushman, 1998). Compatibility standard setting 
enables such coordination by spelling out the technical specifications through which the 
complementary technologies will connect. 
 Standards are commonly set de jure via voluntary standard setting organizations 
(SSOs). Research has shown that when firms disclose their intellectual properties (IP) to 
SSOs so to establish the underlying technologies as part of an industry standard, they 
promote ‘openness’ of their technologies and mitigate subsequent hold-up problems within 
the system (Weiss and Sirbu, 1990; Besen and Farrell, 1991). Coordination occurs more 
efficiently than in de facto standard setting (Farrell and Saloner, 1988). Recent empirical 
work also demonstrates that patents disclosed to SSOs subsequently become more 
valuable, as indicated by citations received and litigation rates. The higher values did not 
merely arise from a selection effect—more valuable patents are more likely to be 
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disclosed—but also from a marginal effect—the disclosures per se added to the patents’ 
values (Rysman and Simcoe, 2008; Bekkers et al, 2017). 
 Despite these demonstrations, there has been little evidence or understanding of 
whether and how the value created during disclosure accrues to the disclosing firm (see 
Pohlmann, Neuhausler, and Blind, 2015), even as the system benefits from improved 
coordination and the disclosed patents themselves gain intrinsic value. There are reasons 
to doubt that licensing of standard essential patents (SEPs) would fully compensate for the 
costs borne by the disclosing firm. For one, the firm can spend millions of dollars and 
thousands of labor hours on standard-setting activities (Chiao et al, 2007; Bar and 
Leiponen, 2014). Given SSOs’ typical mandates to provide open access to all users, the 
disclosing firm is usually obligated to license out its disclosed SEPs to any user at a ‘fair, 
reasonable, and non-discriminatory’ (FRAND) rate, which is likely lower than the 
monopoly price (Lemley and Shapiro, 2013). When patent pools are used, licensing fees 
are further split among multiple patent owners. SSOs are increasingly advocating royalty-
free licensing (Bekkers et al, 2012). The disclosing firm further bears the cost of potential 
undue expropriation of the disclosed technology, and conflicts, delays, and strategic 
gaming by rivals as the firm attempts to gather consensus around the SEPs (Updegrove, 
2007; Farrell and Simcoe, 2012). Yet, with these hurdles in generating returns from the 
disclosed technology, firm participation in SSOs is still on the rise. This calls into question 
whether out-licensing of disclosed SEPs is indeed the main way through which the 
disclosing firm captures value, if the firm does at all.  
  13 
 In this paper, we study whether and how a firm’s disclosure to SSOs during 
standard setting adds to firm value. We examine disclosures made by firms to 13 SSOs 
during standard setting within the information and communication technology (ICT) 
industry 1988-2010. We start with a key observation: contrary to the common depiction of 
‘complementary technologies within the system requiring coordination being owned by 
different firms,’ in our sample, more than two-thirds of disclosing firms own multiple of 
these complementary technologies themselves, not all of which are disclosed to SSOs. This 
forms the basis of our main assertion: as the firm discloses to SSOs, increase in its value 
occurs mainly through its other complementary technologies that remain non-disclosed, 
rather than through its disclosed technology. 
In firm-level analyses, we use Tobin’s Q as a measure of firm value, and examine 
its relationship with the firm’s non-disclosed complementary technologies over disclosure 
events using panel fixed effect models. We then explore the effect of complementary 
technologies on the returns to disclosure more rigorously using a stock market event study. 
As the development of complementary technologies are endogenous firm choices, there 
may be selection issues that bias our estimated effect that are not adequately addressed in 
the regression models. We further use inverse propensity-weighted regression adjustment 
(IPWRA) models (Wooldridge, 2007; Elfenbein, Hamilton, and Zenger, 2010), which 
account for the firm’s propensity to have complementary technologies, and compare 
treatment effects on a set of treated observations relative to the same set of observations 
themselves as if they have not been treated. We then explore two potential explanations of 
how the firm’s non-disclosed complementary technologies increase firm value during 
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disclosure—increased compatibility and competitiveness of these complementary 
technologies. 
Our main firm-level findings are as follows: a firm’s disclosure does not seem to 
increase its firm value in general; in fact, we find weak evidence suggesting that such effect 
of disclosure is negative. However, we find that disclosing firms with non-disclosed 
complementary technologies experience an increase in Tobin’s Q post disclosure. 
Evidence from our event study strongly indicates that non-disclosed complementary 
technologies significantly increase firm value. A one-standard-deviation increase in 
complementary technologies increases the cumulative abnormal returns over a three-day 
window by 0.48% on average, translating into approximately $328 million increase in 
market value over three days. Evidence also aligns with our explanations of this main 
effect—that disclosure increases compatibility and competitiveness of the non-disclosed 
complementary technologies. We find that the main effect of complementary technologies 
is weaker when these technologies are also compatible to other firms’ potential substitutes 
for the firm’s disclosed technology (and hence increased compatibility is less valued), and 
is stronger when the disclosing firm active in downstream markets faces more competition 
downstream (and hence increased competitiveness is more valued). 
We further conduct patent-level analyses which allow us to more closely trace 
changes in value of non-disclosed complementary technologies during disclosure, using 
subsequent citation received as an indication of value (Rysman and Simcoe, 2008). Fixed-
effect Poisson models are used to examine changes in citations received by a non-disclosed 
patent when its complementary counterpart was disclosed. An observed increase in citation 
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over the disclosure event could stem from other non-observed disclosure-related factors, 
instead of from the non-disclosed patent being complementary to the firm’s disclosed SEP, 
which would bias estimates even in fixed effect models. To address this potential issue, we 
conduct patent matching with difference-in-difference analyses. For each non-disclosed 
patent that became complementary to a disclosed SEP over a disclosure event, we match it 
to one (or more) almost identical non-disclosed patent(s) from the same firm, technology 
class and application year, and similar in various attributes, but that did not become 
complementary to any disclosed SEPs. We then compare the relative changes in citations 
received over the disclosure event between the treatment and control. By creating 
counterfactuals for complementary technologies using the firm’s similar, non-
complementary patents, we can suppress potential effect of firm-level unobservables that 
may select the firm into disclosure.  
 The main patent-level findings are as follows: a non-disclosed patent experiences 
an average of 13.3% increase in citations received after its complementary patent belonging 
to the same firm is disclosed as a SEP during standard setting. This effect is magnified in 
the post dot-com era (2003-2010), at 32% increase in received citations, which is 
substantially larger than even the increases experienced by the disclosed SEPs themselves 
post disclosure event (16.2%). Hence, disclosures to SSOs appear to enhance firm value 
though the firm’s non-disclosed complementary technologies. Additionally, we find that 
the firm itself is more likely to build on (self-cite) these non-disclosed complementary 
technologies after the disclosure event, relative to the firm’s own disclosed SEPs or to 
similar non-disclosed and non-complementary patents in its portfolio. 
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 These findings have clear managerial implications. As the firm strategizes on the 
extent to which it should participate in organized standard setting within the industry, by 
disclosing its IP to SSOs, the tradeoff it faces goes beyond ‘enhancing coordination in an 
open system and increasing efficiencies of technological development’ versus ‘risking the 
loss of control over and its ability to appropriate returns to the technologies it puts forth 
during disclosure’ (Gawer and Henderson, 2007). Gains in value of other complementary 
technologies in the firm’s portfolio, that are not part of disclosures and hence remain 
uncompromised, should be factored into consideration as well. While the focus in past 
literature in standard setting has largely been on the appropriation conditions surrounding 
the disclosed technology, in terms of IP enforceability, changes in value, terms of licensing, 
etc., our findings provide an alternative view of how firms profit from disclosures—via its 
complementary technologies rather than the SEPs themselves. This suggests that managers 
instead focus on appropriation conditions surrounding the complementary technologies. 
 Our findings may have implications for policy makers as well. In supervising 
standard setting activities, the objective of institutions such as the U.S. Department of 
Justice and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is usually to ensure that firms are not 
manipulating these activities to gain market power in fraudulent manners or locking in 
users at monopolistic prices. Cases in point are FTC’s lawsuits against Dell in 1996 and 
more recently against Rambus in 2005.7 There have also been efforts to insert protective 
                                                 
7 In the case of FTC against Dell, Dell was accused of knowingly not disclose IP that are central to the 
standard being set by the Video Electronics Standards Association. Only after the standard was set did Dell 
then asserted its IP to demanded royalty payments. It was subsequently ruled that Dell had violated antitrust 
laws. Dell was then subjected to FTC oversight in subsequent standard-setting activities for ten years, and 
was made to grant royalty-free licenses to all users. In the Rambus case, FTC alleged that Rambus had failed 
to disclose relevant IP and illegally manipulated the standard setting process to acquire and exert monopoly 
power. 
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mechanisms in the standard setting process, such as the ‘defensive suspension’ terms8 in 
licensing contracts, to prevent disclosing firms from subsequently reneging on licensing at 
FRAND rates once lock-ins occur (Updegrove, 2007; Sidak, 2015). Our findings suggest 
a different potential problem: even if a firm’s assertion of market power over its disclosed 
SEP is curtailed, it may still be able to create socially undesirable lock-ins via its 
complementary technologies that are not disclosed and hence not subjected to oversight. 
By retaining control over licensing and use of these complementary technologies, the firm 
may create distortions from socially optimal equilibrium prices and usage as it maximizes 
profits. 9 We clearly do not offer evidence of such distortions in this paper, but simply raise 
a possibility that may be worth examining. 
 
RELATED LITURATURE 
In this section, we provide a brief review of standards literature. Here, we refer to 
compatibility standards, as opposed to minimum quality, safety, or reference standards. 
Compatibility standards define interoperability between various components in a 
technological system.10  
                                                 
8 The ‘defensive suspension’ term in contracts allows a party to revoke its cross-licensing agreement with 
another party if the latter subsequently attempts to assert licensing under non-FRAND rates. 
9 Qualcomm is accused of employing a similar strategy in which it combines its SEPs and complementary 
technologies in noncompetitive ways. A $975 million antitrust fine was levied against Qualcomm in China 
in 2015 and $835 million fine in South Korea in 2016.  
10 For example, a mobile phone communications network will consist of the radio transmission protocol 
that defines how information signals are modulated and communication channels are shared (multiplexing), 
a base station system for transmitting signals, a network switching system to control ‘traffic’, receiver and 
transmitter technology to allow a phone to send and receive signals, and operation support system for 
testing and maintenance of the communication network, all of which need to be function together to create 
any value for users. Because many of the components are independently supplied, the coordination through 
standards setting is necessary to assure interoperability. 
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Standards play an important role in the evolution of markets by functioning as a 
mechanism of selection and diffusion of innovation (Antonelli, 1994). Standards can be 
“selected” through market competition,11 or as we focus on in this paper, through consensus 
within SSOs (Farrell and Saloner, 1988). Standards increase the diffusion of standard-
based products by reducing user transaction costs and purchase risk, and allowing users to 
benefit from direct network effects (Demsetz, 1993; Antonelli, 1994). Standards also 
impact the supply side. Access to technological specifications and IP behind a standard can 
reduce the barrier of entry into standards-based product markets by reducing tacit 
knowledge and decreasing design and production costs (Anotelli, 1994). Alternatively, 
standards can be a source of market power by creating a barrier to entry when access to 
essential IP is restricted. The outcome of the standardization process can create winners 
and losers. The process of selecting between alternative technology paths, the standard can 
render some knowledge, technologies, and physical resources valuable, and others 
obsolete.  
The importance of the selection process to market evolution is why much of the 
literature on standards focuses on the standard setting process (Farrell and Saloner, 1985; 
Farrell, 1996; Chiao, Lerner, and Tirole, 2007; Dokko, Nigam, Rosenkopf, 2012; Farrell 
and Simcoe, 2012; Simcoe, 2012; Lerner and Tirole, 2015; Lerner, Tabakovic, Tirole, 
2016). Several issues emerge from this stream. First, is the difficulty in pricing standard 
essential technology (Lerner and Tirole, 2015). Theoretically, licensing rates for standard 
essential technology can surpass the price they would fetch in market competition because 
                                                 
11 For example, VHS standard prevailed over its rival, Betamax.  
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the ex-ante price of a candidate technology is partially the function of competing 
technological options. Yet, pricing is not considered in the selection process because 
discussing licensing rates ex ante creates antitrust concerns (Lerner and Tirole, 2015). 
Instead, price negotiations often begin post-selection, when the technology has a monopoly 
position in the standard. This has led to the development of frameworks to analyze price 
commitments within the standard setting process (e.g. Lerner and Tirole, 2015). The legal 
literature also identifies the importance of price commitments, and extant research reviews 
litigation stemming from the issue (Lemely, 2002; Skitol, 2005; Lemley 2007; Sidak, 
2015). To deter malignant strategies,12 many SSOs have adopted strict IP disclosure and 
licensing rules (Bekkers et al., 2015), policy that the Antitrust Division of the U.S. 
Department of Justice encouraged (Sidak, 2015). Such policies may unfairly favor 
licensees over SEPs owners (Sidak, 2015).  
Second, the process of achieving consensus can be difficult because firms have 
vested interests in the outcome of the standard (Farrell and Simcoe, 2012). Therefore, 
several papers study rule making and barging in standards (Farrell and Saloner, 1988; 
Shapiro and Varian, 1998; Chiao, Lerner, and Tirole, 2007; Farrell and Simcoe, 2012; 
Simcoe, 2012). This stream commonly views the standards setting process as a war of 
attrition that leads to slow selection process (Farrell and Saloner, 1988; Farrell and Simcoe, 
2012). For example, Simcoe (2012) finds that vested interests created coordination issues 
                                                 
12 IP policies deter a firm from employing a ‘submarine strategy’ by which the firm waits until its IP 
becomes essential to the standard before disclosing its stakes and licensing rates. Cases such as Rambus vs. 
Infineon Tech highlight the problem faced when an SSO does not have a sufficient IP policy (see Rambus, 
Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 164 F. Supp. 2d 743 (E.D. Va. 2001), or Lemely (2002) for an analysis). These 
polices also help ensure that all adopters will have equal access to technology that is essential to run the 
standard.  
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that delayed the adoption of several important internet standards. This stream highlights 
firm’s rent seeking behavior within the standard setting process, and by doing so, suggests 
that valuable stakes are involved. 
Another stream investigates the properties of patents deemed essential for a 
standard (Rysman and Simcoe, 2008; Simcoe, Graham, Feldman, 2009; Bekkers, Bongard, 
and Nuvolari, 2011). Rysman and Simcoe (2008) study four SSOs that sponsor technology 
standards and find that firms disclose valuable technology during the standard setting 
process. Results suggest that consensus standardization selects technology that creates 
value for consumers and adopters. Bekkers et al. (2011), however, find that participation 
by IP owners in the standard setting process increases the odds of their technology 
becoming essential more than technological merit alone. Their results point to strategic 
behavior on the part of firms. Simcoe et al. (2009) find that technology increases in value 
after it becomes essential to the standard. Overall, this stream demonstrates that standards 
select valuable technology, and that post-adoption, this now essential technology becomes 
even more valuable.  
Several recent papers examine the impact of standards on firm performance. 
Aggarwal, Dai, and Walden (2011) examine how the number of participants in a standard 
setting initiative impacts firm performance, by tracing the announcement of standard 
setting initiatives on firm stock market performance. They find that as the number of 
participants increase, a participant’s idiosyncratic risk tends to increase while its near-term 
stock returns decrease, suggesting that the market anticipates that the outcome of the 
standard setting process will create winners and losers among the participants. Pohlmann 
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et al. (2015) research the relationship between a firm’s return on assets and the ownership 
of SEPs, and find that they are positively correlated. Interestingly, they also find that the 
impact of SEPs on firm performance rapidly declines as the number of SEPs increases, 
which they attribute to FRAND licensing restrictions and poorly positioned patent 
portfolios. Both papers point to the possibility that value creation in standards cannot be 
fully deciphered by looking at only participation in the standard setting process or 
ownership of SEPs.  
 
DISCLOSURES DURING STANDARD SETTING 
 In this section, we discuss key features of the standard setting process in SSOs.13 
For a given standard, a typical process would start with an open call for all members to 
mention their IP or awareness of existing IP that are relevant to the standard. Committees 
and workgroups, staffed by representatives from participating firms, are then formed to 
develop technical specifications for the standard (Leiponen, 2008). Participation in 
committees is voluntary, though members who are active in related technologies would 
tend to be on these committees.14 These representatives from member firms would try to 
influence the direction of development in favor of their firms’ technologies and work to 
reject developments that would be detrimental to them. Once the exact specifications are 
                                                 
13 We appreciate helpful insights on the standard setting process from an expert industry practitioner who 
represented Motorola and Nokia in standard setting activities on multiple occasions over the past decade. He 
has experience on standard setting in the following: Location Interoperability Forum (LIF) for location 
technologies, Open Mobile Alliance (OMA), browsing technologies (XHTML, HTML4), and W3C internet 
standards. He has also chaired device capabilities working groups during standard setting. 
14 Note that most SSOs charge a nominal membership fee (Updegrove, 2007). As SSOs strive to create 
widely adopted standards, firms can still license technology even if they are not members of the SSO or fail 
to participate in the standard setting process.  
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determined, members with SEPs would then officially make disclosures to the SSO via 
declaration letters, and in doing so formally establish the standard. It is common for 
uncertainty over exact specifications to remain till the end of the process, as firms have 
incentives to delay disclosing technologies details even within workgroups.15 Not all IP 
mentioned during the initial call would be included in the standard, depending on how the 
standard evolves in the negotiated process. While most disclosed SEPs belong to 
participating members in the workgroups, members who did not participate in the technical 
committees can also disclose.16 
Firms typically state their relevant technologies in a declaration letter or email to 
the SSO. A declaration letter is meant to disclose ‘technically essential’ components which 
are needed by any firm to implement the standard (Bekkers et al, 2012).17 Letters can take 
two forms: specific disclosures that list patents and IP claims over essential technology and 
blanket disclosures that indicate ownership IP but do not list specific patent or patent 
applications.18  
Disclosures to SSOs can be costly. First, firms typically spend millions of R&D 
dollars on standard related projects. Therefore, the baseline cost of generating relevant IP 
                                                 
15 In early stages, there is often uncertainty about how the standard would shape up and hence how valuable 
each technological component will eventually be. Firms are concerned that early disclosure of details and 
commitment to license would allow rivals to conspire and trap them into unnecessarily disclosing too much 
of the valuable technologies (Chiao et al., 2007; Updegrove, 2007). 
16 It is also possible for a participant to disclose another participant’s technology, though based on our 
analysis of disclosures, this is very rare.  
17 ‘Commercially essential’ IP, such as ones protecting methods of implementation that enable substantial 
quality improvements or cost reductions, are not required to be disclosed during this process. 
18  Firms may use blanket disclosures when they own large patent portfolios and would incur high search 
costs to determine the exact relevant patents or claims (Updegrove 2007). However, some scholars debate 
whether search costs play a role. Bekkers and Martinelli (2013) suggest that blanket disclosures may signal 
that the firm has lower quality patents, though they do not provide evidence that firms making blanket 
disclosures lack standard essential IP.  
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is nontrivial. Second, IP may also have uses outside the standard, but disclosure can 
facilitate efforts to circumvent the patent in outside uses, which can reduce the firm’s 
ability to fully appropriate returns from the IP (Chiao et al., 2007). Third, SSO IP policies 
typically dictate that disclosing firms must make SEPs available to license on a non-
discriminatory basis (Bekkers, et al., 2012).19 While facilitating the widespread adoption 
of the standard, the requirement reduces the firm’s ability of to benefit from exclusive use 
of the technology. Moreover, it eliminants the firm’s ability to block or slow rivals’ 
development along a lucrative technological trajectory or deter them from a technological 
space altogether (Clarkson & Toh, 2010). Fourth, by disclosing IP, the firm reveals 
valuable information about their patent portfolio and future technology strategies to rivals 
(Chiao et al., 2007). Moreover, during the standard setting process, knowledge beyond 
what is typically specified in the essential patent document can spillover to rivals 
(Rosenkopf et al, 2001). Such spillovers can further inform rivals of the focal firms’ 
technology strategy and facilitate imitation.20  
Returns from licensing essential IP may not fully compensate for the 
aforementioned costs. Most SSOs’ IP policies commit firms to FRAND licensing terms. 
While SSOs’ IP policies rarely define what counts as ‘fair and reasonable,’ some SSOs do 
place a ceiling on licensing rates. Even when rates are not capped, outcomes often represent 
a ‘middle-ground’ from negotiations that may not favor the disclosing firm (Updegrove, 
                                                 
19 If the firm fails to disclose certain patents or IP, it may still be obligated to abide by the SSO IP policy 
and license patents on a FRAND basis if it has participated in a standard setting committee for a certain 
amount of time (e.g. more than 60 days). 
20 From a conversation with an industry participant, we found that firms are aware of such spillovers and 
try to mitigate them by using managers with standards setting experience.  
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2007; Sidak, 2015). Some standards have patent pools, which represent an alternative to 
party-to-party negotiations. Patent pools allow a licensee to access all patents in the pool 
for one fee. Patent owners typically split revenue based on their proportion of patents in 
the pool. Firms with more important IP may receive less revenue than they otherwise would 
have under party-to-party negotiations. Moreover, royalty-free licensing is increasingly 
being used in many important standards (e.g. mobile browsing). Therefore, knowing the 
extent of the firm’s SEPs is only a first step in understanding how it creates value from its 
standard-setting activities.  
 
COMPLEMENTARY TECHNOLOIGES AND VALUE CREATION  
In this section, we discuss complementary technologies and how they affect value 
created from firm’s disclosures to SSOs. Two technologies are ‘complementary’ when they 
are compatible (i.e. co-function together) and when both are functioning, can create more 
value together than they do alone (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990; 1995; Toh and Miller, 
2017). Complementary technologies are often used jointly, as they can represent separate 
parts of a technological solution. For example, to solve the problem of sending data over a 
wireless network channel, Qualcomm developed a technology for ‘high rate packet data 
transmission’ (see patent US 6173007). The technology efficiently packeted data to better 
utilize the communication channel, and became an essential technology in the UMTS 
standard. However, the technology by itself did not allow for fair allocation of data speed 
to all users of the network. To solve the problem, Qualcomm created a complementary 
technology for generating optimal data packet lengths (patent: US 6064678) to complement 
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the data transmission technology. The technology was programmed into base station 
software which then ensures that all users get their fair share of data throughput, and 
therefore optimized the performance of the data transmission technology.  
 It is common for a firm to own and develop multiple complementary technologies 
within a technology ecosystem (Baldwin and Woodward, 2009; Toh and Miller, 2017). 
How the firm strategizes around these technologies to create value will depend on the 
location of the technologies in the system. In the standard setting context, a firm can 
leverage a technology’s position inside the standard to increase the value of nondisclosed 
technologies that are complementary. To illustrate the basic value creating strategy that 
underlies this argument, take the following example. Nokia included its innovation for 
encoding radio signals into the GSM communications standard, but is forced to license this 
technology to rivals. However, Nokia also developed a technology that works with its radio 
signal method to enhance the signal clarity in its mobile phones. Nokia embeds this 
proprietary technology into its phones, which allows users to experience better voice clarity 
when making calls, and therefore, differentiates Nokia’s phones from competitors. If a rival 
had placed a substitute technology in the standard, the value of Nokia’s signal clarity 
technology could be zero if Nokia’s technology was incompatible with the substitute. 
This example illustrates how the firm can utilize disclosed, standard essential 
technology to enhance the value of its undisclosed, complementary technologies. Several 
interrelated mechanisms drive the relationship. First is the increase in the compatibility 
between the firm’s technologies and the standard. Because a standard often defines the core 
technology platform in the industry, the value of technologies within the same domain will 
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depend on whether they function in conjunction with this platform (Baldwin and 
Woodward, 2009). When one technology becomes part of the industry standard, its 
complementary technologies become interoperable with the standard, which increases their 
value creating potential. The firm’s complementary technologies are also more likely to be 
interoperable with other complementary components in the system. Therefore, the firm 
with complementary technologies can more fully benefit from the coordination standards 
provide.  
Second, the firm increases its competitiveness by owning a portfolio of 
complementary technologies. At the individual technology level, compatibility with 
standard enhances potential users’ willingness-to-pay for complementary technologies,21 
which can have a positive effect on the firm’s competitiveness in several ways. For a firm 
that focuses on licensing technologies, the more technologies it has that are interoperable 
with the standard, the more likely it is to attract potential licensees. The larger the firm’s 
portfolio of complementary technologies, potentially the greater bargaining power it will 
have over licensees. A firm that produces products that function on the standard can embed 
its complementary technologies into the products to differentiate them. As noted in the 
prior example, Nokia increased consumers’ willingness-to-pay for its phones by utilizing 
its complementary technology to enhance voice clarity. Qualcomm designed its chipsets to 
optimize battery life on wireless networks that used its CDMA technology, thus 
differentiating the chipsets from those of competitors (Mock, 2005).  
                                                 
21 Because the firm may co-design both the disclosed and nondisclosed technologies together, the firm’s 
own complementary technology may represent the best way to harness the functionality of its disclosed 
technology. 
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By making its technologies compatible with the standard, the firm mitigates the 
need to convert its technologies to be compatible with rivals’ standards proposals, while 
potentially forcing rivals to do so (Eggers 2012). For example, Nokia did not have the same 
position in CDMA based wireless compunction standards as it did in TDMA based 
standards (as noted in the example at the beginning of the section). Nokia lacked 
complementary technologies needed to differentiate its CDMA mobile phones, and thus, 
exited the CDMA-based phone market to focus on the TDMA-based market.22 To compete 
in the same way in the CDMA-based phone market as it did in the TDMA-based market, 
Nokia would need to develop a similar set of technologies or licensee such technologies 
from rivals like Qualcomm and Motorola.  
Third, the firm is better positioned to gain from future development of the 
ecosystem surrounding the standard. New applications for the standard often develop in 
the surrounding technology ecosystem. The firm can adapt or further develop its 
complementary technologies to capitalize on new opportunities. For example, in the late 
2000s, products in many industries began to utilize wireless communications networks. 
Qualcomm built upon its previously established complementary technologies to meet the 
needs of industries such as automotive, home appliance, and health care.23  
                                                 
22 See, “Nokia to exit CDMA after scrapping Sanyo JV plans”, via http://www.itwire.com/it-industry-
news/strategy/4724-nokia-to-exit-cdma-after-scrapping-sanyo-jv-plans. [Last accessed, March 2017.] 
23 See for example the Qualcomm Incorporated press release from May 14, 2015: 
https://www.qualcomm.com/news/releases/2015/05/14-0. [Last accessed, March 2017.] 
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From these mechanisms, we draw our core hypothesis: the more non-disclosed 
technologies the firm has that are complementary to its disclosed technology, the greater 
the gain in firm value upon disclosure to SSOs.  
 
 
EMPRICAL ANALYSIS  
 
Data 
We conduct the empirical analysis in the information and communication 
technology (ICT) industry between 1988 and 2010. Standards are essential for many 
products within the ICT industry to function properly and many firms within the industry 
engage in standard-setting activities across multiple standards and SSOs. Example types of 
standards include: wireless telecommunication standards (e.g. GSM, GPRS, CDMA, 
WCDMA, LTE), local area networks (e.g. Wi-Fi), mobile browsing (e.g. xtml), and audio-
video compression (e.g. MPEG-4). 
We use multiple data sources in our analysis. Data on IP disclosures to standards 
comes from the Disclosed Standard Essential Patents (dSEP) database (Bekkers et al., 
2012). The dSEP Database includes the date of disclosure, the entity disclosing, the name 
of the standard or technical committee, the name of the SSO, and any disclosed patents. 
Patent data is collected from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). We obtain 
citations data by merging the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) (Hall et al., 
2001) patent citation data from the Patent Network Dataverse (Lai et al., 2013). We collect 
data on stock prices from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). Data on firm’s 
financials and SIC codes come from Compustat and firms’ 10Ks. We collect information 
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on mergers, acquisitions, and stock buybacks from Thomson SDC. We conduct our 
analysis using multiple samples at both the firm and patent level, and will separately detail 
how we construct the dependent variable and sample prior to each analysis. 
 
IP Disclosures & Complementary Technologies 
 To create the disclosure dataset, we use the dSEP database to identify 4,609 
disclosures events to 13 different SSOs between 1988 and 2010. Each disclosure event 
consists of one or more letters or emails to a given SSO on a single date indicating that the 
entity believes it owns IP essential for the functionality of a proposed standard. These 
disclosures can either contain information on specific patents or patent applications, or 
make a blanket disclosure.  
  To link the disclosure data to stock price information, we manually match the 
disclosure letters to publicly traded firms listed in the CRSP database, which results in 
2,882 disclosure events from 270 firms. Of these disclosure events, 1,012 (from 143 
different firms) have at least one U.S. patent or patent application. We identify 3,820 
granted U.S. patents, some of which were disclosed on more than one occasion. Table 2.1 
provides a summary of IP disclosures by SSO and information on the types of standards 
the SSO’s manages. 
The main independent variable, Complementary Technologies, captures the number 
of technologies the firm owns that are complementary to the disclosed IP. To identify 
complementarity, we rely on the established idea that inventions that draw on combinations 
of technologies reflect the complementarities between them (Fleming, 2001; Toh and 
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Miller, 2017). To apply this principal, we identify all the U.S. patents that the firm discloses 
during a disclosure event. We then trace all unique undisclosed patents that the firm owns 
that are co-cited with at least one of its disclosed patents prior to or in the year of the 
disclosure. We only count co-cited patents from a different technology class than the 
disclosed patent because patents in the same class may refer to different components of the 
same technology or to prior versions of the same technological concept, rather than 
complementarity across separate and distinct technologies (Makri et al., 2010). At the 
patent level, Complementary Technology is a binary variable that takes the value of one if 
the patent meets the above criteria. In our event study, Complementary Technologies 
measures the total number of patents meeting the above criteria that have not been 
previously disclosed to a standard.24  
We may underestimate complementarity because not all technologies are patented. 
However, focusing on the ICT industry, where patenting is important and patent propensity 
is likely similar across firms, helps mitigate this issue.  
 
Descriptive Analysis of Disclosure on Firm Performance 
We begin by investigating the broad relationship between IP disclosures and firm 
value. We draw a sample of firms in which standards in the ICT industry are likely relevant. 
We define this set as firms that patent in the 89 USPTO technology classes related to 
communications equipment as per the NBER concordance system. After matching with 
                                                 
24 We exclude patents that are previously disclosed because licensing requirements associated with such 
disclosures could restrict the firm’s ability to exercise IP rights over these patents.  
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Compustat and CRSP, we have an unbalanced panel of 412 firms with observations that 
span 1988-2010 period.  
 We measure firm performance using Tobin’s Q, which is widely used in the 
economics, finance, and management literatures (Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1986; 
Lang and Stulz, 1994). We calculate Tobin’s Q as the sum firm’s end of the year market 
value of equity and reported book value of total liabilities divided by the total book value 
of assets. To measure the effect of disclosure, we calculate the number of disclosure events 
the firm has in a year (Disclosure Events).  The measure should proxy for the number of 
different standard setting activities the firm participated in during the year.  
Panel A of Table 2.2 provides the descriptive statistics for the firm-year panel. 
Tobin’s Q averages 2.14 in the sample with a standard deviation of 2.7 and a median of 
1.54. Several small software and IP development firms have a Tobin’s Q greater than 20 
(for example, mobile internet IP firm Unwired Planet25).26 Their inclusion does not 
significantly change the analysis. On average, firms have 0.4 Disclosure Events per year. 
Approximately 12 percent of the firm-year observations have at least one disclosure event. 
 We control for various firm, industry, and technology related factors. We control 
for R&D spending and the firm’s patent stock over the past five-years (Total Patents) 
because highly research active firms are more likely to have technologies relevant to 
standards. We control for firm size using the natural log of total revenues (ln(Revenues)) 
and profitability using the firms Operating Margin.27 To account for industry, technology, 
                                                 
25 The firm was more commonly known as Openwave.  
26 Note that the max Tobin’s Q is 76. However, the 99th percentile value is only 10.  
27 Calculated as operating income (e.g. earnings before interest and taxes) over revenue 
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and year trends, we include fixed effects for the firm’s four digit SIC code, technology 
subclass for which the firm applies for patents in during the year, and year.  
 To assess the effect of the disclosure of standard essential technologies on firm 
performance, we regress Tobin’s Q on Disclosure Events and controls (Model 1 of Table 
2.3). We find negative but insignificant effect of Disclosure Events. To help suppress 
unobserved heterogeneity, such as the firm’s propensity to participate in standard setting 
activities, we rerun the model with firm-level fixed effects. In Model 2 of Table 2.3, we 
find that Disclosure Events is negative (-0.065), with a p-value of 0.063. These results 
suggest that, contrary to expectations from prior literature, disclosure of standard essential 
technologies may have a slight negative affect on firm performance. Using the estimate in 
Model 2, an additional disclosure event reduces Tobin’s Q by about 3 percent.28   
 Note that the negative correlation between disclosures and Tobin’s Q is not out of 
line with our expectations. As discussed previously, firms give up exclusivity and 
uniqueness of their standard essential IP and may not always receive sufficient licensing 
revenue in return. We argue, however, that firms can benefit when they own non-disclosed 
complementary technologies. To assess this potential effect on performance, we split 
Disclosure Events into two variables: disclosure events in which the firm does not have 
any traceable complementary technologies (Disclosures Events Without Comp. Tech.) and 
disclosure events in which the firm has at least one traceable complementary technology 
(Disclosures Events With Comp. Tech.).29 Disclosures Events Without Comp. Tech. is 
                                                 
28 Coefficient of -0.065 divided by mean Tobin’s Q of 2.14.  
29 Disclosure events include blanket disclosures, which may cause us to underreport the number of events 
with complementary technologies.  
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negative but statistically insignificant (-0.054; p-value 0.203) in Model 3 and negative and 
significant in the firm fixed effect estimation in Model 4 (-0.105; p-value 0.019). We find 
a positive effect significant at the 10 percent level for Disclosures Events With 
Complementary Technologies in Model 3 (0.122; p-value 0.088) and a positive but 
insignificant effect Model 4 (0.059; p-value 0.470). The results point to interesting 
heterogeneity related to having complementary technologies.  
A firm’s IP and standard strategy may change over time. To allow the fixed effect 
models to better absorb potential cofounding firm level effects, we break the long panel 
into three shorter panels (Models 5-7). We find that Disclosures Events Without Comp. 
Tech. is consistently negative in all three models and statistically significant in the 2003-
2010 period (Model 5), while the coefficient on Disclosures Events With Comp. Tech. is 
consistently positive in all three models and statistically significant at the 10 percent level 
in the 1996-2002 period (Model 6).  
To check whether the amount of disclosed IP drives the above results, we estimate 
how the total number of IP disclosures (either blanket letters or patents) in a year effects 
Tobin’s Q.30 We find results similar to Model 1, with IP Disclosed negative and statistically 
insignificant (see Model 8). Splitting the count of IP Disclosed by whether we can trace at 
least one complementary patent to the disclosure, Model 9 shows that IP Disclosed Without 
Comp. Tech. is negative and insignificant (-0.001; p-value 0.325) while IP Disclosed With 
Comp. Tech. is positive and significant (0.0009; p-value 0.012). Using coefficient for IP 
                                                 
30 To be clear, IP Disclosed measures the total number IP disclosures the firm makes in a year.  
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Disclosed With Comp. Tech from Model 9, a one standard deviation increase in the number 
of disclosures with complementary technologies increases Tobin’s Q by 2.5 percent.  
 Conventional wisdom suggests that firms benefit financially from disclosing 
patents that become essential to a standard (Pohlmann et al., 2015).  The results in this 
section provide a description of the IP disclosure-performance relationship that is contrary 
to this view. The results suggest a weak negative correlation between IP disclosure and 
performance. By investigating the variance across disclosure, we find some evidence that 
the negative correlation stems from disclosures that lack associated complementary 
technologies, and that disclosures with complementary technologies may be positively 
related to performance. This provides an empirical motivation for a more focused analysis 
of how complementarity technologies affect the disclosure-performance relationship. In 
the next sections, we attempt to better identify the effect of complementarity by performing 
more nuanced tests at the event level and at the patent level. 
 
Disclosure Event Study  
To provide a more specific test of value creation at the firm level, we use an event 
study approach to trace how the firm’s stock market value changes in response to its 
disclosure of standard essential IP. Equity market event studies are commonly used in 
economics, finance, and management research to assess the how events affect firm value 
(MacKinlay, 1997; McWilliams and Siegel, 1997). The approach assumes that capital 
markets receive information regarding the event and will efficiently incorporate this 
information into the firm’s stock price. IP disclosures in the ICT industry are usually made 
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public through online disclosure databases31 and are often simultaneously highlighted in 
press releases by the firm. We assume that investors monitor firms’ standard-setting 
activity (Aggarwal et al., 2011), as equity analysts commonly mention firms’ SEPs or 
recent developments in standards in their analyses (for example, see Sur, Peterson, and 
Chuang, 2015).32  
To estimate the impact of the disclosure event, we calculate daily abnormal returns 
using the Capital Asset Pricing Model. We calibrate the CAPM on 250 trading days prior 
to the beginning of the event window, using the S&P 500 as the market index.33 The main 
dependent variable, CAR, is the cumulative abnormal return in the t-1, t0, t+1 event 
window, where t0 is the day of the disclosure. We focus on the typical three-day window 
because its tends to capture most of the market’s reaction to the event (MacKinlay, 1997). 
It also decreases the likelihood that the event window picks up the market reaction to other, 
confounding news. For robustness, we also provide estimates for several other window 
lengths.  
We begin by analyzing CAR for the full sample of 2,732 disclosures from firms 
with available stock price data during the 1988-2010 period. In Panel A of Table 2.4, we 
test whether the average CAR equals zero using a t-test. Test 1 shows that the average three-
                                                 
31 For example, European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), which has overseen the 
standardization of telecommunication standards such as the GSM cellular standard, lists IP disclosures on 
its website as they are made (see https://ipr.etsi.org/). 
32 Prior work also supports the assumption that equity market participants monitor standard-setting activity. 
For example, Aggarwal et al., (2011) show that the equity market reacts to announcements of a firm’s 
participation in information technology standards. We also observe that firms position in standards or 
changes in SSO policies trigger updated stock reports and ratings. For example, the recent change the IEEE 
patent policy triggered updated research and outlooks on Broadcom and Marvell (Sur et al., 2015).  
33 The CAPM regresses the firm’s risk adjusted returns on the benchmark return. The risk-free rate is 
specified using the daily interest factor from that day’s three-month Treasury Bill rate. As a robustness 
check, we calibrate the CAPM models using 500 daily trading days, all results are robust.  
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day CAR is negative and significantly different from zero (-0.30 percent; p-value 0.002). 
Tests 2-5 replicate the test for longer windows. As we increase the window length, average 
CAR continues to be negative but is only significantly different than zero in five-day 
window (Test 3).  
In Panel B of Table 2.4, we replicate the t-tests on a sample of disclosures with 
traceable U.S. patents and no confounding events in the estimation window. To remove 
events, we do the following. First, we use data from Thomson SDC to exclude observations 
with any merger or acquisition related announcement34 or stock repurchase in the event 
window. Next, we remove observations with other IP disclosures in the event window. 
Finally, using a LexisNexus search, we remove any observations in which another 
important announcement (e.g. earnings, earnings guidance, lawsuits) occurred in the 
window. This results in a sample consisting of 123 firms making 752 IP disclosures in 
‘clean’ three-day windows. T-tests on this sample (Tests 6-10) show that the average CAR 
is positive across all windows, but not significantly different from zero.  
To probe how complementary technologies influence the return from disclosure, 
we split the sample from Table 2.4 Panel B into two groups: observations with and 
observations without at least one complementary patent. For the three-day window (Test 1 
of Table 2.5), we find a positive and significant CAR (0.53 percent; p-value 0.02) when the 
firm owns Complementary Technologies and a negative and significant CAR (-0.66 
percent; p-value 0.01) when the firm has no Complementary Technologies. Testing the 
equality of means using Welch’s t-test, we find that CAR is 1.19 percentage points greater 
                                                 
34 This also includes announcements of a withdrawal from a merger.  
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when the firm has Complementary Technologies than when it does not, and that the 
difference in means is statistically significant (p-value 0.003). We find a broadly similar 
pattern in the other windows (Tests 2-5). Firms typically have a positive CAR when they 
own Complementary Technologies and a negative CAR when they do not. For all the 
windows, we find a statistically significant difference in the means of the two subsamples.  
 
Event Study Regression Analysis  
In this section, we use a regression analysis to more closely examination of how 
Complementary Technologies affect returns to disclosure. We use the sample of 752 
disclosures with traceable patents and no confounding actions in the event window.  
We begin by describing the variables used in the analysis. As discussed before, 
Complementary Technologies provides a count of the number of patents complementary to 
the firm’s disclosed patents. To account for how much IP the firm disclosed to the SSO, 
we calculate IP Disclosed as the sum of the disclosed patents and blanket disclosures.  
We propose that the firm can benefit from disclosing IP by creating compatibility 
between its portfolio technologies and the standard. However, when the firm’s technologies 
are complementary to rivals’ proposed solutions for the standard, the firm may reap the 
gains from compatibility regardless of whose IP becomes essential to the standard. To 
account for this, we first identify all patents from other firms over the prior three years that 
are in the same technology class as the focal firm’s disclosed IP. To calculate Compatibility 
With Rivals, we count all of the focal firm’s patents that are co-cited with the identified set 
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of other firms’ patents.35 We exclude co-citations between patents in the same technology 
class so to not include patents covering the same technology.   
We include various firm, technology, and environmental factors as controls. Firms 
with more patents may be more likely to have Complementary Technologies and could 
have more valuable disclosures, so we control for the firm’s total patents in the five-years 
prior to disclosure (Total Patents). To control for the firm’s size and overall profitability 
we include the natural log of revenues (ln(Revenues)) and Operating Margin36 in the year 
prior to disclosure. Some types of standards may create more value than others. To account 
for this, we aggregate the standards in to three areas. Telecommunications standards that 
cover mobile phone networks, such as GSM, and local area networks, such as Wi-Fi. 
Information technology standards that cover internet standards and computer connectivity 
standards (e.g. firewire). The third bucket covers the 4 percent of the remaining disclosures, 
and is comprised of audio-visual standards and electrical standards. We also control for the 
industry and year of disclosure.  
Panel B of Table 2.2 provides the descriptive statistics and correlations for the 
sample. On average, firms make 29 IP disclosures per event. Of the 752 disclosure events, 
527 have Complementary Technologies greater than zero, with an average of 42 and a 
standard deviation of 119. Firms in the sample are highly research active, with an average 
of 2,714 patents applications over five years prior to disclosure.  
                                                 
35 For example, if the focal firm only discloses in technology class A during the disclosure event, then 
Compatibility With Rivals measures how many of its patents that are not from technology class A are co-
cited with rivals’ patents from technology class A.  
36 Operating income divided by revenues 
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  Table 2.6 provides the baseline estimates of the return to disclosure. We begin by 
analyzing the return to disclosure using the constant and IP Disclosed. In the univariate 
model (Model 1), we find a positive and significant effect of IP Disclosed. We also find a 
positive and significant effect for Complementary Technologies in a univariate estimation 
(Model 2). Adding both variables in Model 3, Complementary Technologies remains 
positive and significant and while IP Disclosed becomes negative and insignificant. The 
constant, which proxies for the average return to disclosure, is positive but insignificant. 
The results in Model 3 suggests that it is not disclosures per se or the amount of IP disclosed 
that drive positive returns. Instead, positive returns stem from having a portfolio of 
technologies that become complementary to the standard. This result is consistent with the 
t-tests from Table 2.5.   
Model 5 displays the fully specified model. We find a positive and significant effect 
of Complementary Technologies (0.004; p-value 0.032). Using this estimate, a one standard 
deviation increase in Complementary Technologies increases the three-day CAR by 
approximate 0.48 percent. To put the estimate into perspective, the average market value 
for firms in the sample without adjusting for inflation is $68.3 billion. Therefore, a 0.48 
percent return equates to an increase in market value of $328 million over three days. 
Notice that Operating Margin is surprisingly negative and significant. This is due 
to the presence of one outlier that had a very negative operating margin (-78 percent). 
Removing this observation and rerunning Model 5, Operating Margin becomes 
insignificant while the coefficient on Complementary Technologies remains similar (0.004; 
p-value 0.032).  
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Sensitivity Analysis  
We conduct several sensitivity analyses. In Model 6 we include a SSO fixed effect 
and obtain similar results (Complementary Technologies coefficient of 0.004; p-value 
0.027).37  We also rerun Model 5 with different event widows and find similar results (see 
Models 7-9).  
Event studies assume that CAR can accurately be estimated using some model of to 
adjust returns for market risk factors. However, the precisions in which the benchmark 
accounts for typical returns in the stock can vary. To account for this, we run the full model 
using weighted least squares (Model 10), using the precision of the estimated abnormal 
returns as weights38 (Girotra, Terwiesch, and Ulrich, 2007). The estimates remain robust.  
To check the sensitivity of our results to the chosen benchmark model (CAPM 
using S&P 500 as benchmark), we rerun the full model with abnormal returns calculated 
using a CAPM with the CRSP market weighted index as a benchmark. We also estimate 
abnormal returns using a Fama-French three factor model (MacKinlay, 1997). While not 
shown, results remain robust. We also check the sensitivity to the calibration window 
length. Instead of 250 day CAPM we use a 500 day CAPM and find similar results.  
 
Selection into Complementary Technologies 
Unobserved factors, such as differences in firms IP strategy or differences in their 
ability to create complementary technologies could affect both returns to disclosure and 
likelihood of having complementary technologies. To help suppress these concerns, we 
                                                 
37 In fact, all results in Table 6 remain robust to the inclusion of SSO fixed effects.  
38 The weight is calculated as 1/(1- R-Square), where R-Square is from the CAPM model.   
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take advantage of within-firm variation across disclosures by rerunning the full model 
using firm fixed effects. In the firm-event panel there are approximately six disclosure 
events per firm. Amongst firms with Complementary Technologies in at least one 
disclosure, the average within-firm coefficient of variation for Complementary 
Technologies is 110 percent. Other variables also exhibit some within-firm variation.39 
Model 11 of Table 2.6 presents the fixed effect estimates for the entire sample. We find a 
positive and significant effect for Complementary Technologies (0.004; p-value 0.011).  
Because firms’ strategies and abilities likely change over time, a firm fixed effects 
can more effectively account for unobserved factors when the panel is shorter. We rerun 
the fixed effect model on the 2003-2010 sample. The sample begins after the dot-com 
bubble and telecommunication sector stock crash, and comprises about three quarters of 
our sample (Model 12). We find a positive and significant effect for Complementary 
Technologies (0.004; p-value 0.019).  
We also attempt to suppress the potential selection effect stemming from 
differences in firms’ ability to create complementary technologies by directly estimating 
this propensity. We do this using the inverse probability-weighted regression adjustment 
(IPWRA) model (Wooldridge, 2007, Elfenbein et al., 2010). To conduct the IPWRA 
analysis, we separate the sample into treated and untreated groups, by first converting 
Complementary Technologies into a binary variable indicating whether the firm-disclosure 
observation has complementary technologies (value=1) or not (value=0). In the 1st stage, 
we estimate the propensity to have technologies complementary to the disclosure using a 
                                                 
39 For example, the mean within-firm coefficient of variation is 58% for IP Disclosures, 122% for 
Operating Margin, 27% for revenues.   
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logit regression. The inverse of the predicted propensity is then used as a weight in two 
separate 2nd stage models, one for the treated (firms with complementary technologies) and 
one for the untreated (no complementary technologies). Each 2nd stage model uses a linear 
regression to estimate CAR. We estimate parameters of the treated (untreated) 2nd stage 
model using only observations with complementary technologies (no complementary 
technologies).40 These parameters essentially tell us how the control variables adjust 
returns for disclosure for the treated (untreated) firms. This estimation is robust to 
misspecification of one of the models in either 1st or 2nd stage (Wooldridge, 2007).41 
To determine the effect of complementary technologies, we calculate the average 
treatment effect on the treated (ATET), which estimates the additional return from 
disclosure the firm receives from having complementary technologies as compared to if 
the same firm had not had complementary technologies. To calculate treatment effect on 
the treated, we enter each treated observation separately into the two 2nd stage (treated and 
untreated) models, and predict two respective CARs. We then calculate the difference in 
                                                 
40 The three equations comprise an exactly identified system of equations that can be handled by generalized 
method of moments. The exact specifications are as follows. Let the 1st stage logit estimate of the propensity 
of the firm having complementary technologies be given by 𝑝(𝑧𝑖 , 𝑐𝑖  , 𝛾) = [ 
𝑔(𝑧 𝑖?̂?
′) [𝜏𝑖−𝐺(𝑧 𝑖?̂?
′)]
𝐺(𝑧𝑖?̂?
′)[1−𝐺(𝑧 𝑖?̂?
′)]
] 𝑧𝑖  where the 
z variables are the predictors of the treatment effect, 𝑐𝑖 is a binary indicator of the treatment, 𝐺(𝑧) is the 
cumulative distribution function (cdf) for the logit, and 𝑔(. ) is probability distribution function given by the 
partial derivative of the cdf with respect to z. From the propensity score model, we derive the inverse 
probability weight, 𝑤𝑖(𝑐), which is equal to the inverse of 𝑝(𝑧𝑖 , 𝑐𝑖  , 𝛾) in treated model and the inverse of 1- 
𝑝(𝑧𝑖  , 𝑐𝑖  , 𝛾) in the untreated model. The conditional outcomes for the linear treated and untreated models are 
estimated using the following equation: 𝑢𝑐{𝑥𝑖, ?̂?𝑖, 𝑤𝑖(𝑐)} =  𝑤𝑖(𝑐)𝑐𝑖[𝑦 𝑖− (𝑥 𝑖?̂?
′)]𝑥𝑖. We do not report the 
propensity score, treated and untreated model output, as interpreting their coefficients do not directly shed 
light on our overall prediction.  
41 Consistent estimates of the treatment effect are based on two assumptions. First, conditional on 
observables, the conditional mean of disclosure for treated and untreated firms is independent of the 
treatment. Second, for similar values of the observables, there are firms that will have complement 
technologies and firms what will not. This second assumption is also referred to as the overlap or common 
domain assumption. Together, these two assumptions provide a weak condition for ‘strong ignorability’ 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983).  
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predicted CARs for the same observation, weighted by the inverse propensity score. This 
difference shows how much the treatment (complementary technologies) has changed the 
return to disclosure for that one observation (estimated via the treatment model 
parameters), compared to itself without treatment (estimated via the control model 
parameters). ATET is the average of this difference over all treated observations. 
To estimate the 1st stage, covariates are chosen based on maximizing model fit and 
to control for potential confounding factors. Firms with broader patenting scope (Scope42), 
larger patent stock (Total Patents over the prior five years), and higher R&D should be 
more likely to have Complementary Technologies. Firms with greater Capital Expenditure 
Intensity43 or Property Plant & Equipment may be advantaged in downstream competition, 
thus may be more likely to disclose without complementary technologies. We also include 
IP Disclosed, ln(Revenues), Operating Margin, and fixed effects for the standards type, 
technology subcategory and year. We estimate 2nd stage models using the same control 
variables as Model 4 of Table 2.6.  
We report the estimates of ATET in the Table 2.7. The 1st stage, while not shown, 
predicts the propensity to have Complementary Technologies reasonably well, with a 
Pseudo R-squared of 0.38. Model 1 of Table 2.7 shows a statistically and economically 
significant ATET (1.37 percent; p-value of 0.01) for the three-day window. We find similar 
results for the other windows (Models 2-4). Overall, as we attempt to suppress potential 
                                                 
42 We calculate scope as 1-Herfindal index of firm’s patents across different technology classes. Higher 
scope indicates the firm patents more broadly.  
43 Calculated as total capital expenditures divided by total revenues.  
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selection concerns, our estimated effect of Complementary Technologies on CAR remains 
robust.  
 
Demonstrating the Compatibility and Competitiveness Mechanisms 
 In this section, we provide empirical support for two mechanisms that underlie our 
theoretical argument: compatibility and competitiveness. We begin by highlighting the 
effect of compatibility with the standard on returns to disclosure.  
The firm can benefit from creating compatibility between its portfolio of 
technologies and the standard. To do so, the firm needs to have its technological proposal 
(which has non-disclosed complementary technologies) accepted by the standard. 
However, when the firm’s complementary technology is compatible with rivals’ substitute 
proposals, the compatibility based benefit from disclosure should decline. This is because 
the focal firm’s technology will be compatible with the standard even if the firm does not 
disclose standard essential technology.  
To test this mechanism, we interact Complementary Technologies with 
Compatibility With Rivals. Compatibility With Rivals measures how many of the firm’s 
non-disclosed patents are compatible with rivals’ patents in the same technology class as 
the firm’s disclosed patents. High values of Compatibility With Rivals indicates that the 
focal firm patents would likely be compatible with rivals’ alternative proposals for the 
standard. We expect that as Compatibility With Rivals increases, the likelihood the firm 
would have technology compatible with the standard increases, even if the firm did not 
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disclose technology to the standard. Therefore, when Compatibility With Rivals is high, the 
firm would likely accrue the benefits of compatibility even without disclosure.  
In Model 1 of Table 2.8, we find a positive and significant effect for 
Complementary Technologies (0.005; p-value 0.009) and a negative and significant effect 
of the interaction between Complementary Technologies and Compatibility With Rivals (-
0.00001; p-value 0.021). Using the estimates of Model 1, a one standard deviation increase 
in Complementary Technologies increases CAR by 0.55 percent when Compatibility With 
Rivals is zero. The return declines to 0.38 percent when Compatibility With Rivals increases 
by one standard deviation. The return falls to zero when Compatibility With Rivals reaches 
the 95 percentile. At high levels of Compatibility With Rivals, the firm receives little 
compatibility based benefit from disclosure.44   
Next, we explore how complementary technologies can affect the competitiveness 
of the firm. We argue that complementary technologies enhance the firm’s ability to 
compete against rivals across the various product markets that the standard enables. 
Therefore, the saliency of this mechanism will depend on the level of competition the firm 
faces. As the market tends towards monopoly, the marginal benefit the dominant firm 
accrues from an additional complementary technology should be small because the firm 
already has a strong market position. In more competitive markets, the marginal benefit of 
an additional complement technology should be larger. Thus, to highlight our mechanism, 
we test how complementary technologies impact returns to disclosure under different levels 
of market competition.  
                                                 
44 We rerun the analysis by calculating Compatibility With Rivals over five-years instead of three-years, 
results remain fully robust.  
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To proxy for a market’s competitiveness, we utilize the sales concentration in the 
firm’s four-digit SIC code. This empirical strategy maps well to firms that primarily 
compete in products markets downstream from the standard, but may not capture 
competition for upstream-focused, technology licensers. Hence, we focus our analysis on 
downstream firms for which sales concentration in the four-digit SIC industry is a valid 
proxy of competitive conditions. We classify a firm as ‘downstream’ if it primarily 
produces products that function on the standard (e.g. Nokia and Motorola) or if it must 
adopt a standard to service its customers (e.g. AT&T).45 Alternatively, we classify a firm 
as ‘upstream’ if it primarily develops and licenses technologies (e.g. Interdigital and 
Intellectual Ventures LLC) or if it focuses on both licensing technologies and the 
development of components for downstream firms (e.g. Qualcomm and Broadcom).46 
We begin the analysis by analyzing the full downstream sample (Model 2). We find 
that Complementary Technologies is positive but only significant at the 10% level (0.006; 
p-value 0.089). Differences in downstream market competition may account for the weaker 
significance level. To test whether this is the case and to highlight the competitive 
mechanism, we split the downstream sample into two subsamples based on competitive 
conditions in the market. To proxy for competitive conditions in the firm’s downstream 
product market we use an established measure of market competition, the Herfindahl-
                                                 
45 For a wireless communications standard, firms that only offer technologies (Interdigital) and ones that 
offer technology and components like chipsets (Qualcomm) are upstream firms, while firms that primarily 
make standard based products such as base stations, routers, switch gear, and handsets (Alcatel, Ericsson, 
Nokia, and Motorola) are downstream firms.  
46 This includes most semiconductor firms that actively create technologies for standards but rarely product 
products that adopt the standard or must license standard essential technologies to function.   
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Hirschman Index (HHI)47 of market share in the firm’s four-digit SIC industry. We then 
create the two subsamples based on the U.S. Justice department’s standard for a highly 
concentrated market (an HHI greater than or equal to 2,500).48 The high (low) 
concentration subsample will proxy for a less (more) competitive downstream market.  
We find a positive but insignificant effect for Complementary Technologies in the 
high HHI subsample (Model 3). The result indicates that Complementary Technologies 
benefit firms’ competitive position less in highly concentrated markets. Put differently, a 
firm with a large market share already has a strong competitive position in the market and 
the marginal benefit of Complementary Technologies on its competitive position is 
minimal.  
In a more competitive market (HHI < 2,500; Model 3), we find a positive and 
significant effect for Complementary Technologies (0.007; p-value 0.046). Complementary 
Technologies enhance a firm’s position in a competitive market. The estimated effect is 
almost twice the size of the baseline estimate from Table 2.6-Model 5. In a competitive 
market, increasing Complementary Technologies by one standard deviation results in a 0.7 
percentage point increase in CAR.  
If Complementary Technologies enhance competitiveness (and thus, returns to 
disclosure), then we should observe a high marginal benefit for firms with small market 
shares in highly concentrated markets. To test this conjecture, we interact Complementary 
Technologies with the ln(Revenues) in the high concentration sample (i.e. HHI >= 2,500). 
                                                 
47 The HHI is calculated as the sum of squared market shares for all firms in the market. The number ranges 
from 0 to 10,000 if the market shares are expressed as whole numbers.  
48 Please see the United States Department of Justice website: https://www.justice.gov/atr/herfindahl-
hirschman-index. [Last accessed April 10, 2017]. 
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Model 5 shows a positive and significant effect for Complementary Technologies (0.211; 
p-value 0.001) and a negative and significant effect for its interaction with ln(Revenues) (-
0.019; p-value 0.001). To put the results in perspective, a one standard deviation increase 
in Complementary Technologies (about 75 patents using the high concentration sample) 
results in a CAR of 7 percent when the firm has revenue in the lower 5th percentile of the 
sample, holding all else constant. CAR declines to 3 percent when revenues increase to the 
25th percentile, 0.45 percent at the 75th percentile, and -0.28 percent at the 95th percentile. 
The results suggest that in a concentrated market, the firm with a dominant market position 
will likely benefit from the standard regardless of whether they own complementary 
technologies, while the firm with a small market share will greatly enhance its competitive 
position through complementary technologies.  
In Models 6-8 we rerun the previous analysis using a typical alternative to the HHI, 
the four-firm concentration ratio. We use 75 percent four-firm market share to denote high 
concentration and find robust results.   
Before concluding, we conduct two robustness checks. We first test for whether we 
need to control for the firm’s business model in our main analysis. To do so, we code the 
dummy, Downstream Firm, one if the firm meets our downstream criteria and zero if it 
meets the upstream criteria. Model 9 of Table 2.7 shows that Downstream Firm is negative 
but insignificant. Next, we check to see if our proposed effect holds in the upstream 
subsample. For upstream firms (Model 10), we find a positive and significant effect for 
Complementary Technologies (0.01; p-value 0.018). A one standard deviation increase in 
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upstream firms’ Complementary Technologies increases the three-day CAR by 1.01 
percent.  
In sum, results in Table 2.8 provide some empirical support for our assertion that 
Complementary Technologies enhance returns to disclosure through two of our proposed 
mechanisms: compatibility and competitiveness.  
 
The Patent-Level Analysis of Value Creation 
 In this section, we analyze how technologies become more valuable once they 
become complementary to the standards. We propose that after the firm discloses 
technology to the standard, its complementary technologies will increase in value. 
Demonstrating our proposed effect at the patent level helps underscore how value is created 
at the firm level.  
Analyzing value creation at the patent level also allows us to bypass some potential 
confounding issues at the firm level. In some instances, we may under report 
complementarity at the firm level if the firm has complementary technologies to its IP 
covered in blanket disclosures, because we cannot observe such IP from the disclosure 
letter alone. Our analysis at the patent level allows us to bypass this issue by precisely 
linking the disclosed technology to its complementary technologies. At the patent level, we 
can also suppress selection concerns related to unobservable firm-level factors that 
influence the decision to disclose technology to a standard, by comparing similar 
complementary and non-complementary technologies within the firm’s own portfolio.  
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 To investigate how becoming complementary to the standard creates value at the 
technology level, we analyze a patent’s received citations (also known as forward 
citations). Received citations—citations a patent receives from other patent applications—
is an established measure of economic and technological value in the strategy and 
economics literature (Harhoff et al., 1999; Jaffe and Trajtenberg 2004; Allison et al., 2004; 
Hall et al., 2005) and has been used to understand the effect of standards on the value of 
disclosed IP (Rysman & Simcoe, 2008; Simcoe et al., 2009).49  
 We begin by analyzing the effect of becoming ‘complementary to the standard’ for 
a sample of 9,824 complementary patents. We collect a seven-year panel for each patent. 
At time t0, the firm discloses the standard essential IP, which makes the complementary 
patent compatible with the standard. The sample ranges from three-years prior to three-
years after the year of disclosure. We drop any patents that do not have all seven years of 
citation data. We only include the first time a patent is complementary to a disclosure. 
Complementary Technology takes the value of one once the patent becomes 
complementary to the standard and zero otherwise. Age measures the time in years between 
the application date and time t. Because the typical patent exhibits a humped shaped 
relationship between citations and age, we also control for Age Squared (Hall et al., 2002; 
Mehtra, Rysman, and Simcoe, 2010). Results are very similar if we use grant date instead 
of application date to calculate our age controls.  
                                                 
49 Hall et al. (2005) find a firm’s market value is more highly correlated with its citation weighted patent 
stock than its unweighted patent stock. Rysman & Simcoe (2008) use forward citations to measure the 
value of standard essential patents.  
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 We estimate the effect of becoming complementary using a fixed effect Poisson 
model.  Model 1 of Table 2.9 displays the results for the full sample. The coefficient on 
Complementary Technology is positive and significant (0.133; p-value 0.000). Patents 
experience a 13.3 percent jump in citations once they become complementary to the 
standard via the firm’s IP disclosure. To see if this trend differs across time, we separate 
the sample into two groups. Model 2 shows the sample of patents between 1988 and 2002. 
Patents see an 8.6 percent yearly bump in citations once they become complementary to a 
standard. This effect increases in the years after the dot-com and telecommunications crash 
(Model 3). Patents in this period experience a 32 percent increase in citations once they 
become complementary to a standard.  
 Prior literature finds that SEPs increase I values post-standard (Rysman and 
Simcoe, 2008). To benchmark these results, we estimate the effect on citations from 
disclosure to a standard on a sample 1,683 disclosed patents. We use the same sampling 
strategy and control variables as before. From Model 4 of Table 2.9, we find that a patent 
receives a 14 percent yearly increase in citations once it is disclosed to a standard. The 
result is similar to the estimate for complementary technologies in Model 1 (13.3 percent). 
Comparing the complementary technologies verse SEPs in the different periods, we find 
complementary technologies experience a smaller post-standard increase in the 1988-2002 
period (8.6 percent vs. 15.3 percent) and a larger post-standard bump in the 2003-2010 
period (32 percent vs. 16.2 percent).  
 Firms that disclose to standards may raise the visibility of their entire technological 
portfolio. In the prior analysis, we use the patent own history as the counterfactual. With 
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this analysis alone, we cannot tell if the increase in citations stems from being 
complementary to the standard or from some firm wide effect related to standards 
participation. To tease out this possibility, we compare patents that become complementary 
to the standard to a control group comprised of one or more of the firm’s similar, but non-
complementary patents.  
To conduct the test, we proceed as follows. For each complementary patent, we 
assemble a set of potential control patents that are from the same firm, technology class, 
and application year. Then, we match complementary patents to one or more of these 
control patents using three variables: Received Citationst-3 to t-1, Backward Citations and 
Breadth of Citations. Received Citationst-3 to t-1 is calculated as the number of citations the 
patent received over the three years prior to the disclosure date (t0), and proxies for the 
value of the patent prior to the disclosure event. Backward Citations measures the number 
of citations made by each patent, which captures the depth of knowledge used (Lanjouw 
and Schankerman, 2004). Breadth of Citations measures the number of different 
technology classes cited by the patent, which serves as a proxy for the diversity of 
knowledge used in the invention (Toh and Miller, 2017). We match the treated patent (i.e. 
patent that is complementary) to a minimum of one ‘nearest neighbor’ untreated (non-
complementary) patent within the set, based on the lowest Mahalnobis Distance on these 
three variables.50 Upon creating these matches, we compute the bias-adjusted average 
treatment effect on the treated51 (Abadie et al. 2004, Abadie and Imbens, 2011).  ATET 
                                                 
50 When there are multiple untreated patents within the set with the same distance, the matching algorithm 
takes the average across them. 
51 Nearest neighbor match using continuous covariates is nonparametric, which makes it flexible. However, 
it also converges at a rate less than √𝑁, which makes it potentially inconsistent even in infinitely large 
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indicates how many more citations a patent with complementary technologies receives as 
compared to its counterfactual created from an almost identical non-complementary 
patent(s). 
 Table 2.10 Panel A provides the results of the within-firm matching. From Test 1, 
we find that becoming complementary to the standard increases the number of citations 
received in t0 to t+3 window by 1.59 (p-value 0.000). ATET increases as we increase the 
window length (2.5 in Test 2 and 3.41 in Test 3).  
 We also rerun the within-firm analysis with the percent change in citations as the 
dependent variable. Test 1 in Panel B show that results for the percent change in citations 
t0 to t+3 over t-1 to t-4. Patents that become complementary to the standard have 
approximately 12 percentage point larger increase in citations than a counterfactual derived 
from the firm’s similar, but non-complementary patents.52 We find similar results for the 
other windows (see Tests 2-4 in Panel B). The results in Table 2.10 suggest that patents 
that become complementary to a standard become more important than similar patents 
from the same firm. These estimates are in line with the fixed effect analysis. Therefore, 
we are more confident that the prior results are driven primarily by the effect of 
complementarity not an unobserved factor that influences the firm’s entire portfolio of 
patents.  
 
                                                 
samples. To correct for this potential inconsistency, we use the adjustment that makes the estimate √𝑁 − 
consistent and asymptotically normal. This basically combines our nearest neighbor matching and a 
regression adjustment to create the counterfactual (see Abadie and Imbens 2011, pages 3 and 4 for the exact 
formula). 
52 The result is approximate to a difference-in-difference analysis.  
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Complementary Technologies and the Firm’s Technological Trajectory 
 We argue that having complementary technologies places the firm in a better 
position to gain from the future development of the ecosystem surrounding the standard. A 
firm may do so by building on the knowledge underlying its complementary technologies. 
This suggest that we should observe firms citing their complementary patents more than 
similar, but non-complementary patents.  
 To assess the empirical support for this mechanism, we begin by analyzing the 
probability that the firm will cite a complementary patent as compared to a similar, non-
complementary patent. To conduct the analysis, we create a firm-patent-event sample, 
where for each disclosure event, we observe all the firms patent applications and granted 
patents at the time of the disclosure. Our dependent variable Self-Cite, takes the value of 
one if the firm cites a patent in the three years after disclosing to a standard and zero 
otherwise.53 Complementary Technology takes the value of one if the patent is 
complementary to a patent disclosed to the standard and is zero otherwise.  
We then run a logit model controlling for Backward Citations, Breadth of Citations, 
application year, technology class, and year. Model 1 of Table 2.11 displays the average 
partial effects (APE) from the logit model. Becoming complementary increases the 
probability of being cited by 16.5 percent (0.165 APE for Complementary Technology). If 
we add a control for Received Citationst-3 to t-1 (Model 2) or in addition, add firm fixed 
effects (Model 3), the APE for Complementary Technology remains positive and 
significant (9.5 percent, p-value 0.000).  
                                                 
53 For a firm, we observe Self Cite in the three-year window for all the firm’s patents.  
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 As a robustness check, we employ a nearest-neighbor matching model as described 
in the previous section. We separate the sample into ‘treated’ patents (i.e. Complementary 
Technology equal to one) and ‘untreated’ patents (i.e. Complementary Technology equal to 
zero). Then for each treated patent, we match one or more untreated patents from a sample 
that comes from the same firm, application year, and technology class using a nearest 
neighbor’ match based on the lowest Mahalnobis Distance on these three variable 
(Backward Citations, Breadth of Citations and Received Citationst-3 to t-1). While not shown, 
the resulting ATET is 7.73 percent (p-value of 0.000). The results suggest that firms are 
more likely to build on their complementary patents than on other, similar patents in their 
portfolio.  
 We conduct two additional robustness checks. In Model 4, we estimate how 
Complementary Technology affects the number of self-citations a patent receives in the 
three years after the firm discloses to a standard. Using the same sample and control set as 
Model 3, our firm-fixed effect Poisson estimates show that complementary patents receive 
about 75 percent more citations than similar non-complementary patents (coefficient on 
Complementary Technology 0.746, p-value 0.000).   
 The prior results could be biased if we cannot control for unobserved factors at the 
technology level that can make a patent more central to the firm’s technology strategy. To 
help suppress these concerns, we estimate a seven-year panel of self-citations using a 
sample of patents that become complementary to the standard. This is the same strategy 
used in Table 2.9, except we use the yearly number of self-citations as the dependent 
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variable. From Model 5, we find that when a patent becomes complementary to a standard, 
the number of yearly self-citations increases by 18.4 percent (p-value of 0.000).54 
We also compare the likelihood of self-cites between the firm’s SEPs and 
complementary technologies. To do this, we rerun the analysis in Model 1 but use SEPs as 
the control group for complementary technologies. In Model 6, we analyze the probability 
the firm will self-cite a patent in the three-years following disclosure. We find that the firm 
has a 5.2 pp greater propensity to cite complementary technologies than SEPs (p-value 
0.000). Controlling for technology class, the effect remains positive and significant (4.1 
pp; p-value 0.000). Rerunning the analysis using citation counts provides similar 
conclusions.  
 Our results in this section suggest that complementary technologies become central 
to a firm’s post-standard technological trajectory. However, we interpret this analysis with 
caution, as the firm, by building on the standard essential technology, may also cite the 
complementary technology. Hence we cannot be certain that effect found in the previous 
analysis is not spurious.55 To probe this effect, we calculate the proportion of the firm’s 
patents that cite complementary patents after the disclosure event that also cite one or more 
of the firm’s own disclosed SEPs. We find that only 10.6 percent do so. The evidence 
suggests that the self-citation analysis indicate that firms are strategically building on their 
complementary technologies, not just the SEPs.  
                                                 
54 Note that the sample in Model 5 (4,880 patents) is smaller than the sample used in Model 1 of Table 2.9 
(9,824). This is because all outcomes (self-citations) for discrepancy (4,944 patents) are zero. The low self-
citation count can be explained partially by the fact that the 4,944 excluded patents are significantly older 
than the 4,880 included patents at the time of disclosure (8.8 years vs. 6.8 years).  
55 Firms may build on their platform of SEP technologies and just happen to cite the complementary 
technology.  
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Discussion Regarding Firms’ Selection into Disclosure  
As disclosures are endogenous firm choices, there may be selection issues in our 
firm-level estimations that are not adequately addressed through fixed effects models and 
event windows. Hence, we interpret our firm-level estimates with caution because we do 
not account for selection into disclosure. Arguably any observable factor that would 
influence the firm’s decision to disclosure would also correlate with the returns to 
disclosure, making it difficult to find a suitable instrument to identify the selection 
threshold.  
Nevertheless, selection bias may not undermine our analysis. In our sample, firms 
that disclose without complementary technologies tend to be the same firms that disclose 
with complementary technologies. Hence, we do not compare firms of different ‘types,’ 
rather, we compare different instances of disclosure. If selection of technology proposals 
by the committee members is not correlated with the proposal owner’s complementary 
technologies, then disclosures without complementary technologies could potentially be a 
suitable control for disclosures with complementary technologies.  
A concern is the possibility that firms disclosing without complementary 
technologies exhibit lower returns to disclosure than the true counterfactual for disclosures 
with complementary technologies. Returns could be lower if the disclosed technology with 
complementary technologies is less valuable than disclosed technology without 
complementary technologies, because both would likely receive similar licensing rates but 
the former would have a lower opportunity cost. We do not find evidence that this is so. 
To assess pre-disclosure value of disclosed technologies, we regress the count of citations 
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in the three-years prior to disclosure on a binary indicator that the disclosed technology has 
complementary technologies, and control for age, standards area, SSO, and firm fixed 
effects.56 We find no significant difference between disclosures with and without 
complementarities (indicator variable APE 1.8, p-value 0.746).   
Our estimates may be inconsistent if technology without complementary 
technologies are disclosed to less important standards or to less important parts of a 
standard. If this is so, then these SEPs will likely garner fewer citations post-disclosure 
relative to SEPs with complementary technologies. Using citation received in the three 
years after disclosure as the dependent variable and controlling for the same set of variables 
as in the previous regression, we find that the indicator for disclosure with complementary 
technologies has an APE of -5.49, but is insignificant (p-value 0.495). Hence, we find no 
significant difference in the post-disclosure increase in value between disclosure with and 
without complementary technologies.  
 Finally, our within-firm patent matching would suppress firm-level unobservables 
that might select firms into disclosure. The within-firm matching analysis strongly suggests 
that complementary technologies increase in value once their corresponding SEPs are 
disclosed.  
 
CONCLUSION   
 This research examines whether and how a firm’s disclosure to SSOs during 
standard setting adds to firm value. We propose that as the firm discloses to SSOs, value 
                                                 
56 We use a negative binomial model.  
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accrues primarily through the firm’s non-disclosed complementary technologies rather 
than through its disclosed technologies. Our empirical results support this hypothesis. 
Firms experience negative returns from disclosure without accompanying complementary 
technologies. Complementary technologies significantly enhance the effect of disclosure 
on firm value. The positive effect is enhanced when increased competitiveness is more 
valued and weakened when increased compatibility is less valued. We also find 
complementary technologies themselves increase in value after their complementary SEPs 
are disclosed.  
 Our results raise an interesting issue as to why a firm would disclose without 
complementary technologies. Indeed, our firm-level results show that cumulative abnormal 
returns over a three-day window are negative (-0.66 percent). There may be several 
explanations. One, firms may rationally choose to disclose because they would be worse 
off otherwise. Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to accurately estimate the 
counterfactual for such firms. Two, firms may have initially suggested a larger proposal 
for the standard, one in which the firm had complementary technologies; however, the 
committee only included a subsection of the proposal, the part without complementary 
technologies. Three, firms may overestimate the potential licensing revenue from SEPs or 
underestimate the costs of disclosure.  
 At the heart of our argument is the notation that strategic actions conducted on one 
technology can impact the value of complementary technologies. In context of 
compatibility standards, by disclosing technology and establishing it as part of a standard, 
the firm not only enables coordination across various technologies within the standard, but 
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also can increase the compatibility and competitiveness of firm’s other technologies. 
Complementarities within the firm’s portfolio provide the firm a source of competitive 
advantage which can potentially explain why firms differ in how they benefit from their 
standard settings activates. This finding is of interest to both managers and policy makers.  
We also contribute to the literature on complementary technologies. Prior work on 
complementary technologies focuses on primarily on the how they are recombined to 
create new innovations. We provide a different lens to view value-creation of 
complementary technologies, beyond that of recombination. Even without combining 
them, the presence of complementary technologies within the firm’s portfolio alone can 
alter its strategic calculations and present additional strategies through which the firm 
creates value.  
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Table 2.1. SSOs and patent disclosures 
 
Table 2.2. Descriptive statistics  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Standard Setting Organization (SSO)
Description of standard setting activity relevant to 
sample
Number of U.S. patent disclosures 
(1988-2010)
American National Standards Institute (ANSI) DSL & cellular telephony protocol (TDMA) 296
Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Standards (ATIS) Telecommunications networks 281
Broadband Forum (BBF) Broadband standards (e.g. DSL) 35
European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization (CENELEC)
Fiber optics, cable tv, electrical engineering of computers 
networks, electrical systems in commercial buildings 3
European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) Telecommunications standards, such as GSM and WCDMA 4,059
International electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 
Power generation and transmission, electronics, and 
magnetics used in telecom, fiber optics, batteries, and 
medical fields 63
International Organization for Standards (ISO)
Coordinates with all of the SSOs on telecommunications 
standards 135
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) 
Broadband, wireless technologies, navigation, radio 
astronomy, VoIP, satellites 774
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Internet protocol 1,292
ISO/IEC JTC1 
ISO’s joint standards with IEC for information and 
communication technologies: IC cards (smart cards), 
automatic identification and data capture (AIDC) 
technologies, information security, biometrics, cloud 
computing, multimedia (MPEG), database query and 
programming languages 777
Open Mobile Alliance for mobile phone standards (OMA) Mobile phone service standards 283
The Institute for Electrical and Electronic Engineering (IEEE) Ethernet, Lan/Man, Wi-Fi 994
The Telecommunications Industry Association (TIA)
Cellular towers, satellites, voice of internet protocol, 
communications equipment 298
Panel A: Firm-Year Panel Data Descriptives Correlations
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(1) Tobin's Q 2.14 2.70 0.21 76.24 1
(2) Disclosure Events 0.40 2.32 0.00 62.00 0.007 1
(3) Total Patents (5-years) 121.83 432.71 0.00 4,075.00 -0.057 0.085 1
(4) ln(Revenues) 6.70 2.22 -3.54 12.11 -0.115 0.242 0.434 1
(5) Operating Margin -0.04 2.95 -176.06 0.60 -0.06 0.009 0.015 0.153 1
(6) R&D 361.83 1,002.23 0 10,991.00 -0.004 0.486 0.448 0.539 0.02 1
Obs: 5,767
Panel B: Event Study Data Descriptives Correlations
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(1) CAR (t-1 to t+1) 0.17 4.94 -19.37 41.65 1
(2) Complementary Technologies 29.73 101.66 0.00 2,004.00 0.059 1
(3) IP Disclosed 29.38 181.97 1.00 3,034.00 0.029 0.644 1
(4) Compatibility With Rivals 99.53 276.62 0.00 3,167.00 0.004 0.219 0.051 1
(5) Total Patents (5-years) 2,713.71 3,587.77 0.00 20,422.00 0.002 0.14 -0.053 0.216 1
(6) ln(Revenues) 9.52 1.90 -3.54 12.11 0.000 0.082 -0.066 0.124 0.433 1
(7) Operating Margin 0.00 2.86 -78.03 0.51 0.145 0.015 0.01 0.014 0.032 0.273 1
Obs: 752
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Table 2.3. Analysis of disclosure events on Tobin’s Q 
 
 
Robust p-values that account for within firm clustering in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Total 
Patents in thousands.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Tobin's Q Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample 2003-2010 1996-2002 1988-1995 Full Sample Full Sample
Pooled OLS Fixed Effect Pooled OLS Fixed Effect Fixed Effect Fixed Effect Fixed Effect Pooled OLS Pooled OLS
Disclosure Events -0.009 -0.065*
(0.722) (0.063)
Disclosure Events Without Comp. Tech. -0.054 -0.105** -0.028*** -0.112 -0.042
(0.203) (0.019) (0.004) (0.261) (0.650)
Disclosure Events With Comp. Tech. 0.122* 0.059 0.008 0.694* 0.030
(0.088) (0.470) (0.740) (0.081) (0.809)
IP Disclosed -0.0003
(0.772)
IP Disclosed Without Comp. Tech. -0.002
(0.325)
IP Discosed With Comp. Tech. 0.001**
(0.0125)
Total Patents (5-years) (000s) 0.175 0.202 0.151 0.172 -0.016 1.710*** -2.650 0.179 0.180
(0.189) (0.509) (0.243) (0.573) (0.910) (0.00792) (0.492) (0.166) (0.163)
R&D -0.250** -0.210 -0.249** -0.207 -0.242 -0.717 0.349** -0.250** -0.250**
(0.044) (0.129) (0.045) (0.131) (0.261) (0.246) (0.047) (0.043) (0.043)
ln(Revenues) 0.0340 0.107*** 0.0339 0.107*** -0.792 0.043* 0.033*** 0.034 0.034
(0.326) (0.000) (0.327) (0.000) (0.262) (0.074) (0.001) (0.326) (0.322)
Operating Margin 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002*** -0.0004 -0.0002 0.0001 0.0001
(0.203) (0.151) (0.215) (0.128) (0.003) (0.217) (0.322) (0.230) (0.211)
Constant 2.219** 2.210** 2.218** 2.209**
(0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025)
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry Fixed Effect YES NO YES NO NO NO NO YES YES
Technology Subcategory Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 5,769 5,769 5,769 5,769 1,787 2,035 1,947 5,769 5,769
R-squared 0.239 0.086 0.240 0.087 0.198 0.125 0.067 0.239 0.240
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Table 2.4. T-tests for cumulative abnormal returns  
 
 
 
 
Table 2.5. Comparing disclosures events with and without complementary technologies 
 
 
Any observation that has a cofounding event in the window is excluded. Complementary Technologies 
includes only patents that have not been previously disclosed. I test the difference in means using Welch’s t-
test.  
 
Window
Mean 
(Std. dev.)
p-
value N
(1) t-1 to t+1 -0.30 (5.28) 0.00 2,732
(2) t-2 to t+2 -0.13 (5.10) 0.18 2,732
(3) t-2 to t+2 -0.29 (671) 0.02 2,732
(4) t-3 to t+3 -0.17 (7.85) 0.23 2,732
(5) t-2 to t+4 -0.22 (8.17) 0.16 2,732
Mean 
(Std. dev.)
p-
value N
(6) t-1 to t+1 0.17 (4.93) 0.35 752
(7) t-2 to t+2 0.18 (4.72) 0.31 710
(8) t-2 to t+2 0.08 (5.99) 0.72 711
(9) t-3 to t+3 0.31 (7.45 0.28 668
(10) t-2 to t+4 0.34 (7.32) 0.23 672
Panel B. Disclosures with tracable U.S. 
patents and no confounding events
Panel A. All disclosure evemts
Dependent Variable: Cumlative Abnormal Return (%)
p-value N p-value N p-value
(1) t-1 to t+1 0.53  (5.28) 0.02 527 -0.66 (3.91) 0.01 225 1.19 0.00
(2) t-2 to t+2 0.38 (4.96) 0.08 503 -0.32 (4.07) 0.27 206 0.70 0.07
(3) t-2 to t+2 0.43  (6.06) 0.11 503 -0.76 (5.77) 0.06 208 1.18 0.01
(4) t-3 to t+3 0.73 (7.68) 0.04 475 -0.71 (6.74) 0.01 222 1.44 0.02
(5) t-2 to t+4 0.70 (7.49) 0.04 477 -0.53 (6.79) 0.27 195 1.26 0.04
Window
Mean (SD) | With 
Complementary 
Technology
Mean (SD) | No 
Complementary 
Technology
Difference In 
Means
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Table 2.6. Regression analysis of cumulative abnormal returns 
 
 
Robust p-values that account for within firm clustering in parentheses. Total Patents in thousands.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 2.7. Inverse probability weighted adjustment analysis of cumulative abnormal 
returns 
 
 
Test statistics use Abadie & Imbens' robust standard errors. Treatment is the presence of complementary 
technologies.  Significant (two-sided test) at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: CAR Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
Window t-1 to t+1 t-1 to t+1 t-1 to t+1 t-1 to t+1 t-1 to t+1 t-1 to t+1 t0 to t+2 t-2 to t+2 t-3 to t+3 t-1 to t+1 t-1 to t+1 t-1 to t+1
Method Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS
Weighted 
Least 
Squares
Firm 
Fixed 
Effect
Firm 
Fixed 
Effect
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full Full Full Full Full Full
2003-
2010
Complementary Technologies 0.003*** 0.003** 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 0.003** 0.005** 0.007** 0.004** 0.004** 0.004**
(0.004) (0.027) (0.017) (0.032) (0.027) (0.046) (0.017) (0.021) (0.017) (0.011) (0.019)
IP Disclosed 0.0008** -0.0004 -0.0008 -0.0008 0.0004 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.0009 -0.0007 -0.0008
(0.026) (0.535) (0.343) (0.379) (0.551) (0.407) (0.189) (0.113) (0.267) (0.274) (0.396)
Compatibility With Rivals 0.0005 -0.0008 0.0003 -0.0006 -0.0007 0.0004 -0.00002 -0.003
(0.325) (0.323) (0.587) (0.532) (0.521) (0.449) (0.956) (0.298)
Total Patents (5-years) (000s) -0.025 -0.026 -0.041 -0.010 -0.018 -0.080 -0.034 -0.055 -0.040
(0.713) (0.695) (0.568) (0.860) (0.839) (0.415) (0.587) (0.577) (0.826)
ln(Revenues) 0.171 0.154 0.198 0.125 0.228 0.0394 0.0851 1.338* 1.166
(0.209) (0.264) (0.174) (0.347) (0.242) (0.857) (0.528) (0.0894) (0.251)
Operating Margin -0.305*** -0.305*** -0.324*** -0.214*** -0.294*** -0.242*** -0.297*** -7.899 3.325
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.166) (0.405)
Constant 0.147 0.0846 0.0825 -5.982** -6.228** -3.980 -2.811 -4.069 3.421 -5.965***
(0.360) (0.618) (0.627) (0.014) (0.0141) (0.175) (0.305) (0.108) (0.243) (0.003)
Year Fixed Effect NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry Fixed Effect NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES NO NO
Standards Area Fixed Effect NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
SSO Fixed Effect NO NO NO NO NO YES NO NO NO NO NO NO
Observations 752 752 752 752 752 752 751 711 669 752 752 560
Number of Firms 123 123 123 123 123 123 123 123 122 123 123 85
R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.04
Dependent Variable: Cumulative Abnormal Return
(1) t-1 to t+1 1.37 0.53 0.01 726
(2) t0 to t+2 1.30 0.42 0.00 724
(3) t-2 to t+2 1.51 0.72 0.04 684
(4) t-3 to t+3 1.40 0.81 0.09 644
Window
Average 
Treatment 
Effect on 
Treated (%)
A&I 
Robust 
SE p-value Total N
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Table 2.8. Highlighting the effect of compatibility and competitiveness on the 
complementary technology-cumulative abnormal return relationship 
 
 
Robust p-values that account for within firm clustering in parentheses. Total Patents in thousands. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 2.9. Analysis of yearly citation counts using fixed effect Poisson models 
 
 
Patent-year panel from t-3 to t+3, with t0 denoting the disclosure date. Mean yearly received citations in 
sample: 3.61 and standard deviation of 5.8. P-values calculated from robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: CAR t-1 to t+1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Test Type:
Compatibility 
mechanism
Robustness 
check
Robustness 
check
Sample: Full
Downstream 
firms
Downstream 
firms: Highly 
concentrated 
market (HHI 
>= 2,500)
Downstream 
firms: Less 
concentrated 
market (HHI < 
2,500)
Downstream 
firms: Highly 
concentrated 
market (HHI 
>= 2,500)
Downstream 
firms: Highly 
concentrated 
market (C4 >= 
75%)
Downstream 
firms: Less 
concentrated 
market (C4 < 
75%)
Downstream 
firms: Highly 
concentrated 
market (C4 >= 
75%) Full
Upstream 
firms
Complementary Technologies 0.005*** 0.006* 0.002 0.007** 0.211*** 0.010 0.007** 0.107** 0.004** 0.010**
(0.009) (0.089) (0.708) (0.046) (0.001) (0.290) (0.032) (0.044) (0.028) (0.018)
Compatibility With Rivals 0.001* 0.002 0.002*** -0.001 0.002*** 0.0001 -0.003* -0.004* 0.001 -0.01**
(0.072) (0.702) (0.002) (0.189) (0.007) (0.824) (0.083) (0.067) (0.360) (0.018)
Comp. Tech.* Compatibility With Rivals -0.00001**
(0.025)
IP Disclosed -0.001 -0.0003 0.044 -0.003 0.034 0.025 -0.003 -0.009* -0.001 -0.0003
(0.385) (0.292) (0.187) (0.166) (0.251) (0.339) (0.150) (0.0594) (0.323) (0.632)
Total Patents (5-years) (000s) -0.020 -0.068 -0.082 -0.006 -0.008 -0.258 -0.143 -0.095 -0.043 -0.24
(0.763) (0.360) (0.479) (0.515) (0.946) (0.116) (0.183) (0.314) (0.531) (0.471)
ln(Revenues) 0.133 0.291 -0.050 0.524** 0.0330 0.329 0.675** 0.708** 0.218 0.110
(0.333) (0.113) (0.854) (0.022) (0.902) (0.328) (0.015) (0.014) (0.187) (0.840)
Operating Margin -0.302*** -0.323*** -0.204*** 0.787 -0.245*** -0.322*** -3.453 -3.864 -0.315*** -0.318
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.838) (0.000) (0.000) (0.395) (0.345) (0.000) (0.810)
Downstream Firm -0.632
(0.291)
Comp. Tech. * ln(Revenues) -0.019*** -0.009**
(0.001) (0.0488)
Constant -6.574** -7.256*** -6.679** 0.375 -7.427*** -1.686 -9.863*** -10.39*** -6.014** -11.69***
(0.013) (0.004) (0.017) (0.856) (0.008) (0.623) (0.000) (0.000) (0.018) (0.003)
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Standards Area Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 752 643 249 381 249 280 350 350 752 109
R-squared 0.070 0.075 0.251 0.097 0.276 0.212 0.148 0.157 0.070 0.423
Competiveness mechanisms for downstream 
firms using HHI
Competiveness mechanisms for downstream 
firms using C4
DV: Yearly received citations Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Sample: Full Sample 1988-2002 2003 to 2010 Full Sample 1988-2002 2003 to 2010
Complementary Technology 0.133*** 0.086*** 0.320***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Standard Essential Patent 0.140*** 0.153*** 0.162***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Age 0.007 0.028*** -0.191*** 0.027 0.087*** -0.112***
(0.396) (0.000) (0.000) (0.170) (0.002) (0.000)
Age Squared -0.009*** -0.006*** -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.0092*** -0.006***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 68,768 41,426 27,342 11,781 5,138 6,643
Number of patents 9,824 5,918 3,906 1,683 734 949
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Table 2.10. Within-firm matching analysis of patent citations 
 
 
Exact Match: Within Firm, Disclosure Year, Application Year, and Technology Class.  Nearest-Neighbor 
Matching: Citations received (t-3 to t-1), breadth of backward citations: number of backward citations. Test 
statistics use Abadie & Imbens' robust standard errors. Significant (two-sided test) at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A. 
Dependent variable: Count of citations received 
(1) t0 to t+3 1.59 0.13 0.000 69,812
(2) t0 to t+4 2.50 0.180 0.000 57,628
(3) t0 to t+5 3.41 0.23 0.000 47,500
(4) t+1 to t+5 2.76 0.20 0.000 47,500
Panel B. 
Dependent variable: Percent change In citations received
(1) % Change: t-1: t-4 to 
t0:t+3 11.53 0.016 0.000 54,121
(2) % Change: t-1:t-5 to 
t0:t+4 9.83 0.018 0.000 39,179
(3) % Change: t-1: t-4 to 
t+1:t+4 11.45 0.019 0.000 44,693
(4) % Change: t-1: t-5 to  
t1:t+5 9.41 0.02 0.000 30,905
Window
Average 
Treament Effect 
on Treated 
(Count)
A&I 
Robust 
SE p-val N
Window
Average 
Treament Effect 
on Treated (%)
A&I 
Robust 
SE p-val N
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Table 2.11. Analysis of self-citations 
 
 
P-values are in parentheses. P-values from robust standard errors used in Poisson models. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Sample: Firm-Patent Firm-Patent Firm-Patent Firm-patent Patent-Year for t-3 to t+3
Firm-Patent: SEPs vs. 
complementary patents 
Firm-Patent: SEPs vs. 
complementary patents 
Dependent Variable:
Self-Citation (1/0) in  
t+1:t+3 window
Self-Citation (1/0) in  
t+1:t+3 window
Self-Citation (1/0) in  
t+1:t+3 window
Count of Self-Citation in  
t+1:t+3 window
Count of yearly self-
citations
Self-Citation (1/0) in  
t+1:t+3 window
Self-Citation (1/0) in  
t+1:t+3 window
Method: Logit Logit Logit 
Conditional Fixed Effect 
(Firm Level) Poisson
Conditional Fixed Effect 
(Patent Level) Poisson Logit Logit 
Information Shown: Average Partial Effects Average Partial Effects Average Partial Effects Coeffiecient Coeffiecient Average Partial Effects Average Partial Effects
Complementary Technology 0.165*** 0.094*** 0.095*** 0.746*** 0.184*** 0.052*** 0.041***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Backward Citations 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.0003*** 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Breadth of Citations 0.001 -0.0001 -0.002*** -0.0017 0.003** -0.003**
(0.153) (0.887) (0.000) (0.469) (0.031) (0.026)
Received Citations t-3 to t-1 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.019***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age -0.071**
(0.010)
Age Squared -0.011***
(0.000)
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES NO YES YES
Application Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES NO YES YES
Technology Class Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES NO NO YES
Firm Fixed Effect NO NO Yes YES NO NO NO
Observations 160,842 160,842 160,842 159,394 34,160 28,964 28,700
Pseudo R-Square 0.17 0.20 0.27 0.15 0.17
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CHAPTER 3 
 
The Effect Of Complementary Technologies On Value Appropriation In 
Cooperative Settings: Evidence From Patent Litigation Related To Compatibility 
Standards 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In many settings, firms must reveal intellectual property to other, potentially rival, firms 
so to enable coordination and value creation. Such disclosures come with a cost, as the 
firm will often lose exclusivity over its intellectual property, which can severely 
deteriorate its ability to appropriate value directly from the associated technology. In this 
essay, I examine how firms incorporate disclosures into their strategy. In the context of 
compatibility standards, I examine where the firm appropriates value after it discloses 
technology to the standard setting body. I argue that firms utilize their disclosures to 
increase the value of their portfolio of complementary technologies. Using patent 
litigation as a signal of appropriation efforts, I estimate the impact of complementarity 
on patent litigation rates. Findings suggest that after disclosure to a standard, firms’ 
focus their litigation efforts around their complementary technologies.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In technology ecosystems, firms often need to cooperate to create value (Rosenkopf 
and Tushman, 1998; Adner and Kapoor, 2010; Kapoor and Lee, 2013). For example, many 
rival firms collaborated to produce the LTE wireless communications network standard, 
the Apollo spacecraft, and the HTML5 markup language. In these settings, different firms 
create technological solutions to separate parts of a larger problem, and therefore, need to 
reveal intellectual property (IP) to other participants. By revealing IP, the firm risks its 
ability to appropriate returns from the innovation (Arrow, 1962); however, if no one 
cooperates, little value can be created (Mizik and Jacobson, 2003; Henkel, Scholeberl, and 
Alexy, 2014).  
The ability to appropriate value from innovation plays a central role in a firm’s 
success (Teece, 1986). To appropriate returns from innovation, firms typically need an 
isolating mechanism (Rumlet, 1984). Extant literature on appropriability highlights four 
such mechanisms: legal protection (i.e. patents), secrecy, lead time, and complementary 
assets (Levin et al., 1987; Cohen et al. 2000; James, Leiblein, and Lu, 2013). The first two 
mechanisms, patents and secrecy, allow the firm to maintain exclusivity of its IP. Yet, in 
settings such as compatibility standards or open source software development, firms 
compromise both legal protection and secrecy to create value through cooperation. In 
collaborative standard setting, firms’ both reveal their technology to others and relinquish 
their ability to control who uses their technology.57 Downstream mechanisms do not 
                                                 
57 In some cases, the IP deemed essential to the functionality of the standard can generate substantial 
licensing revenue for the IP owner because the standard becomes widely adopted. However, the costs of 
disclosure can also be substantial because knowledge about the technology, the firm’s technological 
capabilities, and current development projects can spillover to rivals. Licensing revenue from standard 
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necessarily explain cooperation, as firms with complementary assets or lead time 
advantages stand to benefit from the establishment of any standard, whether they disclose 
IP or not.58 So how do IP disclosures figure into the firm’s upstream IP strategy? In other 
words, if the firm gives up some or all measures of appropriability of a disclosed 
technology, can the firm capture some of the value created through the disclosure in other 
parts of its IP portfolio, if so, where? The answer to this question can explain how and why 
firms differ in the way they benefit from revealing IP in cooperative settings. 
To approach this question, I begin with the observation that disclosing often own 
other complementary technologies within the ecosystem. Technologies are complementary 
when the value of one is greater when used in conjunction with the other (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1990; Toh and Miller, 2017). I then argue that by disclosing a technology so to be 
part of the standard, the firm increases the value of the non-disclosed complementary 
technologies. Therefore, the strategic concern of these firms may not be limited to the 
disclosed technology; rather, appropriating returns from its non-disclosed complementary 
technologies could be just as critical, if not more so.59  
In an ideal test of my theory, I would observe how the firm’s appropriation strategy, 
such as licensing efforts or product design, change once it discloses IP. While I cannot 
consistently observe such appropriation efforts across all firms, I can observe a closely 
related factor—the assertion of IP rights via litigation. Therefore, to address the question 
                                                 
essential patents will often not fully compensate the firm for the costs of its IP disclosure (Updegrove, 
2007). Of course, when essential technology is provided royalty free, then the firm will not ‘capture’ value 
simply by disclosing technology. 
58 To elaborate, a firm would not need to participate in the standard setting process unless without 
participation, the standard would negatively affect the firm downstream assets.  
59 For example, JP Morgan equity analysts reported that Nokia had much to gain by asserting its non-SEPs 
related to communication networks (Deshpande et al, 2013).  
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posed, I investigate IP lawsuits in the context of compatibility standards. Specifically, I 
examine where the firm uses legal disputes to assert IP rights after disclosing technology 
to a compatibility standard. I hypothesize that after the formation of the standard, litigation 
rates will be higher for technology complementary to the standard, as compared to similar 
non-complementary technologies. Moreover, the litigation rate will increase for 
complementary technologies post-disclosure of their complementary SEP.   
I test my argument using data on patent litigations and ICT standards between 1988 
and 2010. Legal disputes over IP are common in the ICT industry, and should correlate 
with other value appropriation activities such as licensing. To estimate the effect of 
complementarity on the incidence of litigation, I use information on similar, non-
complementary patents in the firm’s portfolio to create counterfactuals. I also examine how 
the litigation rate changes for complementary patents using both patent-level fixed effect 
regressions and difference-in-difference matching estimators. Results show that, prior to 
the disclosure event, complementary patents do not have a significantly different litigation 
rate than their counterfactual computed using similar patents in the firm’s portfolio. Once 
they become complementary to the standard, the likelihood of future litigation for 
complementary patents is approximately 2.8 percentage points higher than for their 
counterfactual. Using a patents own litigation history, I find that the likelihood of litigation 
in a five-year window post-becoming complementary jumps 54 percent over the prior five 
years. Empirical evidence strongly support my predictions. 
I also decompose the effect of complementarity on litigation rates into two 
underlying factors: the firm’s incentive to protect the IP and the increased incidence of 
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infringement due to the greater demand for technologies related to the standard. Allowing 
for the endogeneity of demand and future litigation rates in a simultaneous equation model, 
I find evidence for both the incentive and demand effects are significant. Rough 
calculations suggest that firm incentives account for 50 to 85 percent of the effect, evidence 
which supports the notion that the higher post-disclosure litigation rate on complementary 
technologies is partially a function of firms’ strategies.  
My arguments differ from and expand on prior literature on appropriation in several 
ways. First, extant work on the standard setting context suggests that firms with 
downstream resources will cooperate on standards and seek rents in downstream product 
markets (Simcoe et al., 2009). This, however, does not explain why the firm would provide 
technology to the standard rather than free ride on the efforts of others.60 Instead, I argue 
that the firm’s technology disclosure to the standard directly impacts the value of the firm’s 
complementary technology—technology that the firm can use to appropriate value by 
embedding them into products or by licensing them to implementers of the standard. Even 
in the absence of compensating licensing revenue and in the presence of high disclosure 
costs, the firm may still be willing to reveal technology to others if doing so enables it to 
capture value in other parts of its technology portfolio.  
Second, profiting from innovation literature tends to emphasize the importance of 
complementary downstream assets for appropriating value from innovations (Teece, 1986; 
Pisano, 2006; Arora and Coeccagnoli, 2006). I expand on this literature by arguing that 
                                                 
60 The firm may lower the cost of licensing technology from others if it to owns technology essential to the 
standard. Yet, the emergence of IP policies in SSOs and the increased use of patent pools to regulate and 
ease licensing reduce the explanatory power of the cross-licensing argument. 
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complementarities in the firm’s upstream technology portfolio also play an important role 
in the firm’s appropriation strategy and ultimately firm success (Teece, 1996). However, 
unlike specialized supporting assets that play a supporting role in an innovation’s 
competitiveness, I suggest that complementary technologies provide additional channels 
for which the firm can capture value from the focal innovation. By accounting for upstream 
complementarities, I provide a more complete view of the role complementarity plays in 
appropriating returns.  
I also contribute to the work on the economics of IP litigation. I demonstrate how 
the firm’s technological position in cooperatively set standards can change its incentives 
to protect IP. Accounting for how complementarities influence these incentives helps 
explain recent patterns in IP litigation. For example, the role of complementarity between 
technologies that underlie wireless communication standards and technologies embedded 
in smartphones can help explain the uptick in patent litigation in the ICT industry over the 
past decade. 61  
 
THEORY  
IP Protection and Appropriation in Cooperative Settings 
A hi-tech firm’s innovations tend to be embedded in a technology ecosystem 
consisting of multiple innovations from a variety of competing firms (Adner and Kapoor, 
2010). Most innovations do not function independently, but instead depend on other 
                                                 
61 Some of the increase in patent litigation in the ICT industry is related to the so-called smartphone wars 
(Kumar & Shasin, 2016). One area of dispute concerns wireless communication technologies embedded in 
smartphones.  
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interdependent innovations to create value (Adner, 2006). To manage these 
interdependences, firms often need to cooperate with others (Rosenkopf and Tushman, 
1998). Cooperation can entail disclosing important IP to other, potentially rival, firms so 
interfaces between technologies can be created or to allow the technologies to be developed 
further. While revealing IP to others can be essential to value creation, it can dampen the 
firm’s ability to appropriate value (Arrow, 1962). The extent of this concern, of course, 
will depend on the context. In simple bilateral cooperative arrangements, such as an R&D 
alliance, appropriation conditions can be (imperfectly) specified upfront.  However, in 
many important contexts, firms must reveal IP to rivals or contribute IP to a project without 
much formal guarantee that they will be able to capture any of the value that their IP helps 
create (West, 2014). Example contexts in which multiparty cooperation is needed include 
open-technology systems, such Linux software, and compatibility standards, such as LTE 
wireless communications standard or HTML5 markup language. So how do firms capture 
value in these contexts? 
A burgeoning literature on firm’s incentive to cooperate in open source software 
systems or in technology standards provide some evidence (Allen, 1983; Harroff, Henkle, 
and von Hipple, 2003; Henkle, 2006; Pisano, 2006; Simcoe et al., 2009). First, firms will 
cooperate with others in order to grow the potential market (Simcoe, 2005; West, 2014). 
Literature on compatibility standards suggests that firms cooperate on standards and 
compete on implementation’ (Simcoe, 2005). However, these firms need to have resources 
or capabilities that provide an advantage in capturing value in the downstream market 
(Rumlet, 1984; Teece, 1986; Barney, 1991). Typically, this includes a lead time advantage, 
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costs advantages, or some set of specialized downstream assets (James et al., 2013). For 
instance, Seagate Technologies provided royalty free licensing to their technology that 
increased the data flow rate between the computer’s systems board and disk storage drive 
(Ethiraj, 2007). By making technology widely available, Seagate could grow the market 
for more complex disk and storage drives for which it had strong design and production 
capabilities. In the context of compatibility standards, Simcoe et al. (2009) find that firms 
with downstream capabilities litigated standard essential patents less than more specialized 
upstream technology suppliers that had lesser ability to appropriation returns downstream. 
Overall, this stream of literature suggests that a downstream appropriation mechanism is 
needed to incent firms to reveal IP to others.  
Second, literature suggests that some firms, particularly small entrepreneurial 
ventures, may benefit from revealing IP, not by directly creating profits from their IP, but 
rather by increasing their reputation or signaling their quality to others (Allen, 1983; Lerner 
and Tirole, 2002; Haroff et al., 2003; Waguespack and Fleming, 2009; Henkel et al., 2014). 
Henkel et al. (2014) find that firms reveal source code in Linux development because they 
believe it provides a signal that is beneficial in marketing. Waguespack and Fleming (2009) 
find small entrepreneurial ventures’ participation in open standards positively correlates 
with likelihood of a near-term IPO or acquisition. Overall, cooperation can create indirect 
benefits that allow firms to acquire valuable reputation or access financial resources.  
Third, firms disclose IP to others to increase diffusion of the innovation. The firm 
can benefit from widespread adoption of its innovation if it leads to a decrease in the cost 
of inputs, or the availability of or improvements in co-specialized equipment. Haroff et al. 
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(2003) detail how IBM revealed information about its process to manufacture 
semiconductors using copper based circuitry rather than aluminum circuitry so that 
suppliers of specialized semiconductor equipment would build new equipment that utilized 
the new technology. Without a large customer pool (i.e. IBM plus rival semiconductor 
firms), the suppliers would not have been willing to switch their designs to incorporate the 
new technology.  
Finally, firms can receive payment for their contributions to multiparty technology 
systems. Payment often comes in the form of licensing revenue or royalties tied to the IP 
that becomes essential to the system. In Apache open source development, software 
engineers were compensated for their contributions. In many compatibility standards, firms 
receive "Fair, Reasonable, and Non-Discriminatory" (FRAND) licensing rates for IP 
essential for the standard to function properly (i.e., standard essential patents or SEPs) 
(Rysman & Simcoe, 2006). Much of the literature on standards either explicitly or 
implicitly assumes that the firm’s objective is to place its technology into the standard for 
the purpose of licensing this technology to implementers. This literature places the locus 
of value appropriation ‘inside’ the standard.  
To expand on this literature, I offer a different perspective on value capture in 
collaborative settings. I propose that firms leverage technology disclosures in standards so 
to create and appropriate value in their portfolio of non-disclosed, complementary 
technologies. This differs from the growing the market perspective in that I directly link 
the way the firm participates in the cooperative setting (e.g. disclosures to SSOs) to how 
the firm enhances and appropriates value (e.g. through technology complementary to the 
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disclosed technology).62 In contrast to the notation that licensing revenue from SEPs is the 
main source of value, I instead argue that firms may participate even when licensing 
revenue is zero.  
Before laying out my argument, I briefly review the standard setting process and 
how I trace appropriation efforts.  
 
Standard Setting & Intellectual Property Disclosure 
Standards63 play a central role in many technology markets by providing the 
blueprint for how different technologies function together. Most modern compatibility 
standards typically require technology from multiple parties and thus require coordination. 
Standard Setting Organizations (SSOs) coordinate the standard setting process and provide 
a forum for interested parties to achieve a consensus on the blueprint for the standard. 
During the standard setting process, firms voluntarily disclose patents essential on the 
standard to function (i.e., SEPs). While the disclosure process is voluntary, the firms that 
participate in the standard setting process typical must adhere to the SSO’s IP disclosure 
policy. Such policies try to avoid “submarine” strategies in which a firm with IP essential 
to the standard waits for a standard to be finalized then asserts its IP rights at unreasonable 
rates (Farrell et al., 2004). Therefore, IP policies detail when a firm must disclose its 
technology to other participants, which typically predates the final approval of the 
                                                 
62 In the case of standards, the firm with strong downstream capabilities could benefit from a new standard 
whether or not it discloses to the standard. 
63 There are a variety of standards, including compatibility standards, minimum quality or safety standards, 
and reference standards. I focus on compatibility standards that define interoperability between various 
technological components. Any reference to ‘standards’ henceforth will refer to such standards.    
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standards. These policies may also detail licensing rates, which may range from free, as in 
many internet standards, to fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (FRAND), like in many 
wireless communications standards.  
Literature on standards assumes that licensing revenue from SEPs motivates IP 
disclosure, however, prior research also finds that the costs of disclosing can be substantial 
(Cargill, 2002; Farrell and Simcoe, 2012). Firms spend significant time and money on 
standard setting activities (Siegel, 2002; Updegrove, 2003; Chiao et al., 2007; Farrell and 
Simcoe, 2012). Through the process of negotiating technological specifications, a firm can 
reveal strategic information about its knowledge base and future development path 
(Rosenkopf, Metiu, and George, 2001). So not only do firms relinquish exclusivity of 
disclosed technologies, they can compromise secrecy of their knowledge base (Toh and 
Miller, 2017). Thus, the returns to IP disclosure may not always compensate the firm for 
the costs incurred. While firms strive to capture value through licensing SEPs, firms may 
also have other incentives to disclose technology to the standard. To explore how the firm’s 
SEPs can be leveraged in an alternative appropriation strategy, I theorize as to where firms 
will focus their IP protection efforts after disclosing to the standard.  
 
Patent Litigation 
Patent litigation signals the strategic behavior and appropriation concerns of the 
firm (Lerner, 1995; Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001; Somaya, 2003; 2012). Patents 
provide the firm with the firm with the ability to attempt to exclude others from using its 
IP (Lemly and Shapiro, 2005). For a patent to function as an isolating mechanism that can 
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help the firm appropriate value from its IP, the firm must be willing to enforce the patent 
in court (Rivette and Kline, 2000; Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001; Somaya, 2003). Prior 
research demonstrates that patent litigation64 signals that the stakes surrounding the IP are 
high. Median legal costs for a $1 million patent claim is $650,000; litigation costs range 
between $1 million and $5 million as claims grow above $1 million (Kersetter, 2012). 
Firms also accrues other costs. A firm’s stock market value typically dips by 2% to 3% on 
average after filing a patent lawsuit (Bhagat, Brickley, and Coles, 1994; Lerner, 1995). 
Patent suits can be both time consuming and distracting for senior managers. Therefore, 
patent litigation strongly signals appropriability concerns (Lerner, 1995; Lanjouw and 
Schankerman, 2001). It should also be correlated with licensing, as the two go hand in hand 
(Auora, Fosfuri, and Gambardella; 2001; Galasso, Schankerman, and Serrano, 2013). 
Because of the difficulty in tracing how firms embed complementary technologies into 
products or the details behind their licensing behavior, I instead rely on patent litigation as 
evidence of the firm’s appropriation strategy.  
  Prior literature finds a link between SEPs and litigation. Standards tend to be based 
on valuable IP (Rysman and Simoce, 2008), and there is a positive correlation between IP 
value, the likelihood of infringement, and the likelihood of litigation. Because standards 
form the backbone of many technology ecosystems, technology included in the standard 
becomes more valuable (Chiao et al., 2007; Farrell et al., 2007; Rysman and Simcoe, 
2008). The increased stakes surrounding these technologies should increase the incentive 
                                                 
64 Why should we see litigation in a valuable area? Would firms not put extra effort into bargaining of 
valuable technologies? Literature offers three core explanations: asymmetric stakes or reputational benefits 
(Lanjouw and Lerner, 1998; Agarwal, Ganco, and Ziedonis, 2009), asymmetric information (Nalebuff, 
1987), and differences in expectations (Priest and Klein, 1984; Galasso, 2008).  
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to litigate (Besen and Levinson, 2012), which bears out in empirical research. Indeed, 
Simcoe et al. (2009) find that litigation rates for SEPs increase after disclosure relative to 
a random control sample of non-essential patents.  
 
Appropriation of Value Through Complementary Technologies 
Although firms can capture value by licensing SEPs, this is not the only strategy to 
appropriate value from standards. A firm can leverage its standard essential technologies 
to raise the value of its portfolio of complementary technologies.65 As the value increases, 
the firm has greater incentive to protect them. Moreover, as the standard becomes central 
to the industry, more firms will move into this knowledge space, causing the incidence of 
infringement of complementary technologies to rise. I explain this logic in more detail 
below.  
When the disclosed technology becomes essential to the standard, technologies 
complementary to the disclosed technology become compatible, and thus complementary 
with the standard. As firms adopt the standard, interoperability with the standard becomes 
valuable because the standard provides the blueprint for the ecosystem. In a wireless 
communication system for instance, handsets, base stations, multiplexers, testing 
equipment, and other network gear must function with the standard. A compatible 
                                                 
65 My argument can be viewed as a more complex version of the razor blade-razor model, in which the firm 
gives one component at a subsidized price (i.e. the razor) in hopes of selling a complementary component 
(razor blades) at higher prices. This does have some precedent in intra-firm cooperation. For instance, 
Hewlett-Packard revealed software code that controlled the interface of its RISC-based hardware products 
with the hope that Linux users would create compatibility between Linux open source software and Hewlett-
Packard’s hardware (Lerner and Tirole, 2002). By doing so, Hewlett-Packard hoped to bring additional 
customers onto its platform by making its hardware (i.e. its razors) more attractive so that it could sign 
lucrative long-term IT services contracts with reoccurring revenue (i.e. its razor-blades).   
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technology will likely function with other parts of the ecosystem, thus its value will rise. If 
the firm had not disclosed essential technology, the associated complementary technology 
might not function with the standard, and therefore, may provide little value.  
By developing knowledge underlying both the standard essential technology and 
the complementary technology, the firm is in a better position to understand the nuances 
of the interdependences between the standard and the complementary technology, and thus 
create more valuable technologies than they would otherwise. So not only are the firm’s 
complementary technologies compatible with the standard, they may also represent the 
‘first best’ solution in applying the standard in some way. For example, Nokia’s technology 
for decoding voice signals functions in conjunction with its standard essential technology 
for sending and receiving voice and data on TDMA based wireless networks. By 
embedding its ‘exclusive’ complementary technology in its own phones, Nokia’s phones 
achieved better sound and voice quality than rivals that had to rely on suboptimal decoding 
methods. This increased the consumers’ willingness-to-pay for Nokia’s phones. The link 
between its complementary technology and the standard provided Nokia an advantage in 
the early TDMA-based handset market.  
When the firm owns complementary technologies, the firm can appropriate value 
from them in two general ways. Adopters need to access not only the technology and 
knowledge underlying the standard, but also complementary technologies that allow for 
optimal functionality of products that utilize the standard. The firm can license these 
complementary technologies to firms adopting the standard. If the firm competes 
downstream instead, it can embed the complementary technologies into its own products 
  82 
to differentiate them in downstream competition. For instance, Qualcomm combined its 
technologies that comprised the core of the CDMA standard with its chipsets and power 
management technologies, which increased their value in the CDMA-based product 
market.  
While complementary technologies themselves become more valuable, so does the 
underlying knowledge. The can firm leverage this knowledge in several ways. One, future 
innovative search will be more certain and more productive because the firm already 
understands how components work with the standard and how technologies can combine 
with the standard to create value (Clark 1985; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Fleming 2001; 
Zahra and George, 2002). For example, Qualcomm leveraged its knowledge position in 
wireless standards and complementary areas to extend its technologies to the automotive, 
home appliance, and health care industries. Two, the firm can use its knowledge position 
to attract partners with valuable complementary resources (Mower, Oxley, and Silverman, 
1996; Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001; Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005). Because of its 
technological position surrounding CDMA standards as Qualcomm sought to expand its 
customer base to new industries, it could attract key partners with complementary 
capabilities.   
Therefore, the knowledge behind complementary technologies enables a range of 
future value capture options. When knowledge is valuable, the firm will want to prevent it 
from spilling over to rivals. Prior work demonstrates that aggressive IP enforcement can 
reduce knowledge spillover (Somaya, 2003; Agarwal, Ganco, and Zidonis, 2009). Thus, I 
expect the firm to protect IP in the complementary area vigorously. 
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Demand for the standard will also increase the incidence of infringement. As 
implementers begin to build their own technology to link to the standard, they may find it 
difficult to utilize the standard effectively without infringing on the firm’s complementary 
technologies. Inadequate attempts to invent around patented technology will drive 
litigation higher (Bessen and Meurer, 2006). For instance, Nokia won rulings against HTC 
in several countries where it alleged HTC violated several implementation patents that link 
chipsets to communication standards. While not ‘essential’ to the standard, these patents 
(e.g. US 7,415,247; US 6,393,260; EP0998024)66 cover how communication signals 
(covered by Nokia’s SEPs) interact with chipsets. The outcome of the suits spurred equity 
analysts to report on the potential that Nokia’s complementary technologies have for 
generating value from its patent portfolio (for example, see Deshpande, Udeshi, Hirani, 
Hall, and Kesireddy 2013).  
As the adoption rate of the standard increases, so will the attempts to build on the 
standard. This demand effect increases the number of rivals working within the proximity 
of the focal firm’s technology area, which should result in higher incident of infringement 
(Bensen and Meurer, 2005). Therefore, when the firm has such well positioned 
complementary technologies, the incidence of infringement will be increasing with the 
adoption of the standard.67  
                                                 
66 This are just several examples.  
67 At some point, the firm’s strategic stakes in the technological area will be well known to market 
participants as the news of patent lawsuits disseminates. Thus, the probability of infringement will likely 
decline at some point. However, licensing rates may continue to increase as the number of implementers of 
the standard increase.  
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Based on these arguments, I layout my core hypothesis: post-disclosure, 
technologies complementary to the firm’s disclosed IP will experience a higher rate of 
litigation relative to the other comparable technologies. The increase in the litigation rate 
will come after the technology becomes complementary to the standard.  
  
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Sample & Variables  
I conduct the empirical analysis in the context of the information communications 
technology (ICT) industry between 1988 and 2014. I focus only on communications and 
information technology standards because the firms involved with these standards tend to 
be R&D intensive,68 have in house IP lawyers, and relationships with IP law firms. 
Lawsuits between firms in the ICT industry are more common than in other industries. For 
example, between 2007 and 2011 over 50% of IP lawsuits involved ICT industry patents 
(Comino and Manenti, 2015). Therefore, lawsuits may be common enough to approximate 
for firms’ appropriation concerns.    
I use the Disclosed Standard Essential Patents (dSEP) Database (Bekkers et al., 
2011) to obtain information on IP disclosures to standards. This dataset includes the 
disclosure date, patents disclosed, firm disclosing, and information to help identify the 
standard. Data on patents comes from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). I 
compile patent citations using data from National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), 
                                                 
68 Firms such as Actel, Qualcomm, and Ericsson send between 10 and 20 percent of revenues on R&D each 
year. As a comparison, large pharmaceutical companies (e.g. Merck, Pfizer, and Eli Lilly) typically spend 
15 percent of revenues on R&D in a year.  
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(Hall et al., 2001) and Patent Network Dataverse (Lai et al., 2013). Firms’ financial data 
comes from the Compustat database.  
To calculate my dependent variables, I collect data on IP lawsuits from Thomson 
Westlaw. This provides a comprehensive set of lawsuits filed in the United States. 
Antidotal evidence suggests that standards related IP patented abroad will often be patented 
in the United States, because of the size and importance of U.S. market. Therefore, major 
patent lawsuits if filed outside the U.S. also tend to be filed in the U.S. as well.69 Because 
I am interested in the incidence of litigation and not outcomes per se, and because I restrict 
my analysis to U.S. patents, there is little to gain by expanding the data collection beyond 
the U.S. court system. 
 To compile the sample of disclosed IP, I use the dSEP database to identify 4,865 
patent disclosures (3,089 unique patents) from ICT industry firms to 10 different SSOs 
between 1988 and 2010. Each disclosed patent represents IP the firm believes to be 
essential to a standard.  
The main independent variable, Complementary Technology, identifies that a 
patent is complementary to a patent disclosed to an SSO. To identify complementarity, I 
rely on the established principal that inventions that draw on combinations of technologies 
reflect the complementarities between them (Fleming, 2001; Toh and Miller, 2017). To 
apply this principal, I identify all the U.S. patents that the firm discloses during a disclosure 
event. Then I trace all unique undisclosed patents that the firm owns that are co-cited with 
at least one of its disclosed patents prior to or in the year of the disclosure. I only count co-
                                                 
69 For example, Ericsson, Nokia, and Samsung all sued Apple over IP related to smartphones. All suits filed 
in non-U.S. domains were also filed within the U.S.  
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cited patents from a different technology class than the disclosed patent because patents in 
the same class may refer to different components of the same technology or to prior 
versions of the same technological concept, rather than complementarity across separate 
and distinct technologies (Makri et al., 2010; Toh and Miller, 2017).  
I control for various technology, firm, and environmental factors that will influence 
the likelihood a patent will be litigated. To control for the importance of a technology, I 
use several measures based on citations. Citations a patent receives (Received Citations) is 
a commonly used measure of value in the strategy and economics literatures (Harhoff et 
al., 1999; Jaffe and Trajtenberg 2004; Allison et al., 2004; Hall et al., 2005; Rysman & 
Simcoe, 2008; Simcoe et al., 2009). Backward Citations measures the number of citations 
made by each patent, which captures the depth of knowledge used (Lanjouw and 
Schankerman, 2004). Breadth of Citations measures the number of different technology 
classes cited by the patent, which serves as a proxy for the diversity of knowledge used in 
the invention (Toh and Miller, 2017). I also use several other patent level and firm level 
variables, which I describe in Table 3.1. I will discuss their usage in the appropriate sections 
below. I use different sample selection criteria depending on the nature of the empirical 
tests, thus, I will describe the relevant sampling methodology prior to each analysis.  
 
SSOs and IP Disclosures 
 In my sample, firms primarily disclose at 10 SSOs that manage major ICT 
standards. I begin by briefly describing each SSO. 
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 The American National Standards Institute (ANSI) coordinates standard 
organizations in the U.S., covering wireless cellular technologies and digital 
subscriber lines (DSL). 
 Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Standards (ATIS) set standards for 
telecommunications networks and technological interoperability.  
 European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) is a central SSO for 
major wireless cellular standards. The ETSI, along with its American counterpart 
the ATIS, play a key role in the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) which 
managed the evolution and maintenance of the GSM, GPRS, EDGE, UMTIS, 
HSPA, and LTE wireless standards.  
 The Institute for Electrical and Electronic Engineering (IEEE) is involved with 
local area network standards such as IEEE 802 LAN/MAN, 802.3 Ethernet 
standard, and 802.11 Wireless Networking (i.e. Wi-Fi) standard.  
 Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) focuses on internet standards and protocol.  
 Joint Technical Committee (JTC) is standard setting body run jointly by the 
International Standards Organization (ISO) and International Electrotechnical 
Commission (IEC)’s for developing ICT industry standards. Example standards 
include smart cards and the coding and compression of audio and video data (e.g. 
MPEG-4 standard). Disclosures appear in the database as being to disclosed to 
either the JTC, ISO, or IEC.   
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 International Telecommunications Union (ITU) manages standards related to 
broadband, wireless technologies, navigation, radio astronomy, satellites, and 
voice-over-internet protocol.  
 The Telecommunications Industry Association (TIA) helps manage standards 
covering transmission systems (e.g. cellular towers and satellites) and voice-over-
internet-protocol.  
 
Figure 3.1 summarizes the count of both standard essential patents (i.e. disclosed 
patents) and complementary patents by SSO. The ETSI has the largest count of both SEPs 
(2,765) and complementary patents (16,412). The IEEE and the IETF are second and third 
in the number of SEPs respectively. 
 
Standards & Litigation Rates 
A simple descriptive analysis demonstrates that SEPs and complementary patents 
exhibit litigation rates well above average. Approximately 2.7 percent of disclosed and 
complementary patents experience at least one lawsuit between the time of the disclosure 
event and 2014. To put this into perspective, consider that of all the ICT related patents 
granted between 1988 and 2010, only 1 percent are litigated over their observable life (i.e. 
application date to 2014).  
Table 3.2 provides a summary for a select set of standards and firms. In Panel A, I 
display the number of SEPs, the number of patents complementary to those SEPs based on 
my Complementary Technology measure, the litigation rate between the disclosure date 
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(t0) and t+5, the litigation rate between the disclosure date and 2014, and a short description 
of the standard. The litigation rate measures the proportion of the complementary and 
disclosed patents that experienced at least one lawsuit between the time they were disclosed 
to the standard and the designated date. Relative to the unconditional litigation rate, SEPs 
and complementary patents have higher litigation rates. Moreover, much of the litigation 
occurs in the first five years after the disclosure event, which points to the possibility that 
the patent’s relationship with the standard contributes to the greater litigation propensity.   
 In Panel B, I display similar information for 15 firms active in ICT industry 
standard setting. Ericsson, Motorola, Nokia, and Qualcomm disclose the most IP to SSOs, 
much of which involves major wireless communication standards. These firms also have 
large portfolios of complementary technologies. Together, they have an average Litigation 
Rate in the t0 to t=2014 window of 2.3 percent. Most firms shown are litigious. Several 
large outliers, such as AT&T, Hybrid Networks and Stratacom, have high rates but 
relatively small standards related patent portfolios.  
  In Appendix 3.1, I provide additional statistics on the relationship between SEP 
and complementary patents in IP lawsuits.  
 
Descriptive Analysis of Complementarity on Litigation  
 I now explore how becoming complementary to a standard affects the patent’s 
future litigation propensity. To create the sample, I first identify 380 events in which firms 
disclose IP to a SSO on a given date. Next, I trace all complementary patents to each 
disclosure event. Then, I create a matched pair of patents by randomly selecting a 
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complementary patent and non-complementary patent that have the same technology class 
and application year. For a given technology class, application, and event year, patents are 
select without replacement. Finally, I define the year of the disclosure event as t0 and 
calculate Litigation Rate, Received Citations, and control variables relative to t0.  
The sample consists of 17,670 complementary patents that have a matched control 
patent. Table 3.3 provides the descriptive statistics of the complementary and control 
sample. Focusing on the future Litigation Rate in row one, complementary patents have an 
average litigation rate of 2.14 percent and non-complementary patents have an average 
litigation rate of 0.96 percent. The difference in means is statistically significant (p-value 
0.000). On average, complementary patents experience higher litigation rates than the 
similar patents.  
Table 3.3 also reveals the difference between complementary patents and the 
average patent. On average, complementary patents receive significantly more citations 
(Received Citationst-3 to t-1 of 14.42) than their matched counterparts (Received Citationst-3 
to t-1 of 5.55). They also exhibit a higher Prior Litigation Rate (0.82 percent vs. 0.28 
percent). These results suggest that the control patents provide a poor counterfactual for 
the complementary patents. Therefore, the following probit regression analysis (Table 3.4) 
should be treated as descriptive rather than causal. The results can be interpreted as the 
impact of a patent becoming complementary as compared to an average patent of the same 
age and technology class. Before proceeding to the analysis, note that the control patents 
tend to come from firms with significantly larger Revenues and Total Assets, but with 
significantly lower Operating Margins.  
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 In Table 3.4, I display the regression analysis using the previously described 
sample. In Models 1-5 I estimate the probability of future litigation over different windows 
using a probit specification. I display the average partial effects (APE) in the table. The 
univariate analysis in Model 1 shows that becoming complementary increases the litigation 
rate by 1.2 percent (p-value 0.000) as compared to similar, noncomplementary patent.  
In Models 2-5, I control for factors that correlate with a technology’s importance 
(Backward Citations, Breadth of Citations, Received Citations). I also control for firm level 
factors that may influence a firm’s litigiousness. Larger firms have more resources for a 
legal battle, so I include log of Revenues. However, larger IP portfolios are harder to 
monitor, which may reduce the likelihood that any one patent is litigated (Total Patents). 
Firms with greater downstream assets (PP&E, CAPX Intensity) may be less willing to 
litigate because they compete through their superior manufacturing capabilities or lower 
production costs. Operating Margin proxies for the firm’s profitability. To control 
litigation trends in the technological area, industry, environment, and by age, I include 
fixed effects for technology class, industry, year, and application year.  
Model 2 displays the fully specified model for the Litigationt0:t=2014. 
Complementary patents have a 1 percent great likelihood of being litigated as compared to 
the average patent. As expected, patents that have greater value before the standard have a 
higher instance of litigation (Received Citations APE 0.0004; p-value 0.000). Patents that 
draw on broader knowledge also see a significant increase in litigation propensity (Breadth 
of Citations 0.002; p-value 0.000). Model 3-5 show similar results. 
  92 
 Model 6 and 7 replicate Model 1 and 2, but use the count of future lawsuits. The 
Poisson model estimate for Complementary Technology shows that becoming 
complementary increases the number of future lawsuits by about 61 percent. While not 
shown, the count model results for the other windows are similar to the results displayed 
in Model 3-5.  
 I also estimate the likelihood that a patent had previously been litigated. From 
Model 8, I find that complementary patents have a 0.6 percent higher prior litigation rate 
than control patents. This suggests that to create a more precise counterfactual for the 
complementary patents, I will need to control for firms’ propensity to litigate as well as the 
pre-complementary value of the patent.  
 As a robustness check, I rerun the analysis using only the first instance a patent 
becomes complementary and findings are similar. For example, using the specification in 
Model 2, I find approximately the same APE (0.01) and significance level (0.000) for 
Complementary Technology. However, Complementary Technology is not significant 
predictor of Litigation prior to disclosure (i.e., running Model 8).  
 
Within-Firm Analysis of Litigation Rates 
In this section, I employ a nearest-neighbor matching procedure (Abadie and 
Imbens, 2006; 2011) with tight set of exact match criteria to create a more believable 
counterfactual for complementary patents (Toh and Miller, 2017). To account for firm 
specific factors, such as litigation capability, resources, and IP monitoring costs, I restrict 
the potential control sample for each complementary patent to non-complementary patents 
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from the same firm. From the within-firm set of patents, for a given complementary patent, 
I further restrict the set of possible control patents to ones that have the same application 
year, technology class, and the exact same number of prior lawsuits. This helps suppress 
differences in value between the complementary and control patents. It also suppresses the 
potential effect of notoriety that might stem from previous lawsuits. I then match for each 
complementary patent, all control patents that meet the criteria. For each complementary 
patent, I denote time t0 as the year of the disclosure event and calculate all variables for 
the complementary patens and control patents relative to this date. I form the counterfactual 
Litigation Rate for each complementary patent by taking the average Litigation Rate for 
all matching control patents. My sample of complementary patents consists of the first time 
a patent becomes complementary to the standard.  
If we think of becoming complementary as a treatment, and if we are willing to 
assume that conditional on the matching variables, treatment is exogenous, then the 
imputed counterfactual from the untreated (control patents) patents can be used to calculate 
the patent’s treatment effect on the treated (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Abadie and 
Imbens, 2002).70 The treatment effect on the treated provides the effect of becoming 
complementary on the litigation rate compared to its counterfactual self (i.e. if it had not 
become complementary). The average across all such observations is the average treatment 
effect on the treated (ATET).  
                                                 
70 We need one additional assumption, that the probability of assignment to the treatment level is lies in 
between zero and one. Together with the other assumption, which more formally, conditional on 
observables, the conditional mean of the outcome for treated and untreated observations is independent of 
the treatment, I have the sufficient conditions for weak ‘strong ignorability’ (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983).  
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Table 3.5-Test 1 displays the results of the above matching procedure. ATET is 
2.84 and significant (p-value of 0.00). The results suggest that once the firm discloses IP 
to the standard, the future litigation rate of complementary patents increase by 2.84 
percentage points (pp) over what the rate would be if the patent was not complementary.   
From the regressions in Table 3.4, I find that a patent’s prior citations and the 
citations it receives correlate with litigation. It also reasons that these factors influence the 
likelihood of becoming complementary to the standard. Standard essential technologies 
tend to be more important and valuable than other patents even before disclosure to the 
standard (Rysman and Simcoe, 2008). It would reason that their complementary patents 
may possess similar traits. Per Table 3.3, I find that a complement patent tends to draw on 
greater depth and breadth of knowledge (see Backward Citations and Breadth of Citations), 
and receive more citations (Received Citations) than a random non-complementary patent. 
Therefore, to better meet the assumption of independence conditional observables, I 
account for these factors.  
I add Backward Citations and Breadth of Citations in Model 2. Since I do not have 
enough observations with exact matches, I instead use a nearest-neighbor matching 
procedure that chooses potential matches based on the lowest Mahalnobis Distance. To 
have more freedom to create matches, I drop the exact match on the Count of Past 
Litigation. Upon creating these matches, I compute the bias-adjusted average treatment 
effect on the treated (Abadie et al. 2004, Abadie and Imbens, 2011). I find a statistically 
significant ATET of 2.78 pp (p-value 0.00). Adding citations received in the three years 
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prior to the event date (Received Citations t-3:t-1) to better control for quality differences 
across patents increases ATET to 2.88 pp (Model 3).  
 In Table 3.5-Test 4, I reapply the strict exact matching procedure—i.e., only 
considering control patents that come from the same firm, application year, technology 
class, and that have the same Count of Past Litigation. I then match using Backward 
Citations and Breadth of Citations and Received Citationst-3:t-1. I find a strong and 
significant ATET (2.80 pp; p-value 0.00). This is over three times larger than the 
unconditional litigation rate (0.9 percent) in the within-firm sample. Thus, being 
complementary to disclosed IP appears to be both statistically and economically 
meaningful. The results support my core hypothesis—that the litigation propensity for 
complementary technologies will be higher than similar, but non-complementary 
technologies after the firm discloses standard essential IP. I find similar results when I use 
a four-year or five-year window for the Litigation Rate. For example, using a five-year 
window, all tests from Table 3.5 are statistically significant (at the 1 percent level), but 
exhibit slightly lower ATETs (range 0.8 pp to 1.4 pp).  
To test how the change in the litigation rate increases between the pre- and post-
event period, I use the matching specification from Table 3.5-Model 3 to conduct a 
difference-in-difference style of analysis. The event at time t0 is when the patent becomes 
complementary to the standard via the firm’s disclosure of SEPs. To conduct the analysis, 
I first estimate the ATET in the t-4 to t-1 period. To reduce ambiguity as to whether lawsuit 
is in the process of being filed prior to the standard, I exclude the year in which the firm 
discloses its SEP (i.e. t0) from the calculation. Next, I estimate the ATET in the post-event 
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period (t+1 to t+4). Then I compare the pre- and post-ATETs, which results in my 
difference-in-difference matching estimate.  
Table 3.6, Tests 1-3 show the estimates for the four-year windows. In the pre-event 
window (Test 1), the ATET is negative (-0.08) and insignificant. Conditional on 
observables, I find no statistical difference in the pre-event litigation rates. Test 2 displays 
the post-event ATET, which is positive and significant (0.87; p-value 0.001). The 
difference-in-difference estimate is 0.95 pp, with a p-value of 0.001. Patents that become 
complementary see a meaningful increase in their litigation rates as compared to their 
imputed counterfactual estimates. Results using three-year windows (Tests 4-6) support a 
similar conclusion. These results support my assentation that increase in the litigation rate 
for complementary technologies will only occur after the firm has disclosed to the SSO. 
 
Patent-Level Fixed Effect Models 
A firm’s patents that do not become complementary to the standard may comprise 
a part of another technology platform that was not selected. For example, a firm may 
develop along two parallel technology trajectories. A standard emerges that 
institutionalizes one of the technology platforms; the other, rejected platform, may become 
worthless. If this is the case, the post-event increase in the litigation rate in the prior 
analyses could be inflated because the control group decreases while the treatment group 
increases.  
To suppress this concern, I focus only on the complementary patents themselves 
and use their own prior litigation rate as a control group. First, I sample complementary 
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patents using only the first instance of becoming complementary. Second, for patents with 
at least five-years of pre-event and five-years of post-event data, I calculate the dependent 
variable as the five-year litigation rate. Third, I create a patent-period panel that contains 
only two time periods (a five-year litigation rate for the pre-event period and five-year 
litigation rate in post-event period). Complementary Technology takes the value of one 
once the patent becomes complementary.  Because patent value and age tend to exhibit an 
inverse-U shaped relationship, I control for Age and Age Squared. I start by running the 
analysis on Litigation, which takes the value of one if the patent is litigated in the five-year 
period and zero otherwise. I estimate the model using fixed effect logit.  
Table 3.7-Model 1 displays the estimates for the five-year windows (t-5 to t-1, t0 
to t+4). The coefficient for Complementary Technology is 0.549 and statistically significant 
(p-value 0.000). Fixed effect logit coefficients cannot be used to recover the marginal 
effects because the marginal effects depend on the fixed effects that are conditioned out of 
the equation. However, the average semi-elasticity can be estimated (Kitazawa, 2012).71 
Using the estimated semi-elasticity, I find that five-year litigation rate increases by 54 
percent once the patent becomes complementary to the standard. The results are both 
economically and statistically significant.  
As a robustness check, I also using a five-year model but omit the event year, (t0) 
from both windows (Model 2). This avoids ambiguity around whether the initial actions to 
                                                 
71 If we want to estimate the average semi-elasticity of  
𝜕𝑙𝑛 Pr [𝑦𝑖𝑡=1|𝑥𝑖𝑡,𝛼𝑖]
𝜕𝑥𝑖𝑡
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1+exp [𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑡+𝛼𝑖]
 , we find that it 
is a function of the fixed effect α, which has been conditioned out of the model (Chamberlain, 1980). 
However, Kitazawa (2012) result bypasses dealing with α because the expected value of the average semi-
elasticity can be consistently estimated as  𝐸[𝑠𝑒𝑚𝑖 − 𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦] = 𝛽(1 − 𝐸[𝑦𝑖𝑡]), where 𝐸[𝑦𝑖𝑡]) = ?̅? 
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file a lawsuit preceded the disclosure in time. Results are similar. I also use a four-year 
window (Model 3) and find similar results.  
Models 4-6 use the Litigation Count as the dependent variable. I estimate the 
models using a conditional fixed effect Poisson model estimated via quasi-maximum 
likelihood and calculate robust standard errors. In Model 4 I find that the coefficient for 
Complementary Technology is 0.504 and statistically significant (p-value 0.000). The 
patent experiences a 50 percent increase in the five-year count of lawsuits once it becomes 
complementary to the standard. Using the alternative windows, I find similar results (see 
Model 5-6). The results further support my hypothesis that litigation rates for 
complementary technologies will rise post-disclosure.  
 
Separating the Incentive Effect from the Demand Effect  
The prior analyses depict a positive relationship between Complementary 
Technology and the future litigation rate, which is consistent with two interpretations. One, 
as a technology becomes complementary to the standard, the firm has a greater incentive 
to protect it. Two, once the standard is set, the demand for technologies related to the 
standard increases, which in turn, increases the potential for infringement on these 
technologies. I expect that both the incentive and demand effects drive the Complementary 
Technology-Litigation Rate relationship. In this section, I try to separately identify the size 
of the two effects by accounting for the potential increase in demand in the Litigation-
Complementary Technology model.  
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To provide a rough estimate of the two effects, I first need a measure of a patent’s 
demand or value. I assume that received citations approximate the value of and demand for 
a patent. As noted before, prior literature commonly uses citations as a measure of value 
(Harhoff et al., 1999; Jaffe and Trajtenberg 2004; Allison et al., 2004; Hall et al., 2005; 
Rysman & Simcoe, 2008). For instance, Simcoe et al. (2009) use citations received post-
disclosure as a proxy for the increase in demand for SEPs.  
I measure the post-disclosure event increase in demand for a patent as the number 
received citations in the t0 to t+5 period (Received Citations). To measure litigation, I use 
Litigation Rate in the t0 to 2014 widow. I expect that demand for a patent will be affected 
by the firm’s litigiousness, therefore, I will need to simultaneously estimate a model for 
each endogenous variable. I use the within-firm patent sample used in Table 3.5. 
To identity each model, I need instruments that effect one endogenous variable but 
not the other. In the Litigation Rate equation, I use the firm’s total patents over the prior 
five years (Total Patents 5-year). I expect that firms in the sample have litigation related 
capabilities, such as in-house IP lawyers and outside law firm relationships. However, as 
the firm’s patent portfolio grows larger, the ability to scan the environment for incidences 
of infringement should decrease. Using a firm-level fixed effects to control for litigation 
capabilities, I expect that Total Patents will negatively influence the Litigation Rate for a 
patent. Because I am relying on within-firm variation in Total Patents to identify the model, 
I check to see if there is sufficient within-firm variation in Total Patents. Total Patents 
does vary within firm, with a within-firm standard deviation of 2,600 and coefficient of 
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variation 55 percent. I exclude Total Patents from the demand model because I assume that 
a patent’s importance is not a function of the size of a firm’s patent portfolio.72  
In the demand equation, I use the patent’s received citations in the t-5 to t-1 window 
(Received Citationst-5:t-1). Using the patent’s prior citations, I proxy for its pre-event 
importance, which should positively influence future demand. In a second specification, I 
also include the ratio of a patent’s Received Citations t-5:t-1 to the total citations received by 
all patents in its technology class during t-5 to t-1 window (Relative Citationst-5:t-1) as an 
instrument. Relative Citationst-5:t-1 proxies for the relative importance and visibility of the 
patent. If the entire technology area experiences an increase in demand after the formation 
of the standard, Relative Citationst-5:t-1, will account for the proportional increase in the 
demand that the patent should experience. I exclude both variables from the litigation 
model because I assume that the future litigation rate is a function of the expected demand 
for the patent which is approximated by Received Citationst0:t+5. Once I condition on 
expected future demand, I assume that the patent’s prior importance should not affect the 
litigation rate. If this assumption does not hold, the litigation equation will not be identified.   
I measure the effect of complementarity in both equations. Complementary 
Technology indicates the patent is complementary to IP disclosed at time t0. In the litigation 
equation, Complementary Technology should approximate the incentive effect, given that 
I am including the demand proxy, Received Citations. In the demand equation, 
Complementary Technology estimates the increase in demand due to being complementary 
to the standard.  
                                                 
72 This should hold after conditioning on complementary technologies.  
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I also include a set of variables common to both equations. To control for 
knowledge structure of the patent, I included Backward Citations and Breadth of Citations. 
To control for visibility of the patent to others and the patent’s importance, I included each 
patent’s prior number of lawsuits (Prior Litigation Count). To suppress unobservable 
factors related to the firm, technological area, environment, and patents’ age, I include firm, 
technology class, year, and application year fixed effects.  
 To simplify estimation of the system, I use a linear specification for both equations, 
which should roughly approximate the marginal effects in both models. To check this, I 
run both the litigation and demand equation separately using OLS. I exclude the 
endogenous regressors. Table 3.8-Model 1 provides the linear probability model results for 
the litigation equation. I find that becoming complementary increases the likelihood of 
future litigation by 3.7 percent (Complementary Technology coefficient 0.037, p-value 
0.000). To benchmark, the marginal effect from a probit model suggests a 3.1 percent 
increase.  
Model 2 displays the linear count model for the demand equation. Using linear 
estimates, complementary patents receive 3.06 more citations than non-complementary 
patents. Using a Poisson or Negative Binomial specification, I find average partial effects 
of 5.42 and 3.67 respectively. The linear model may underestimate the effect. Note that the 
instruments in both Model 1 and Model 2 are significant.  
To estimate the system, I use three-stage least squares (3SLS) (Zellner and Theil, 
1962).  3SLS allow error correlation across equations and provide more efficient estimation 
than other methods (e.g. two-stage least squares) at the cost of transmitting a specific 
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equation specification error through the entire system. Using the less efficient 2SLS, I find 
similar results. 
Model 3 displays the system estimation using one instrument per equation. In the 
demand equation, the instrument strongly predicts demand (Received Citationst-5:t-1 0.529; 
p-value 0.000). I find a positive and significant effect for Complementary Technology 
(2.27; p-value 0.000) and a positive but insignificant effect for the Litigation Rate (41.59; 
p-value 0.15).  
To separate the demand effect from the incentive effect, I use the predicted 
Received Citations t0:t+5 to account for the post-event bump in demand, which should 
allow the estimate of Complementary Technology to generate a rough approximation of the 
incentive to litigate. In the litigation equation in Model 3, I find a positive and significant 
effect for both Received Citationst0:t+5 (0.0002; p-value 0.000) and Complementary 
Technology (0.015; p-value 0.000). Using the median value for the predicted Received 
Citationst0:t+5 for complementary patents, I find that typical post-event increase in demand 
increases the Litigation Rate up by 1.87 percentage points. The Litigation Rate is 1.5 
percentage points greater for the firm’s complementary patents than for the firm’s non-
complementary patents. This provides a ballpark estimate of the incentive effect. Model 4 
displays the estimate with the second instrument added to the demand equation, results 
remain similar.  
I may not have enough within-firm variation in Total Patents for the demand 
equation to be identified properly. Therefore, I rerun the model on a subsample in which 
all observations have a within-firm coefficient of variation for Total Patents that is above 
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the median. Model 5 shows the results. In the litigation equation, I find a positive and 
significant effect for both Received Citations t0:t+5 (0.0001; p-value 0.000) and 
Complementary Technology (0.023; p-value 0.000), The impact of Complementary 
Technology is larger in both equations than in the full sample models. Note that Litigation 
Rate negatively affects future citations (-108; p-value 0.038), which differs from the 
positive and insignificant effect found in prior models. The finding is more consistent with 
the expectation from prior literature that litigiousness will deter rivals from your 
technological space.  
Using the estimate for Received Citationst0:t+5 in Model 5, I find that for the median 
complementary patent, demand increases the probability of future litigation by 0.6 pp. Not 
surprisingly, I find a larger effect for Complementary Technology (2.23 pp; p-value 0.000), 
than in Model 3 or Model 4.  
While not shown, I also estimate the litigation model including the interaction 
between the Received Citationst0:t+5 and Complementary Technology, while including both 
instruments Received Citationst-5:t-1 and Relative Citationst-5:t-1 in the demand equation. 
Using the sample from Model 5, I find positive and significant effects for Received 
Citationst0:t+5 (0.0007; p-value 0.000), Complementary Technology (0.006; p-value 0.017), 
and their interaction (0.001; p-value 0.000). All instruments in the model are significant. 
The results suggest that even after accounting for the specific effect of demand on 
complementary technologies, there remains a positive incentive effect. 
Overall, the system estimates allow me to suppress the effect of demand on future 
litigation by controlling for its endogenous nature in the model. Doing so, I find an 
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economically and statistically significant effect of Complementary Technology. This points 
to an effect on litigation that goes beyond the ‘demand effect.’ Indeed, estimates suggest 
that the incentive effect accounts for approximately 50 percent to 85 percent of the effect 
of complementarity on litigation. 
However, I interpret these results cautiously for several reasons. First, in the models 
shown in Table 3.8, I am only account for average demand, not for how demand differs in 
its impacts litigation across complementary and non-complementary patents. While I 
discuss the results of the model including the interaction of Complementary Technology 
and Received Citationst0:t+5, I am may not have enough unique information from the two 
instruments to identify both endogenous variables. Second, linear models only crudely 
approximate the marginal effects in discrete choice and count models, though the results 
here seem reasonable. Third, I assume that Litigation is independent of prior demand when 
I condition on a proxy for expected future demand (as measured by the predicted value of 
Received Citationst0:t+5), which may be a tenuous assumption. Four, I assume that 
Complementary Technology is uncorrelated with the error terms. However, unobserved 
factors that make the technology compatible with standard essential technology could 
correlate with litigation rates or demand. I help suppress this issue using only patents from 
firms that disclose and that have complementary technologies. I further suppress the effect 
by comparing the complementary patent to very similar patents (same firm, technology 
class, and age) and controlling for other important elements (Backward Citations, Breadth 
of Citations and Prior Litigation Count). Yet, the model may still provide biased estimates.  
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DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION 
 In this paper, I examine the role complementary technologies play in the firm’s IP 
strategy.  Firms actively participating in standard setting often disclose IP that becomes 
essential for the functionality of the standard. By doing so, they lose some measures of 
control over these technologies, often in exchange for licensing revenue. While prior 
literature focuses mostly on these standard essential technologies, instead, I use them as a 
starting point to unravel how they play a role in the firms’ broader standards related IP 
strategy. I argue that firms benefit by having SEPs, not only through licensing revenue, but 
also through the increase in value of their portfolio of technologies complementary to the 
SEPs. Therefore, the firm will focus its appropriation strategy around these technologies. I 
trace these efforts by observing differences in patent litigation. Because of the costly nature 
of lawsuits, higher litigation rates should point to greater appropriation efforts on the part 
of the firm.  
I find strong support for my predictions. As compared to a random sample of similar 
patents, complementary patents have higher litigation rates. To better identify the effect, I 
use information on very similar patents within the firm’s own portfolio to create 
counterfactuals for the complementary patents. I find strong evidence that the firm litigates 
patents once they become complementary more than they likely would have otherwise. 
Focusing only on complementary patents, I also find that the future litigation rate and the 
number of lawsuits increase once the patent becomes complementary to a SEP. The fact 
that firms only start to focus their litigation efforts on these technologies once they become 
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complementary provides strong evidence for a causal link between becoming 
complementary to the standard and a patent’s future litigation rate.  
However, the mechanism underlying this causal link is not clear because two 
interpretations are consistent with the previously discussed findings. One, firms more 
vigorously protect their complementary patents because these patents become more 
valuable and central to the firm’s IP strategy. Two, the standard increases the demand for 
the complementary technologies—as more firms adopt the standard, the incidence of 
infringement, either intentional or inadvertent, increases which raises the litigation rate. 
Mapping back to my theory, I suggest that technology compatible with the standard will 
experience higher litigation rates because they become more valuable and because they 
represent applications of how the supply the standard, which is consistent with both 
interpretations. However, if complementary patents make the firm more competitive or 
play a central role in the firm’s technology trajectory, then the firm should have a greater 
incentive to protect them, which emphasizes the first interpretation. To distinguish between 
the two, I estimate the effect of complementarity on litigation rates while accounting for 
the endogenous increase in demand. The tentative results suggest that demand does not 
account for the entire increase in the litigation rate. Rough decompositions of the overall 
effect using the estimates from Table 3.8, I find that the demand effect may range from 15 
percent to 50 percent of the overall effect of complementarity on litigation. Therefore, the 
incentive effect likely accounts for a nontrivial portion (50 percent to 85 percent) of the 
estimated effect of complementarity.   
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My thesis shifts our view of how firms capture value in the technological portfolio 
from standard setting. Prior literature depicts SEPs as valuable assets because they often 
provide a stream of licensing revenue (Lerner and Tirole, 2006), elevate the firm’s 
reputation as a technology pioneer (Lerner and Tirole, 2002; Waguespack and Fleming, 
2009), or allow the firm the ability to control the pace of technological progression 
(Simcoe, 2012). I add to this literature by demonstrating that SEPs, through non-disclosed 
complementary technologies, can also enhance the firm’s ability to appropriate returns in 
their non-disclosed technological portfolio. By doing so, I also provide a reasonable 
explanation why firms would disclose SEPs, even when doing so does not yield direct 
financial or reputational benefits.  
I also extend the profiting from innovation framework by (Teece, 1986; 1996) by 
providing empirical support for the role complementarity plays in the firm’s technology 
portfolio. While empirical work has mostly focused on the role of complementary 
downstream assets (Tripsas 1997; Arora and Coeccagnoli, 2006), I show how technological 
complementarity influences the firm’s appropriation strategy.  
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Table 3.1. Variable Calculations  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Patent Level Measures: 
Litigation Dummy
Litigation Count
Prior Litigation Count
Complementary Technology
Received Citations
Backward Citations
Breadth of Citations
Age
Technology Class
Firm Level  Measures:
Total Patents (5-year)
Number Tech Classes (5-year)
Patent Scope (5-year)
Total Assets
Revenues
PP&E
CAPX Intensity
Operating Margin
Number of lawsuits that patent is involved prior to the disclosure event.
Number of citations the patent makes to other prior art. 
How many different, unique technology classes are covered in the patent's backward citations.
Whether patent is litigated over the designated window (0/1).
Number of lawsuits that patent is involved in over the designated window.
Total property, plant, and equipment of the firm in the prior year.
Total capital expenditures over total revenues in the prior year.
Operating income over revenues in the prior year. 
Co-cited with a SEP of a different technology class prior to or in the year of the SEPs 
disclosure.
The primary technology class assigned by the USPTO
Time in years from the patent's application date to time t.
Firm's total number patents in the prior five years.
Total number different technology classes that firm patents in during the prior five years
Take the ratio of firm's patents in each technology class to total patents in five year period. 
Scope is one minus the sum of the squared ratios. 
Total assets of the firm in the prior year.
Total revenues of the firm in prior year. 
Number of citations the firm receives during designated window. 
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Figure 3.1. SEPs & complementary patents by SSO 
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Table 3.2. SEPs, complementary patents, & litigation rates for select standards & firms 
 
 
In Panel A, the same patent that is disclosed to multiple standards will be included in each 
standard's count of SEPs. The same goes for Complementary Patents. In Panel B, I count 
a patent that is disclosed to or becomes complementary to multiple standards only once. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A.
Example Standards SEPs
Complementary 
Patents
Litigation Rate 
t0:t+5 (%)
Litigation Rate 
t0:t=2014 (%) Description
Wireless Cellular Standards:
3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) 435 3,351 1.8 2.5
Covers cross-SSO consortia that manages the release of 3rd, 4th, 
and 5th generation wireless standards (i.e. W-CDMA, TDD, 
HSDPA, HSUPA, HSPA+, LTE) that are not broken out below.
CDMA2000 44 863 0.9 0.9 3rd generation mobile wireless standards.
General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) 540 4,744 1.0 1.5 Mobile data service standard for GSM
GSM EDGE Radio Access Network (GERAN) 232 143 1.7 1.7
Radio element of the GSM-EDGE network the specifies the 
interoperability of base station and control/switching systems.
Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) 357 1,192 1.4 2.9 2nd generation TDMA based cellular standard.
Push to Talk over Cellular (PoC) 16 74 4.0 10.5
Covers technology that allows for walkie-talkie type usage over 
mobile cellular networks. 
Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) 504 2,599 1.2 2.1
Third generation mobile cellular standard using W-CDMA 
technology. 
Other wireless cellular standards 435 3,351 1.8 2.5
Composite of 3rd and 4th generation wireless standards (i.e. W-
CDMA, TDD, HSDPA, HSUPA, HSPA+, LTE,) that are not 
broken out above. 
Other Communication Standards:
Digital Enhanced Cordless Telecommunications (DECT) 22 262 0.4 1.8 Standard covering cordless telephone systems.
Local Area Networks (LAN) 343 1,912 1.6 1.6 Includes Ethernet, wireless Lan (Wi-Fi) and other 
Digital private mobile radio (dPMR) 12 226 1.3 2.1 Simple common air interface standard for private networks
Universal Integrated Circuit Cad (UICC) 7 98 2.9 8.6 Smart card used in GSM and UMTS network mobile terminals 
Internet & Audio-Visual Standards:
Firewire 69 196 1.8 2.3 Interface standard for devices
Forward Link Only (FLO) 14 30 5.3 5.3
Standard coving delivery of multimedia over TV channel 
bandwidths 
Internet Protocol televisions (IPTV) 6 58 9.4 9.4 TV content delivery using internet protocol.
MPEG-4 & associated audio visual standards 237 967 2.4 2.8 Method for compressing digital audio and visual data. 
Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) 5 794 0.8 2.0 Pre-HTML wireless web browser standard for mobile devices.
vCards 2 71 1.4 11.0 Standard covering electronic business cards.
Panel B.
Example Firms SEPs
Complementary 
Patents
Litigation Rate 
t0:t+5 (%)
Litigation Rate 
t0:t=2014 (%) Description
AT&T 34 38 13.9 19.4 Internet, LAN, MPEG, transmission systems  
Apple 32 261 1.4 1.4 Internet, firewire, MPEG,  LAN 
Broadcom 11 8 5.3 10.5 Cable networks, internet, wireless cellular
Cisco 58 702 0.7 1.3 Internet, LAN, MPEG
Ericsson 206 1,202 1.3 2.3 Internet, transmission systems, wireless cellular
Fujitsu 15 53 2.9 2.9 MPEG, voice and data
Hybrid Networks 11 5 18.8 18.8 LAN
Lucent Technologies 18 128 2.1 3.4 Transmission systems 
Motorola 291 2,625 0.6 1.5 LAN, transmission systems, wireless cellular
Nokia 248 1,235 1.3 2.5 Internet, LAN, transmission systems, wireless cellular
Nortel Networks 92 447 0.2 3.6 Firewire, internet, LAN, transmission systems
Panasonic 48 168 1.0 1.9 Digital media & broadcasting, MPEG, voice and data
Qualcomm 209 1,076 1.8 2.9 IPTV, LAN, transmission systems, wireless cellular standards
Stratacom 2 21 17.4 17.4 Internet, IPTV, LAN
Toshiba 4 22 3.8 11.5 Internet, LAN, wireless cellular
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Table 3.3. Descriptive for complementary patents and random matches 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.4. Descriptive probit analysis of litigation 
 
 
p-values in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Variable
N Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Litigation Rate t0:t=2014  (%) 17,670 2.14 14.47 0.96 9.76 0.000
Litigation Count t0:t=2014 17,670 0.05 0.53 0.03 0.82 0.013
Litigation Rate t0: t+5 (%) 15,635 1.02 10.06 0.54 7.32 0.000
Litigation  Count  t0: t+5 15,635 0.01 0.17 0.01 0.19 0.006
Prior Litigation Rate application date: t-1 (%) 17,670 0.82 9.02 0.28 5.31 0.000
Prior Litigation Count applicatio date: t-1 17,670 0.01 0.19 0.00 0.10 0.000
Received Citations t-3 to t-1 15,367 14.42 18.47 5.55 9.19 0.000
Received Citations t-5 to t-1 12,497 25.30 30.80 9.73 15.13 0.000
Backward Citations 17,567 12.75 19.45 10.68 17.82 0.000
Breadth of Citations 17,567 3.73 2.90 3.47 2.77 0.000
Age 17,670 7.54 5.04 7.54 5.04 1.000
Total Patents (5-year) 17,346 4,355 5,487 4,448 5,005 0.098
Number Tech Classes (5-year) 17,346 106 62 115 71 0.000
Patent Scope (5-year) 17,346 0.88 0.11 0.89 0.16 0.000
Total Assets 17,667 39,464 35,170 50,398 74,620 0.000
Revenues 17,667 33,595 26,968 38,291 33,583 0.000
PP&E 17,667 15,954 20,356 21,933 23,983 0.000
CAPX Intensity 17,658 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.12 0.000
Operating Margin 17,667 0.14 0.16 0.03 1.72 0.000
Complementary Patents Random Match  Patents
Difference in means (p-
value from t- test)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Dependent Variable Litigation (0/1) Litigation (0/1) Litigation (0/1) Litigation (0/1) Litigation (0/1)
Litigation 
Count
Litigation 
Count Litigation (0/1)
Window t0:t=2014 t0:t=2014  t1: t+4  t1: t+5  t0: t+5 t0:t=2014 t0:t=2014
t=application 
date : t-1
Method Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Poisson Poisson Probit
Information Shown APE APE APE APE APE Coefficient Coefficient APE
Complementary Technology 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.004** 0.004** 0.003** 0.401*** 0.608*** 0.006***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.0440) (0.00623) (0.0397) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000350)
Backward Citations -0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00001 -0.0001 -0.012*** 0.00001
(0.186) (0.254) (0.0701) (0.175) (4.81e-09) (0.834)
Breadth of Citations 0.002*** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001*** 0.174*** -0.00001
(0.000) (0.015) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.968)
Received Citations (t-3 to t-1) 0.0004*** 0.0002*** 0.00001*** 0.0001*** 0.0148*** 0.0002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Total Patents (5-year) in 000s -0.0001*** -0.0004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.131*** -0.400
(0.000) (0.162) (0.476) (0.369) (0.000) (0.261)
ln(Revenues) -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.0847*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
PP&E in 000s -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.004*** -0.001
(0.803) (0.704) (0.724) (0.956) (0.003) (0.796)
CAPX Intensity -0.008 -0.010 -0.008 -0.008 0.0256 -0.025
(0.725) (0.604) (0.591) (0.644) (0.953) (0.140)
Operating Margin 0.008 0.008* 0.010** 0.010* 0.0226 0.004
(0.105) (0.087) (0.038) (0.070) (0.650) (0.202)
Application Year Fixed Effect NO YES YES YES YES NO YES YES
Technology Class Fixed Effect NO YES YES YES YES NO NO YES
Industry Fixed Effect NO YES YES YES YES NO NO YES
Year Fixed Effect NO YES YES YES YES NO NO YES
Observations 35,340 25,295 21,102 23,079 20,989 35,340 21,974 14,869
Pseudo R-squared 0.02 0.14 0.240 0.13 0.24 0.004 0.13 0.25
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Table 3.5. Within-firm matching analysis of litigation rates 
 
 
Dependent variable is litigation rate t0:t=2014. Test statistics use Abadie & Imbens' 
robust standard errors. Treatment is the presence of complementary technologies.  
Significant (two-sided test) at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nearest-neighbor 
matching variables Exact match
(1) none
Firm, Application year, 
Technology Class, 
Year, Count of Past 
Litigation 2.84 0.23 0.00 81,852
(2)
Backward Citations, 
Breadth of Citations
Firm, Application year, 
Technology Class, 
Year 2.78 0.26 0.00 80,943
(3) 
Backward Citations, 
Breadth of Citations, 
Received Citations (t-3:t-1)
Firm, Application year, 
Technology Class, 
Year 2.88 0.30 0.00 68,514
(4) 
Backward Citations, 
Breadth of Citations, 
Received Citations (t-3:t-1)
Firm, Application year, 
Technology Class, 
Year, Count of Past 
Litigation 2.80 0.30 0.00 68,311
Average 
Treatment 
Effect on 
Treated (pp)
A&I 
Robust 
SE p-value Total N
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Table 3.6. Within-firm difference-in-difference matching analysis of litigation rates 
 
 
Test statistics use Abadie & Imbens' robust standard errors. Treatment is the presence of 
complementary technologies.  Significant (two-sided test) at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
 
Table 3.7. Fixed effect Logit and Poisson models 
 
 
Robust p-values calculated from standard errors that account for within firm clustering in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
p-value Total N
(1) Litigation Rate t-4:t-1 -0.08 0.15 0.608 39,577  
(2) Litigation Rate t+1:t+4 0.87 0.25 0.001 39,577  
(3) Difference-in Difference 0.95 0.30 0.001 39,577  
(4) Litigation Rate t-3:t-1 0.03 0.01 0.743 55,425  
(5) Litigation Rate t+1:t+3 0.72 0.16 0.000 55,425  
(6) Difference-in Difference 0.70 0.09 0.000 55,425  
Test
Average 
Treatment 
Effect on 
Treated 
(pp)
A&I 
Robust 
SE
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Dependent variable: 
Litigation 
(0/1)
Litigation 
(0/1)
Litigation 
(0/1)
Litigation 
Count
Litigation 
Count
Litigation 
Count
 Window length: 5 year
5 year 
(omitting t0) 4 year 5 year
5 year 
(omitting t0) 4 year
Method
Fixed 
Effect Logit
Fixed 
Effect Logit
Fixed 
Effect Logit
Fixed 
Effect 
Poisson
Fixed 
Effect 
Poisson
Fixed 
Effect 
Poisson
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full
Complementary Technology 0.549*** 0.349*** 0.511*** 0.504*** 0.337*** 0.468***
(0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000)
Age 0.100 0.124* 0.057 0.098 0.122 0.032
(0.125) (0.0663) (0.424) (0.220) (0.121) (0.724)
Age Square -0.002 -0.003 0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0.002
(0.575) (0.281) (0.579) (0.652) (0.310) (0.570)
Observations 1,194 1,174 1,103 1,212 1,190 1,115
Log-pseudolikelihood -490.95 -475.37 -427.38 -868.81 -822.52 -741.04
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Table 3.8. Analysis of demand and incentive effects 
 
 
p-values in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2
Method OLS OLS
Equation Litigation Demand Litigation Demand Litigation Demand Litigation Demand
Dependent Variable Litigation Rate
Received 
Citations
Litigation 
Rate
Received 
Citations
Litigation 
Rate
Received 
Citations
Litigation 
Rate
Received 
Citations
Litigation Rate 41.59 12.90 -108.0**
(0.150) (0.612) (0.038)
Received Citations t0:t+5 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Complementary Technology 0.037*** 3.058*** 0.015*** 2.267*** 0.015*** 2.602*** 0.023*** 4.798***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Total Patents (5-year) in 000s -0.00001*** -0.00001*** -0.00001*** -0.0001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Relative Citations t-5:t-1 27.81*** 55.35***
(0.000) (0.000)
Received Citations t-5:t-1 0.529*** 0.497*** 0.492*** 0.545***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Backward Citations 0.0002*** 0.034*** 0.0003*** 0.0214** 0.0003*** 0.030*** 0.0001 0.010
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.035) (0.000) (0.000) (0.623) (0.431)
Breadth of Citations 0.0001 0.119*** -0.0003 0.125*** -0.0003 0.115*** 0.0003 0.315***
(0.443) (0.000) (0.200) (0.000) (0.210) (0.000) (0.448) (0.000)
Prior Litigation Count 0.070*** 0.088 0.057*** -2.299 0.058*** -0.569 0.044*** 4.184*
(0.000) (0.859) (0.000) (0.186) (0.000) (0.711) (0.000) (0.081)
Constant -0.0424 -4.65 -0.034 -2.871 -0.034 -5.835 0.007 9.444
(0.535) (0.528) (0.648) (0.717) (0.645) (0.430) (0.936) (0.418)
Firm Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Application Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Technology Class Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year Fixed Effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 67,911 67,911 67,911 67,911 67,911 67,911 32,826 32,826
R-Square 0.03 0.50 0.04 0.43 0.04 0.50 0.04 0.58
3SLS
Model 5
3SLS
Model 3
3SLS
Model 4
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Appendix 3.1. Litigation of Standard Essential Patents & Complementary Patents 
  
 In this section, I discuss the relationship between SEPs and complementary patents 
in patent lawsuits and how their individual litigation rates compare. Litigation of IP related 
to standards tends to fall into two broad categories. The first set of lawsuits tend to focus 
on cases where one or more parties allegedly infringes on the plaintiff’s SEP by adopting 
the standard. Table A3.1 breaks down lawsuits that include a SEP or complementary 
patent. SEP focused cases tend to cover a smaller number of SEPs (see column three in 
Table 9), with 1.3 SEPs litigated on average. The second set of lawsuits revolve around 
how the defendant applies the standard in product market competition. These suits often 
detail how the defendant allegedly infringes on the plaintiff’s IP by including it into a 
product that functions on a standard, such as smartphone. In Table A3.1, I find that of the 
343 cases with at least one complementary patent, 25 percent of the cases also include a 
SEP. Cases that include both a SEP and complementary patent tend to specify a larger 
number of patents (4.8 SEPs and 6.6 complementary patents on average). Often, the 
plaintiff alleges the defendant infringes on its SEP by using the standard while not licensing 
the underlying IP, and then builds products that apply the standard, and by doing so, 
infringe on the firm’s complementary IP.  
Table A3.1 Lawsuits by SEP and complementary technology 
 
 
Lawsuits | SEP>=1
Lawsuits | SEP>=1, 
Comp. Tech.=0
Lawsuits |Comp. 
Tech>=1
Lawsuits |Comp. Tech>=1 
& SEP=0
Number of lawsuits 238 153 343 258
SEPs
   Mean 2.55 1.3 1.19 -
   Standard deviation 4.08 0.8 3.69 -
Complementary Technology
   Mean 2.36 - 4.19 3.39
   Standard deviation 6.47 - 6.38 4.72
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Strong Firms, Weak Products? The Role Of Within-Firm Product 
Complementarities In New Market Entry Strategy 
 
 
Abstract 
 
While prior research documents the importance of pre-entry resources on the likelihood of 
entry and post-entry success, less studied are firms’ product strategies as they enter new 
markets. Evidence suggests that highly capable firms often enter markets with inferior products 
yet thrive in the market. I address this puzzle by examining firms’ product feature choices as 
they enter new markets, and how these choices affect performance. I argue that new product 
markets are embedded in ecosystems comprised of other, complementary product markets and 
that this influences firms’ product strategy. Taking a demand-side view of complementarities, 
I propose that firms with existing products complementary to the new market will enter the new 
market with products that have lower technical performance, and that firms with 
complementarities will choose features and components that function with their 
complementary products and exclude features and components that do not. Examining entry 
into the nascent smartphone market, I find strong support for these conclusions. Empirical 
results also demonstrate that firms can achieve high market performance by relying on 
complementarities in lieu of high technical performance. I identify complementarities within 
the firm’s product portfolio as an important driver of product strategy in new markets, and 
compatibility between complementary products as a mechanism the firm can use to achieve 
successful entry.  
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INTRODUCTION 
New market entry has long been an important topic in strategy (Helfat and 
Lieberman, 2002). Prior research suggests that a firm’s pre-entry resources influence what 
product markets it will enter (Penrose, 1959; Mitchell, 1989; Helfat and Lieberman, 2002; 
Lee, 2008). Literature also demonstrates that diversifying entrants that possess resources, 
such as technological knowhow, that fit the needs of the new market tend to be more 
successful when they enter (Klepper and Simon, 2000; King and Tucci, 2002; Franco, 
Sarakar, Agarwal, and Echambadi, 2009). Yet we know much less about firms’ product 
strategies as they enter nascent markets despite the importance that key strategic elements, 
such as product design, play in post-entry success (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995; Krishnan 
and Ulrich, 2001). Understanding what drives heterogeneity surrounding product design 
choices can allow us to better assess the performance of a firm’s entry strategy and how 
entry into a market fits into the firm’s overall strategy. 
Our limited knowledge of product strategies in new markets is apparent in 
technology focused sectors. Here, common wisdom suggests that diversifying entrants with 
superior technological resources will choose to compete by developing products with high 
technical performance (Bayus and Agarwal, 2007; Franco, et al. 2009). However, firms 
with strong technological resources that compete on the technological frontier in existing 
markets often enter new markets with products that exhibit low technical performance or 
contain a limited set of features. Knowledge based theories suggest that these firms cannot 
adequately transfer their technological resources to the new market (Winter, 1995; 
Szulanski, 1996). Yet, these firms often thrive in the new market, even when competing 
against other firms whose products have superior technical performance. This suggests that 
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firms may intentionally enter behind the technological frontier.73 74 So why would firms 
with strong technological capabilities enter behind the technological frontier? What drives 
their product strategy in new markets?  
To address these questions, I depart from prior literature that typically focuses on 
how the firm’s resources match with new market, and instead, consider how other markets 
the firm operates in may influence its product strategy in the new market. Indeed, a new 
product market is often part of an innovation ecosystem consisting of many complementary 
markets (Adner and Kapoor, 2010). In such an ecosystem, there is the potential for cross-
market correlation in consumer preferences (Brandenberg and Nalebuff, 1996; Zander and 
Zander, 2005; Ye, Priem, and Alshwer, 2012; Schmidt, Makadok, and Keil, 2016) that the 
firm can exploit if it owns complementary products in the ecosystem. Therefore, a firm’s 
position in other markets in the ecosystem may bear on its product strategy as it enters a 
new market.75  
In this paper, I examine how the firm’s portfolio of existing products influences its 
entry strategy and its resulting performance in the new market. I identify a key element that 
influences the firm’s entry strategy—the potential complementarity between its existing 
products and its new market products. Products are complementary when consumers derive 
more value from using the products together than separately.76 I assume both products exist 
separately and one is not just a component part of the other. I predict that firms with 
complementary products will enter the new market with products that exhibit lower 
                                                 
73 Examples include Merrill Lynch in online brokerage and Google in smart television/digital media 
players. 
74 This is especially puzzling because early adopters typically prefer technological performance (Porter, 
1983; Adner and Levinthal, 2001; Rogers, 2003). 
75 Prior literature on innovation incentives demonstrates that the firm’s position in the current market 
influences its incentive to invest in new technologies (Arrow, 1962; Reinganum, 1985; Conner, 1988). 
Likewise, position in complementary markets can influence the firm’s technological decisions in new 
markets.  
76 Complementary products can be thought of as Edgeworth complements in that when both can be 
accessed and consumed together then utility is higher than it otherwise would be (Allen, 1934; Samuelson, 
1974).  
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technical performance or contain fewer features as compared to firms without 
complementary products, but achieve similar success in the market.  
I conduct my empirical tests using product characteristics in the nascent stage of 
the global smartphone market. I collect a novel dataset on smartphone features that allows 
for the calculation of dependent variables that capture complexity of a product’s technical 
performance. I use several matching and propensity score weighting techniques to address 
potential selection issues related to complementary products. I also account for selection 
into the market. 
I find that firms with complementary products enter the new market with products 
that exhibit inferior technical performance as compared to firms without complementary 
products, yet perform better in terms of market share. I also unpack how firms make 
decisions regarding product features. Consistent with the strategy of competing on 
compatibility with their complementary products, evidence shows that firms include 
product features that correspond to their complementary products, but exclude some 
features that do not function with their complementary products.  
The research contributes to the literature on market entry in several ways. I move 
beyond a single market focus, which can make some entry strategies appear puzzling or 
unsuccessful. Instead, by highlighting compatibility between complementary products as a 
mechanism through which some firms base their new market entry strategy, I can explain 
why firms with vast technological capabilities may choose to enter markets behind the 
technological frontier, and why such a strategy can be successful. Doing so also helps place 
entry into the broader context of the firm’s value creation and capture strategy by detailing 
the link between the new market product and other products in the firm’s portfolio. By 
investigating firms’ choice of different product features in new product markets, I move 
beyond the typical binary view of entry and reveal a critical source of and reasons for 
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heterogeneity within firms’ entry strategy. Doing so provides insight into tradeoffs 
managers make when entering a nascent market. 
The research also contributes to our understanding of complementarities in market 
entry research. Prior work using Teece’s (1986) complementary asset framework 
demonstrates that diversifying entrants can redeploy downstream resources such as 
distribution facilities or a sales force to support the success of a new product or innovation 
(Mitchel, 1989; Helfat and Raubitschek, 2000). Kapoor and Furr (2014) extend this 
framework by suggesting that complementary asset availability influences firms’ 
technology choices upon entry. In this extant view, complementarity is a supply-side 
phenomenon that plays an important supporting role in the new products success.77 Instead, 
I focus on how demand-side complementarities influence product strategy. I stress that 
complementarities in the firm’s portfolio not only allow the new product to create more 
value for customers and thus make the product more competitive, but they also offer 
additional channels to appropriate value from entry. This phenomenon is particularly 
important in the context of high technology ecosystems, such as mobile communications 
and streaming media, which encompass many, potentially interdependent product markets 
in which the firm’s position in one could bear on its strategy in another.  
 
THEORY & HYPOTHESES 
Background 
Market entry literature has moved from stylized models in which firms enter and 
learn about their cost efficiency (e.g. Jovanovic, 1982) to a focus on pre-entry resources 
                                                 
77 A similar strand of literature investigates how complementary assets can buffer the firm from technology 
change (Tripsas 1997). My work differs because instead of suggesting that the path dependent firm 
survives technological upheaval because it owns some key complementary assets, I point out that 
technologically advanced firms choose to rely on complementarities instead of advancing the technological 
frontier.  
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(Helfat and Lieberman, 2002). This literature demonstrates how pre-entry resources 
influence if and when firms enter a market, and their subsequent performance (Penrose, 
1959; Lane, 1988; Chatterjee and Wernerfelt, 1991; Mitchell, 1989; Schoenecker and 
Cooper, 1998; Silverman, 1999; Klepper and Simons, 2000; Lee, 2008; Bayus and 
Agarwal, 2007; Franco et al., 2009). In general, this research finds that firms with superior 
resources are more likely to enter the market and perform well when they do (Lee, 2008). 
For example, Klepper and Simons (2000) find that firms with significant marketing, R&D, 
and production experience in a similar market are more likely to enter and perform well in 
the new market. Franco et al. (2009) demonstrate that only firms with strong technological 
capabilities benefit from moving into the market early. The product development literature 
draws similar conclusions. Firms succeed when they have resources that fit with the new 
market and thus, allow them to create high performing products that satisfy consumers 
(Cooper, 1979; Cooper and Kleinschmidt, 1987; Zirger and Maidique, 1990; Montoya-
Weiss and Calantone, 1994; Gatignon and Xuereb 1997; Henard and Szymanski, 2001). 
While prior literature documents the importance of resources for entry success, we 
know a lot less about firms’ product strategy upon entry. Do firms always convert their 
superior resources into technologically superior products? Most research ignores what 
firms actually do in terms of product design (i.e. characteristics and features choices) when 
they enter the market,78 despite the importance of product development decisions for firm 
performance (Ali, Kalwani, and Kovenock, 1993; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995). The 
product development literature focuses on drivers of product success, such as technical 
performance or the firms’ market orientation (Montoya-Weiss and Calantone, 1994; 
Henard and Szymanski, 2001), but ignores how development decisions fit in the firms’ 
                                                 
78 Benner and Tripsas (2012) provide one of the few studies to investigate product level strategy as firms 
enter a new market. Using product data from the digital camera market, they find substantial heterogeneity 
in features and characteristics, even among entrants with access to similar technological resources.  
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overall strategy. Therefore, prior literature offers little explanation for why highly capable 
firms might enter markets with products that exhibit lower technical performance. This gap 
can obscure our ability to accurately assess entry performance or understand how entry 
plays a role in the firm’s broader strategy.  
To shed light on this puzzle, I begin with the observation that in many high-
technology industries, new product markets form in the context of a larger innovation 
ecosystem consisting of multiple, potentially complementary product markets. Firms often 
operate in many of these product markets, and in some instances, offer existing products 
that are complementary to the new market. Products are complementary when they can 
create more value for some consumers when used together. The bases for this idea has a 
long history in economics (e.g. Allen, 1934; Hicks and Allen, 1934a; 1934b; Samuelson, 
1974). For example, a video streaming service is complementary to a smart television 
device.79 
When consumers value combining the products from different markets, the firm 
that operates in both the new and complementary market may have a difference set of 
incentives than a firm that operates in only the new market. Thus, the firm’s portfolio of 
complementary products may influence how it views the new market opportunity.80 So 
how does the firm’s portfolio of products influence its product strategy in new markets?  
To answer this question, I consider how complementarities in the firm’s product 
portfolio incentivize the firm to make certain product characteristic and feature choices 
                                                 
79 From the point of view of a consumer, the better the streaming service that can be accessed through the 
device (e.g. more content or better content) the more the consumer will derive utility from the device. The 
better the device functions (e.g. makes searching content easier), the more the consumer will derive utility 
from using the streaming service.  
80 This is similar to the notion of how the firm’s business model or resource base will influence how it 
views the new market. For example, Tripsas and Gavetti (2000) illustrate that Polaroid’s business model in 
film based photography shaped how its executives viewed the digital photography market. Wu et al. (2013) 
theorize that complementary assets influence the way in which incumbent firms respond to technological 
change. 
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upon entry into a new market. Products are complementary when consumers derive more 
value from using them together than separately.81 I assume that firms face some demand 
uncertainty and do not know the exact product attributes consumers’ value most, which is 
consistent with conditions typically experienced during the early stages of a market 
(Utterback and Abernathy, 1975; Tushman and Anderson, 1986). I conceptualize the 
product as a “complex assembly of interacting components” (pg 3, Krishnan and Ulrich, 
2001), which can be evaluated relative to other competing products, based on technical 
performance (Krishnan and Ulrich, 2001). I define technical performance as how the 
various product dimensions combine to influence how users experience the technology. 
For example, one can compare laptop computers based on technical measures such as clock 
speed, screen quality, random access memory, and battery life.  
 
Complementary Products Influence on Product Design  
Firms differ in the way in which they can approach the nascent stage of the market 
depending on whether they possess complementary products. In new high technology 
markets, the initial consumer pool is often comprised of what the product life-cycle 
literature calls early adopters82—consumers that tend to favor products with high technical 
performance. Firms without complementary products will focus on capturing a share of the 
early adopters by applying their technological resources to develop high performing 
products. However, competing on the technological frontier in the early stages of the 
market is difficult. Slight product performance differences can create large differences in 
market share and profits (Bayus, Jain, and Rao, 1997). It is also costlier, both in terms of 
                                                 
81 Basically, the user has higher utility when using the two products together because the marginal benefit 
to the consumer of one product is enhanced when combined with the other product (Milgrom and Roberts, 
1990; Siggelkow, 2002; Toh & Miller, 2017).  
82 In the product life cycle / product adoption literature, the first two sets of adopters are typically called 
“innovators” and “early adopters.” I combine both and simply call them early adopters. Both tend to favor 
technological sophistication.  
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product development and per unit costs (Clark et al., 1987; Schoonhoven, et al., 1990). 
Building products on the frontier typically requires experimenting with unproven 
technology, which tends to yield more negative outcomes than proven technology 
(Pacheco-de-Almeida, Henderson, and Cool, 2008), and therefore, raises development 
costs by increasing both research effort and development time (Mansfield, 1988; Cohen, 
Eliashberg, and Ho, 1996). For example, Apple spent over $100 million (about 5% of total 
annual sales) to create the Newton, which was easily surpassed in the market by slightly 
better functioning offerings from Sony and Motorola.  
Competing on compatibility offers an alternative strategy through which firms with 
complementary products can enter a new market. This strategy can benefit firms in several 
ways. First, the firm need not compete on the technological frontier because it does not 
need to target early adopters that prefer technical performance. Instead, the firm can target 
consumers that value compatibility between its new product and complementary 
products.83 This may include growing the market by attracting the firm’s current 
complementary product customers that are not typical early technology adopters.84 These 
consumers may tradeoff technical performance for compatibility with complementary 
products if the new product surpasses their minimally acceptable performance threshold. 
In this way, complementary products increase the competitiveness of the firm’s new market 
                                                 
83 I assume that firms with complementary products do not incur additional development costs for these 
complementary products, as these products are already in existence. I also assume that firms without 
complementary products do not consider entering the complementary product market, at least not until after 
the firm’s initial product development is complete and the firm has entered the market. This allows me to 
focus on how the firm’s existing complementary products shape entry and product strategy in the new 
market. 
84 For example, Merrill Lynch entered the online brokerage market by targeting a subset of its current 
customers that valued its complementary products, such as stock market research and customized 
investment advice, with the ability to trade independently on an online platform. Similarly, Research in 
Motion’s foray into the smartphone market targeted its corporate customers that wanted to combine its 
Blackberry Enterprise Server with a phone capable of receiving secure messages and emails. In both cases, 
the firms target audience was not typical early adopters in the new market, but rather current customers that 
would value combining the firm’s complementary offerings with a product in the new market.  
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product. This effect is accentuated when the firm’s complementary products are not 
compatible with rivals’ offerings in the new market.  
Second, complementary products offer additional channels through which to profit 
from entry into the new market. For each unit of the new product sold, the firm may be 
able to sell additional units of the complementary product. If consumers of complementary 
products value combining them with the new market product, launching a product in the 
new market can make the firm’s complementary products more competitive in their 
existing markets. When combined with the first mechanism, complementarities within the 
firm’s portfolio allow it to create and capture an indirect network externality85—
complementarities increase the demand for and competitiveness of the new product which 
in turn, increases the demand for and competitiveness of the complementary product(s). 
Such positive feedback loops can be a major driver of success in the market (Katz and 
Shapiro, 1986; Schilling, 2002; Zhu and Iansiti, 2012).86  
Together, these two mechanisms suggest that the firm with complementary 
products will find consumers who value its complementarities more attractive because it 
can potentially reach them at lower costs than other consumers. Moreover, these consumers 
will also be more profitable for the firm because they will potentially buy the firm’s 
products in both the new and complementary markets.  
The firm will also find consumers that do not value its complementary products 
less attractive. The firm expects that the benefit from complementarities will diminish as it 
                                                 
85 The network externalities argument is often applied to standard wars (e.g., Betamax vs. VHS) and other 
platform competition, in which the focus is on the central technology and its success is determined by 
access to compatible technologies. However, in the case of within-firm complementarities, the firm owns 
both the central and compatible technology, and financially benefits from the success of both.  
86 It is useful to compare this argument to the concept of economies of scope. Scope based benefits accrue 
through cost savings via shared inputs (Clark, 1923; Panzar and Willig 1981), or the shared use of 
indivisible tangible or intangible resources (Penrose, 1959; Teece, 1980). Economies of scope are a driver 
of market entry. Furthermore, products that are complementary might exhibit cost based economies of 
scope. However, my core proposition regards how complementarities across the firm’s product portfolio 
operate on the revenue function and differs from typical economies of scope arguments that typically 
focuses on the cost function. 
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tries to target consumers that prioritize technical performance. To successfully target such 
consumers, the firm will likely need to increase technical performance, and therefore incur 
higher product development and per unit production costs. At the early stages of the 
market, most entrants will focus on early adopters, which could increase price and technical 
performance competition in this segment.  
Based on the above argument, the firm with complementary products is more likely 
to focus on consumers that value compatibility with its complementary products, and will 
choose features and characteristics that bring its product to the technical performance level 
that will allow it to maximize profit on this segment. Increasing technical performance to 
reach other segments of the market could potentially force the firm to shift price and/or 
incur higher costs that will lower total expected profits. Therefore, the strategic effect of 
differentiation on compatibility—focusing on the less competitive and more lucrative 
consumers that benefit from complementarities—will tend to outweigh the potential 
benefit of targeting all early adopters.87 Firms with complementarities will compete on 
compatibility and thus, will tend to design lower technically performing products than they 
would if they did not benefit from complementarities.    
Another mechanism may also influence the firm’s product strategy. The firm may 
tradeoff technical performance for time-to-market when it believes that it either can benefit 
from or be harmed by network effects between the new market and its complementary 
product markets. By entering earlier than it otherwise would, the firm can help generate a 
positive network externality in its portfolio. It can also avoid a decline in the sales of its 
complementary product portfolio that could stem from users switching to rivals’ products 
                                                 
87 Note that this logic is consistent with models of differentiation under different types of demand 
uncertainty (Meagher and Zauner, 2004; 2005, Meagher et al., 2008).  
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that are compatible with the new market. This is particularly important when the cost of 
adapting technologies to be compatible with rivals is high (Eggers, 2012).88  
When the firm believes that entering early will allow it to gain an advantage or 
avoid becoming disadvantaged in complementary markets, the firm will want to rush its 
new product to market. To achieve shorter time-to-market, the firm will need to tradeoff 
technical performance of the product. Creating innovative technology or including new 
components is time consuming and costly (Schoonhoven et al., 1990). Many of the aspects 
of product development, such as knowledge of how various components function together, 
are subject to time compression diseconomies (Dierickx and Cool, 1989). Even for a firm 
with significant related resources, the time to design and launch a new product in an entirely 
new market can be significant because prior product development experience may be of 
only limited value in searching for the best solutions (March, 1991).  
Apple’s entry into digital media player market with their Apple TV device provides 
an example of how complementarities influence entry. The initial Apple TV had only basic 
features but provided a compatible interface to link a television to other Apple devices, and 
most importantly, to its iTunes content platform. Apple’s intent is not to derive profits 
solely from the sale of the device, but instead to also profit from selling entertainment 
content across its iTunes platform.89 They can achieve this goal without making the most 
sophisticated device. By entering the market, Apple ensures that its platform is compatible 
with at least one product in the market. It also avoids losing content sales if consumers 
choose content platforms based on their TV compatibility.  
                                                 
88 For example, Palm attempted to make its Pre-series smartphones compatible with Apple’s iTunes 
entertainment content platform after it was clear that Palm could not succeed with its own entertainment 
platform. However, on each successive update to iTunes, Apple made iTunes incompatible with Palm’s 
products, forcing Palm to create an expensive update to reintroduce compatibility.   
89 Indeed, the device often sells for much less than what Apple expects consumer will purchase in content 
from iTunes. 
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Firms without complementary products do not have the same incentive structure. 
They neither capture value in their entire portfolio by entry, nor face the same competitive 
pressures linked to cross-market externalities. Instead, this type of firm is more likely to 
differentiate its products through superior technical performance than a firm with 
complementary products, because the former does not offer another source of value to 
customers.90 Therefore, I predict: 
 
Hypothesis 1: A firm with products that are complementary to the new market will enter 
the new market with products that have lower technical performance. 
 
 A corollary of this prediction relates to the endogenous relationship between 
complementarity and entry. If complementarities can allow the firm to profitably target a 
subset of consumers at lower costs, then complementarities lower the entry threshold. 
Therefore, firms with complementary products should exhibit a higher propensity to enter 
the new complementary market. Moreover, if the firm can benefit from or be harmed by 
network effects in the market, the firm will more likely enter the market to harness the 
benefits and stymie the threat.   
It is possible that the firm with complementarities will enter the market with inferior 
technical performance for other reasons.91 However, if it is rational for firms with 
complementary products to implement a strategy based on compatibility, and thus enter the 
market low performing products, then, along with support for Hypothesis 1, I should also 
find evidence that complementary products enhance firm performance. While I do not 
formally build a theory of a complementary product-performance relationship, using the 
same logic behind Hypothesis 1, I propose two empirically testable conjectures. First, 
                                                 
90 For example, Kapoor and Furr (2014) find that start-up entrants into the solar photovoltaic industry 
choose higher performing technology to differentiate themselves from rivals.  
91 For example, the firms resource base makes it path dependent or the firm. 
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holding the new product design constant, firms with complementary products will have 
higher market performance than firms without complementary products. Support for this 
conjecture would highlight the general benefit of complementarities. Second, firms with 
complementary products can enter the market with inferior technical performance and 
achieve at least a similar level of profit (from the new market and through complementary 
products) as firms that have superior product technical performance but no complementary 
products. Empirical support for this prediction would underscore the rationality of 
compatibility-based strategy and explain why highly capable firms may choose to enter 
new markets in this manner.  
 
Choice of Product Features and Components 
 When entering a new product market, firms must decide on what features to include 
in their products. Different features or design parameters can come with various tradeoffs 
(Ulrich and Eppinger, 2000). For example, to make a race car safer, the designer can 
include a stronger frame, additional roll bars, and airbags, however, these features will 
come with a weight penalty, which will reduce speed, handling, and fuel efficiency. 
Tradeoffs may not only affect technical performance, but also include the absence of 
another feature. A car can only be fitted with one type of tire at a time; software can be 
designed to function with only certain operating systems, but by doing so, eliminates its 
capability to function with others.  
When weighing tradeoffs between different features, we might expect a typical firm 
to choose the bundle of features that it believes consumers will most likely prefer. 
However, in new markets, firms may not know consumers’ exact preferences for different 
product attributes. In absence of concrete knowledge of consumer preferences, my 
arguments behind Hypothesis 1 suggests that having complementary products will bear on 
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the firm’s product feature choices. To capture the benefits from complementarities, the 
firm needs to make its new product compatible with its complementary products. The firm 
may also want to include features that enhance the co-functionality of the products.  
 
Hypothesis 2: A firm with products that are complementary to the new market is more 
likely to include features in its new market product that function with its complementary 
products. 
 
While the firm may choose to include features that help capture the benefit of 
complementarities, such choices may come at the expense of other features. Here, I argue 
that the firm may exclude features that it has the capability to include for several reasons. 
In line with the argument behind Hypothesis 1; the firm may want to keep costs low or 
reduce development time. To achieve this objective, the firm may need to omit features 
that do not help capture the benefit of complementarities.  
Another strategic motivation may play a role in feature choice. The firm may 
exclude features that co-function with rivals’ complementary products, so to decrease 
rivals’ ability to appropriate returns from the firm’s product. The firm is likely to do this 
when it plans to develop a competing complementary product or when the benefit of 
compatibility with the rival’s complementary product is outweighed by the costs of 
supporting the rival’s product. For example, compatibility with a rivals’ complementary 
product could enhance rivals’ positive network effects, to the detriment of the focal firm.  
 
Hypothesis 3: A firm with products that are complementary to the new market is more 
likely to exclude features in its new market product that do not function with its 
complementary products. 
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EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Empirical Setting  
 I test my propositions using entry and product design data from the global 
smartphone market. Smartphones combine features of a mobile phone with features of a 
computer. Smartphones differ from feature phones in that they have an operating system 
that can run a variety of software applications.  
Smartphones are complex products comprised of many interdependent 
components. Designing a smartphone involves making many decisions so to achieve both 
performance (such as calculation speed) and form (such as weight and thinness). A variety 
of technologically sophisticated firms from different industries entered the market, 
including current92 market leaders Apple and Samsung, computer makers Acer and Dell, 
industrial conglomerates Siemens and Toshiba, and consumer electronics makers LG and 
Sony.  
The smartphone traces its origins back to the IBM Simon Personal Communicator 
in 1994—a phone that had some limited ability to receive faxes and email. Between 1999 
and 2002, several firms, such as Nokia, Ericsson, and Qualcomm, launched phones that 
included very limited computing ability. However, it was not until the mid-2000s that both 
advances in mobile chipset technology and the adoption of wireless networks that could 
support significant data transmissions (e.g. GSM’s GPRS service) led to the creation of an 
actual market for smartphones. At the start of 2005, the smartphone market began to grow 
rapidly (see Figure 4.1), which intrigued computer and consumer electronics firms that had 
previously ignored the mobile phone market. Many firms started to develop smartphone 
development projects in 2005, which led to surge in entry between 2005 and 2009. 
Therefore, I focus my analysis in this period, when the market is still in the nascent stage. 
                                                 
92 Based on 2015 sales data.  
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Note that this period predates the explosion in growth and subsequent maturation of app-
based ecosystems that dominate the current smartphone landscape.93 
 
Data Sources 
To construct my sample, I use data from multiple sources. I collect data on 
smartphone market entry and product features primarily from two online databases: 
GSMArena and Phonescoop. GSMArena has been used to create a census of phones and 
is used by industry participants to track product characteristics (Koski and Kretschemer, 
2005; Cecere, Corrocher, and Battaglia, 2015). Patents covering phone design often cite 
GSMArena data on phone features and design (e.g., US D636364 S1). These two sources 
combine to provide comprehensive coverage of all mobile phone launches between 1994 
and 2015. I supplement the feature data with information from the manufacturers, four 
other online phone data sites (fonerena.com, gadgets.ndtv.com, mobiles-prices.com, and 
techradar.com), firms’ websites and product brochures, and three technology and trade 
magazines (PCWorld, PCmag, and CNet). From these sources, I can identify over 200 
features and components for each phone. 
I collect information on firms’ product scope and capabilities using the Corp-Tech 
database, annual reports, firms’ websites, Mergent database, and IBM Research 
publications. The Corp-Tech database lists technology companies and their products. The 
directory contains detailed product codes for each firm and is collected directly from the 
firms and updated on a yearly basis (Lee, 2008; Lee and Lieberman, 2010). Information on 
firms’ participation in wireless communication standards comes from Disclosed Standard 
Essential Patents (dSEP) Database (Bekkers et al., 2012). I gather data on firm financials 
                                                 
93 Several major mobile app stores opened in late 2008 through 2010 (e.g. Android Market/Google Play, 
Blackberry App World, Windows Phone Marketplace, Nokia Store, etc.). This spurred the growth of third-
party developers that acted as complementors to different operating systems. 
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from Compustat and firms’ annual reports. I acquire patent data from the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office. Data on firms’ smartphone market performance comes from Statista, 
Inc. (who collects it from Nielsen, IDC, and Gartner) and firms’ own records. Data on 
broadband access by country comes from the International Telecommunications Union 
(ITU). Because I use multiple different samples in the analysis, I discuss how I form each 
sample directly prior to the relevant analysis.  
 
Dependent Variables 
 To test hypotheses regarding products’ technical performance, I need to compare 
the technological aspects of smartphones. I take several approaches to this task. First, I 
create one all-encompassing measure that captures all the major aspects of the product, 
such as speed, screen quality, form, and software applications supported. The measure also 
reflects the tradeoffs inherent in such a complex product. For example, if the smartphone 
has a large, fast processor, it will be heavier and will use more power. Therefore, as one 
measure nears the frontier, other measures will likely regress from the frontier. The 
dependent variable is designed to capture these tradeoffs. Second, I create several measures 
that capture one or several specific aspects of the product’s technical performance, for 
example, CPU speed or primary camera image quality. I describe these in detail below.  
 To capture the overall technological sophistication of the product, I create a 
measure called Technical Performance. To calculate the measure, I read over a hundred 
smartphone reviews and multiple articles on smartphone performance metrics from five 
different websites and magazines: GSMArena, CNet, PCmag, PCWorld and 
androidauthority. Using this information, I identify 29 different design elements that 
capture speed, form, and functionality of the phone and account for the phone’s overall 
performance. I collect the component data from GSMArena and Phonescoop. I describe 
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each of the 29 components of the measure in Table 4.1, and provide basic descriptive 
statistics for the raw values. For example, CPU Speed measures the clock rate of the 
processor in megahertz, where faster clock rates correlate with quicker calculation times. 
Other components, such as Music-Video Features, capture how many features the phone 
supports, in this instance, the ability to support music and video content. Typically, as new 
features arise (such as MP4 audio format) the phone will also support the prior version 
(e.g., MP3), therefore, counting features will adequately capture the differences between 
products on the dimension in question.94  
 To summarize the information on various components into one measure, I need a 
metric that can handle inputs with different scales (e.g., megapixels, gigahertz, and feature 
count). To accomplish this, I utilize Gower’s distance measure (Gower, 1971). For each 
component, 𝑥𝑖𝑘𝑡, I apply a unit set normalization to create 𝑠𝑖𝑘𝑡. To create the measure, I 
take the average of all 𝑠𝑖𝑘𝑡. Equations (1) and (2) provide the calculations: 
 
(1)            𝑠𝑖𝑘𝑡 = (1 −  
max(𝑥)𝑖𝑡−𝑥𝑖𝑘𝑡
max(𝑥)𝑖𝑡−min(𝑥)𝑖𝑡
) 𝑤𝑖𝑡 
(2)  𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑘𝑡 =  
∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝐼
𝑖=1
∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑡
𝐼
𝑖=1
   
Where i is a component, k is a smartphone, and t is a year. Note that w takes the value of 1 
if any product in year t has component xi, and is 0 otherwise. If no products in year t have 
feature xi, then xi is ignored (i.e. w is 0 for that i). This allows the overall frontier to evolve 
from year to year, not only on the value of a particular component, but also with the 
                                                 
94 The measure may overweight the importance of indicator and count variables (such as GPS) relative to 
continuous measures (such as primary’ Camera megapixels). To check how sensitive the measure is to the 
inclusion of components measured as a binary indictor or count, I reran the calculation in equations (1) and 
(2), dropping all 13 of these components. The resulting measure was highly correlated with the original 
measure (0.96). Replacing Technical Performance with this new measure does not impact the significance 
of the results.  
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addition of new technological components.95 Technical Performance is in [0,1], and would 
equal 1 only if the product were on the technical frontier for every component. Technical 
Performance measures the aggregate performance of the smartphone relative to other 
smartphones launched in the same year.96  
 One issue with an aggregate measure is that one must assume how much each 
component weighs on performance. This is subjective, as different users will weigh 
dimensions differently. To add some robustness around the measure, I identify several of 
the main components that effect user experience and are prominently featured in in product 
reviews. For example, Data Speed, describes how fast the firm can download information, 
such as a webpage or an email. I calculate Data Speed, as the phone’s speed divided by the 
maximum speed for phones in the same year. Another example, Camera MP, captures the 
image quality of the main camera; I calculate Camera MP as the phone’s camera quality 
divided by the maximum quality for phones in the same year. I also conduct some 
additional analyses using a weighted version of Technical Performance, where the weights 
come from a hedonic regression of smartphone price on the characteristics that comprise 
the Technical Performance measure. I discuss this further in the additional analysis section. 
To test Hypotheses 2 and 3, I identify product features tied to two broad 
complementary product markets: the market for business software and the market for 
entertainment content (i.e. music, movie, and games), and create a variable based on each. 
To decide which features are related to each market, I use product reviews from major 
technology magazines. I describe the dependent variables and independent variables used 
in this analysis in more detail later.  
                                                 
95 For example, to make video and gaming abilities more complex, separate graphics processor units (GPU) 
were added in the late 2000s.  
96 Alternatively, I can calculate the dependent variable as the distance from the technical frontier (i.e., 
distance from max Technical Performance in year). All results all robust if I use this alternative calculation.  
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To analyze the performance conjectures, I use two dependent variables. The first, 
Market Share, is a measure of the firm’s global share of sales for that year. In most years, 
I do not have precise information for firms with less than 1 percent market share, and thus 
set such firms to 0.5 percent share.97 The second, Top Five Performer, takes the value of 1 
if the firm has a Market Share in the top five during the year and is 0 otherwise.   
 
Independent Variables 
The main independent variable, Complementary Products, captures the extent to 
which the firm has products complementary to the smartphone. A product can be 
complementary when it creates more value when used in conjunction with the other than 
used alone (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990). To identify complementary product categories, I 
take the following steps. First, I attempt to read at least one product review for each firm 
per year from prominent review sites such as GSMArena, PCWorld, PCmag, and CNets. 
While I randomly select products to review, many products do not have a formal review 
article. Instead, I end up with firms’ most heavily marketed products, which tend to be 
reviewed by technology writers.98 Second, I supplement this information with data from 
Market Line Research reports, academic literature (Gebauer, 2008), and IBM Research 
(e.g., Matthews, Pierce, and Tang, 2009). Third, I verify my information through 
discussions with industry experts and through firms’ own documentation (e.g., websites, 
product brochures).  
From this research, I identify two broad types of complementary categories: 
business software and entertainment applications. Example entertainment 
complementarities include entertainment platforms (e.g. Apple’s iTunes), internet search 
                                                 
97 Setting firms with unit sales but missing share to 0.5 percent should have little effect as the margin of 
error will be very small.  
98 This is not a problem because at this stage in the collection process, I am only identifying types of 
complementary products.  
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engines, and multi-media software (e.g. Google’s multi-media engine, patent US 
7,286,823). Example business complementarities include enterprise communication 
software, operating systems, and custom enterprise software.99  
After identifying the complementary product categories, I need to map the list not 
only to firms that entered the smartphone market, but also to firms at hazard of entering 
the market. To do this, I first map the identified complementary product categories to Corp-
Tech database product groups. I use information on group name, subgroups, and 
discussions with a Corp-Tech database expert to map the information. To verify the 
mapping, I check known producers of certain products and verify that they map the Corp-
Tech product group code. This matching effort results in eight different product groups in 
the Corp-Tech database. Example complementary products include the following: mobile 
internet software, local area network software for mobile devices, enterprise systems, audio 
players, video players, email clients, and search engines.100 I then match the Corp-Tech 
product codes to the firms in my sample. Because there is not a clear product code for 
music and video platforms in the Corp-Tech directory, I use lists of music platforms and 
firms’ annual reports to code the data in each sample accordingly. To calculate 
Complementary Products for each firm, I count the total number of complementary 
categories in which the firm competes.101  
 Products from all nine complementary categories function in conjunction with the 
smartphone, but exist separate from the device. This is consistent with my notation of 
                                                 
99 Note that my focus is on the nascent stages of the smartphone market, prior to the proliferation of mobile 
apps.  
100 I list Corp-Tech product group names and give the Corp-Tech code in parentheses: AI Systems (SOF-
AI), Communications Systems Software (SOF-CS), File Management Software (SOF-DM), Media and 
Communication Software (SOF-ME), Office Automation Software (SOF-OA), Email Systems (TEL-EM), 
Internet Multi-media (TEL-IM), and Internet Search (TEL-IS). As a point of reference, there are 23 
Telecom product groups and 33 software product groups in Corp-Tech. Examples of excluded categories 
include Health Service software (SOF-HL), Financial Management software (SOF-FM). If a financial or 
healthcare software application was made for a smaller device (like a PDA or smartphone) it would map to 
SOF-OA or SOF-AI., even if it connected to or functioned with software from the excluded categories.   
101 Complementary Products can take a maximum value of 9.  
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complementarity. The products also exist prior to the creation of the smartphone market. 
For example, an entertainment platform hosts music and videos in a separate location and 
integrates with a phone or device through an application. Conversely, a technological 
component, such as a microchip, directly integrates with the device, but does not provide 
value outside of its application in the device, and hence, is not counted as complementary.  
Prior literature suggests that resources will affect entry strategy. I control for these 
resources through several variables. Firms with greater research experience might build 
superior products, so I control for lagged R&D expense.102 Phone Patents captures 
knowledge relevant to smartphones, and covers patent applications over the past three years 
in technology categories such as communication technologies, screen technologies, and 
semiconductors. Table 4.2 provides a detailed list of these groupings. Larger firms may 
have superior ability to enter new markets with better products, so I control for Firm Size, 
measured as the total number of employees.103 To capture the firm’s knowledge of wireless 
standards and communications technology, I create a proxy (Standards Disclosure) for 
firm’s technologies essential to wireless communication standards. To create Standards 
Disclosure, I use information from Disclosed Standard Essential Patents Database 
(Bekkers et al., 2012) to calculate the cumulative number of technology disclosures the 
firm makes to standard setting organizations. Firms with experience in feature phones may 
hold an advantage in the smartphone market. To control for this (Prior Feature Phones), I 
count the cumulative number of feature phones launched by the firm. In some models, I 
replace this measure with the number of smartphones (Prior Smartphones).104 Computer 
                                                 
102 Note that R&D will enter most models with enough lag that it should capture spending pre-smartphone 
development. Thus, I can use it to control for the firm’s general research intensity and experience, while 
avoiding it being directly endogenous in the model. Endogeneity is a concern because my theory suggests 
that firms may reduce development costs because of compatibility. All results remain the same if I exclude 
R&D.  
103 Alternatively, I can use total assets or total revenues, all provide similar results.  
104 I do this in panel models where smartphone experience is more relevant. Results are similar using either 
measure. 
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Maker, specifically controls for the firm’s ability to design computers, and takes the value 
of 1 if the firm designs personal computers, laptops, mini-computers, servers, mainframes, 
or super computers. Experience in designing personal data assistants (PDA) could improve 
firms’ ability to develop smartphones, as the products have similar properties. PDA takes 
the value of 1 if the firm has experience designing personal data assistants. 
Downstream assets may influence firms’ entry strategy (Mitchell, 1989). To 
account for downstream resources that relate to the smartphone market, I calculate several 
variables using information from Corp-Tech product categories and annual reports. 
Distribution Capability, takes the value of 1 if the firm has a retail presence and the value 
0 otherwise. Manufacturing Capability, accounts for the firm’s ability to make electronic 
devices and takes the value of 1 if the firm manufactures any electronic parts or components 
and is 0 otherwise.  
I also create several variables to use in selection models and control for potential 
bias in Complementary Products. To account for selection into the market, I collect 
information on broadband access by country (Broadband) from the ITU. To measure 
diversification, I create two variables. Business Segment is the number of business 
segments listed in Compustat. Product Breadth is the number of high-technology product 
categories the firm competes in per the Corp-Tech database. I also use several financial 
variables that I describe as necessary.  
To control for how the firm’s industry might influence behavior, I create controls 
for industry effects using two-digit SIC codes (Industry Dummies). Wireless standards 
behind the phone’s network can influence some of the smartphone’s functionality. I control 
for this using dummy variables for seven different wireless standards (Wireless Standards 
Dummies). To control for phone price, I use GSMAarena’s price tier variable. This measure 
places phones in a price tier each year and thus avoids complications that arise from trends 
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in price over time. The price tiers range from 1 to 10.105 To best control for the price effect, 
I use dummy variables for price (Price Tier Dummies). Finally, I control for phone release 
year (Year Entry Dummies). 
I organize the rest of the empirical section as follows: First, I analyze firms’ initial 
product design upon entry into the smartphone market. Next, I analyze firms’ product 
designs in their first three years in the market. Then, I examine how the firms makes feature 
and component tradeoffs in their product design. Finally, I estimate the effect of 
complementarities on firm market share in the smartphone market.  
 
Preliminary Analysis  
 I begin by noting that one puzzle presented at the beginning of the paper—highly 
capable firms entering with inferior performing products—is present in this context. Of the 
firms that entered the smartphone market, none of the top five firms by either total revenue, 
R&D, phone related patents, communications knowledge (as measured by Standards 
Disclosure), or return on assets, had their initial product designs on the technical frontier. 
In fact, most had products with technical performance below both the median and the 
average.106 Of the top five firms (by each of the aforementioned criteria) that had below 
average or below median designs, the vast majority had Complementary Products, which 
offers descriptive support for Hypothesis 1.  
Next, I plot trends in various product features using data from firms’ first three 
years in the market. The graphs in Figure 4.2 show that products from firms with 
                                                 
105 To provide some context, on average, price tier 3 equates to 125 euros, price tier 5 is 230 euros, and 
price tier 8 is 440 euros. Typically, top end phones are in the 7-10 tier and entry-level phones are in the 1-3 
tier. If prices are missing, I supplement the GSMArena data with historic price data from fonerena.com, 
gadgets.ndtv.com, mobiles-prices.com, techradar.com, phonearena.com, or the firm’s MSRP information. I 
then map the price to the GSMAreana price tier.  
106 Using the top five firms on each criterion, I list the number below the average in parentheses: revenue 
(5), R&D (5), Phone patents (5), Standards Disclosure (5), return on assets (3).  
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Complementary Products tend to be less sophisticated than products from firms with no 
Complementary Products, which supports Hypothesis 1. For example, data download 
speed for firms with complementarities lag that of firms without complementarities by an 
average of 30% between 2006 and 2010 (see Figure 2b).  
 Table 4.3 provides descriptive for the sample of products from entering firms’ first 
three years in the market. As predicted, Complementary Products is negatively correlated 
with Technical Performance (-0.08). Figure 4.3 provides a histogram of Technical 
Performance.  
 
Product Analysis—First Smartphone  
I begin my test of Hypothesis 1 by conducting a simple cross-sectional analysis of 
firms’ first product in the market. I only consider firms that entered in the nascent stage of 
the market (2005-2009). If firms launch more than one smartphone upon entry, I use the 
smartphone with the highest technical performance, so to best represent the firms’ ability 
to create a high technically performing product. I measure all independent variables in 
2005, except for Complementary Products, which I measure two years prior so to avoid 
potential reverse causation. Because Technical Performance is continuously distributed 
within [0,1], I use a fractional logit model (Wooldridge, 2010).  
Model 1 in Table 4.4 provides the basic estimate of the Technical Performance-
Complementary Product relationship. Complementary Products has a significantly 
negative average partial effect107 (APE) (-0.015; p-value 0.003). Models 2 and Model 3 
provide alternative estimates using fractional probit and beta regressions respectively, with 
similar results.  
                                                 
107 The marginal effect of variable j in the fractional logit model depends on the value of the other 
variables. To calculate average partial effect (APE), I take the average impact using the 
formula, 𝑔(𝒙′𝜷)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  𝛽𝑗, where j is the coefficient of the variable of interest and g(.) is the logit pdf. 
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To provide an alternative to the Technical Performance measure, I estimate the 
model using two major technological features as dependent variables: Data Speed and 
Camera MP (see Model 5 and Model 6). I measure these dependent variables as a ratio of 
the products performance on the dimension over the maximum performance achieved by 
any product that year. For example, I calculate Data Speed as a product’s data download 
speed divided by the maximum speed achieved by any product in that year. I find a negative 
and significant effect for Complementary Products in both models, which supports 
Hypothesis 1.  
Because entry is a strategic choice and firms that enter likely believe they can build 
effective products, I model the firm’s entry decision using a sample of firms at hazard of 
entering the smartphone market. I do not find evidence that self-selection into the market 
effects the results. However, I find that having one additional complementary products 
increases the likelihood of entry by roughly 2 percentage points. Firms with 
complementary products are approximately four times more likely to enter than firms 
without. This result supports the conjecture that complementarities lower the entry 
threshold. Second-stage results suggest that Complementary Products significantly 
decrease Technical Performance. I discuss the sample selection analysis and display the 
results in Appendix 4.1.  
 
Product Panel Analysis 
Models in Table 4.4 have limited sample size and barely support the inclusion of 
all necessary controls. To expand the sample, I include all the smartphones released by the 
firm during its first three years in the market (i.e. a firm-product-year panel). Sources 
suggest that firms’ initial strategy unfolds over three years.108 I continue to limit the sample 
                                                 
108 The focus of the paper is on firm’s product strategy upon entry into a new market. If the window is too 
long, I will capture the firm’s behavior as an incumbent.   
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to the nascent period of the market (2005-2009). To account for the product development 
process, I lag all independent variables except Complementary Products two years.109 
Complementary Products is calculated two years prior to entry into the market to avoid 
reverse causality.110 Note that all results are robust if I include the firm’s entire product 
history (instead of first three years) in the nascent period.  
 Table 4.5 provides estimates using the firm-product-year panel sample.111 In Model 
2, using the full set of control variables, I find that a negative and significant effect of 
Complementary Products (average partial effect -0.014; z-statistic -6.26; p-value 0.000). 
To interpret this effect, adding one complementary product decreases Technical 
Performance by approximately two thirds of a standard deviation. To understand what this 
means for the smartphone’s performance, I simulate the effect of going from 0 to 1 on 
Complementary Products on three key elements of phone performance: CPU speed, screen 
resolution, and camera quality. Take for example a firm with no complementarities that 
has a smartphone with a 768 megahertz CPU, 268 pixels per inch screen resolution, and 5 
megapixel camera. The counterfactual (i.e. treatment of Complementary Products equal to 
one) entails a 528 megahertz CPU, 155 pixels per inch screen resolution, and 3.14 
megapixel camera. Therefore, a one-unit increase in Complementary Products represents 
a meaningful decline in technological performance across the three components.   
 
 
                                                 
109 The lag is appropriate because I want to control for knowledge and technology that might be applied to 
the phone design. For example, patents applications covering technologies at the beginning of the design 
process might be included in the product, while a patent application that comes several months after the 
launch of the product will likely have no bearing on product quality.  
110 Complementary Products exhibits almost no variation between the pre-entry and the first several years 
post entry. Thus, Complementary Products is identified using variation across firms; however, this is 
consistent with my theory, which is cross sectional in nature. Of course, this rules out the use of firm fixed 
effects to suppress unobserved firm-level heterogeneity.  
111 The sample has 52 firms that release approximately four phones per year.  
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Sensitivity Analysis  
 The remaining models in Table 4.5 demonstrate the robustness of the result using 
estimates with alternative dependent variables, all yielding similar results. For example, 
Model 3 estimates Technical Performance using only the five key components that affect 
the speed of the phone. 
Because my theory is cross-sectional in nature, I also rerun the above analysis using 
a between estimator. I calculate the average of the variables across all product-years and 
regress the firm’s average Technical Performance on the average of independent variables. 
I find robust results (APE -0.02, p-value 0.000). Overall, the results in this section support 
Hypothesis 1.  
I also analyze the sensitivity of my results to entry timing. I split the sample into 
two: early entrants (firms that entered in the first three years) and late entrants (firms that 
entered afterwards). I find results consistent with my main model, with the APE for 
Complementary Products -0.01 (p-value 0.000) and APE in late entrant model -0.02 (p-
value 0.009). Results are similar if I model each entry year separately.  
 
Selection Issues Related to Complementary Products  
 Firms with complementarities in their portfolio may make design choices not 
because of the complementarities, but because of unobservable factors related to their 
strategy or situation. For example, Complementary Products may simply pick up the effect 
of diversification on product design. Very diverse firms could be more prone to 
technological path dependence or less flexible in adopting new technologies into their 
product designs, especially compared to specialist firms. Alternatively, poor-performing 
firms may diversify in search of better opportunities, and by chance, enter product markets 
complementary to the smartphone market. These firms might enter the new market with 
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inferior product designs because they lack technological capabilities. While I account for 
many firm capabilities, some confounding unobservable effect may remain.  
Before addressing this concern empirically, I compare firms with and without 
Complementary Products to see if there are any obvious differences (see Table 4.6). Both 
groups are similar, differing significantly only on the breadth of their product portfolios 
(Product Breadth). Firms with Complementary Products tend to have broader product 
portfolios than firms with no Complementary Products.  
To address potential unobservable factors in the panel analysis, I use an inverse 
probability weighted regression adjustment (IPWRA) model (Wooldridge, 2007; 
Elfenbein, et al 2010). This method utilizes information on the likelihood of receiving a 
particular treatment to create probability weights. I then use these weights in outcome-
regression models for each treatment level to calculate a counterfactual so to estimate 
causal effect of the treatment.112 This method requires separating the sample into treated 
and control groups, with Complementary Products (measured as 0/1) as the treatment 
factor. In the first stage, I run a logit regression to estimate the propensity of a firm having 
at least one Complementary Products as a function of observable covariates (I discuss the 
variables in this model in Appendix 4.2). The inverse of the predicted propensity is then 
used as a weight in two separate second stage models, one for the treated (firms with 
Complementary Products) and one for the control (no Complementary Products). Each 
second stage model uses a fractional logit regression to create a regression-adjusted 
estimate for treated and control observations. I specify these second stage models using the 
same variables as Model 1 of Table 4.5. The parameters of the second stage models control 
                                                 
112 Two assumptions are needed to derive consistent estimates. First, conditional on observables, the 
conditional mean of disclosure for treated and untreated (control) firms is independent of the treatment. 
Second, for similar values of the observables, there are firms that will and will not receive the treatment 
(e.g. will or will not develop complementary technologies). This second assumption is referred to as the 
overlap or common support assumption. Together, these two assumptions provide a weak condition for 
what Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) call ‘strong ignorability’. 
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for how each covariate impacts Technical Performance.113 By comparing the computed 
mean values from each of the treatment level models, I can compute the average treatment 
effect on the treated (ATET), which is my estimate of the causal impact of Complementary 
Products on Technical Performance. This estimation is robust to misspecification of either 
the first stage model or second stage model (Wooldridge, 2007). 
In Model 1 of Table 4.7, I use the propensity model from Model 1-Table B1 (in 
Appendix 4.2). The propensity score model predicts the likelihood of having 
Complementary Products well (Pseudo R-square of 0.54). In Model 1 of Table 4.7, I find 
a negative and significant ATET (-0.07; p-value 0.037). Model 2 reports ATET using the 
flexible form propensity score model (see Appendix 4.2, Model 2-Table A4.2.1; Pseudo 
R-square of 0.64). ATET is negative (-0.09) and significant (p-value 0.04). The results 
strongly support Hypothesis 1.  
Although the propensity score models do a good job of predicting the likelihood of 
having complementarities, I can increase their effectiveness by constraining the sample to 
a set of very similar firms (Iacus, King, and Porro, 2011). To further control for potential 
bias, I combine the IPWRA model with a pre-model Coarsened Exacting Matching 
procedure. Coarsened Exacting Matching (CEM) is a nonparametric technique that allows 
the user to coarsen the data—effectively placing each observation into a single stratum 
                                                 
113 All three equations have logit specifications and can be thought of as a system of exactly identified 
equations. I estimate parameters of the propensity model using the score equations from the quasi-maximum 
likelihood estimator (QML). The parameters of the two second stage models are estimated using the score 
equations from the weighted QML estimator. The exact specifications are as follows. Let the first stage logit 
estimate of the propensity of the firm having complementary technologies be given by 𝑝(𝑧𝑖  , 𝑐𝑖  , 𝛾) =
[ 
𝑔(𝑧 𝑖?̂?
′) [𝜏𝑖−𝐺(𝑧 𝑖?̂?
′)]
𝐺(𝑧𝑖?̂?
′)[1−𝐺(𝑧 𝑖?̂?
′)]
] 𝑧𝑖 where the z variables are the predictors of the treatment effect, 𝑐𝑖 is a binary indicator 
of the treatment, 𝐺(𝑧) is the cumulative distribution function (cdf) for the logit, and 𝑔(. ) is a probability 
distribution function given by the partial derivative of the cdf with respect to z. From the propensity score 
model, I derive the inverse probability weight, 𝑤𝑖(𝑐), which is equal to the inverse of 𝑝(𝑧𝑖 , 𝑐𝑖  , 𝛾) in treated 
model and the inverse of 1- 𝑝(𝑧𝑖  , 𝑐𝑖  , 𝛾) in the untreated model. The conditional outcomes for the treated and 
untreated models are estimated using the following equation: 𝑢𝑐{𝑥𝑖, ?̂?𝑖, 𝑤𝑖(𝑐)} =
 𝑤𝑖(𝑐)𝑐𝑖 [ 
𝑔(𝑥 𝑖?̂?
′) [𝑐𝑖−𝐺(𝑥𝑖?̂?
′)]
𝐺(𝑥𝑖?̂?
′)[1−𝐺(𝑥 𝑖?̂?
′)]
] 𝑥𝑖. I do not report the treated and untreated model output, as interpreting their 
coefficients do not directly shed light on the hypotheses.  
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based on a pre-specified set of variables (Blackwell, Iacus, King, and Porro, 2009). I 
discard any strata that only contain treated or untreated observations. CEM increases the 
effectiveness of propensity score models because it reduces outliers and increases common 
support, which enhances the propensity score model’s predictive ability and reduces 
potential bias (Iacus et al., 2011).114 
To create the sample for Model 3 of Table 4.7, I begin by running a CEM using 
quartile breakpoints for three key variables, R&D, Product Breadth, and Patent Scope. 115 
I then only retain strata that contain both treated and untreated observations.116 This reduces 
the sample to sets of treated and untreated firms that are very similar on these three 
dimensions. With this new sample, I then run the IPWRA model (per the specification in 
Model 2). The predictive ability of the propensity score model increases, with Pseudo R-
square up 0.18 to 0.82. Using the sample, I find a negative and significant ATET (-0.15; p-
value 0.02), which supports Hypothesis 1.  
Overall, as I do more to suppress endogeneity concerns, the estimated effect of 
complementarities become more economically meaningful while remaining statistically 
significant. 
 
Product Features and Components Choice Analysis  
In this section, I analyze how the type of complementary products the firm has in 
its portfolio influences its choice of new product features. I begin by creating two new 
                                                 
114 Note that I am not using CEM weights, instead, I use CEM to select groups of treated and untreated 
observations that are similar on the defined dimensions. I then use this sample in the IPWRA analysis.  
115 To demonstrate the benefit of the CEM procedure, one usually compares the Multivariate L1 statistic 
before and after the CEM procedure. The Multivariate L1 statistic is a multivariate version of the taxicab 
distance measure (see Iacus, King, and Porro, 2008). Higher values suggest greater imbalance. The pre-
CEM Multivariate L1of the sample on the three variables is 0.76, the post-CEM is 0.25, representing a 
substantial reduction in imbalance between treatment and control groups.  
116 For example, the first stratum is comprised of observations that fall into the bottom quartile on all three 
variables. I drop all observations in this stratum unless there are both treated and untreated observations 
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independent variables. The first, Complementary Products-Business, takes the value of one 
if the firm’s complementary products are business oriented117 and zero otherwise. The 
second, Complementary Products-Entertainment, takes the value of one if the firm’s 
complementary products are entertainment oriented, and zero otherwise.  
Next, I create several dependent variables that capture either business related or 
entertainment related functionality, but not the other. The first business related dependent 
variable, Business Features, provides a count of business related features. To calculate 
Business Features, I sum Business Features Other and Business Enterprise Software (see 
Table 4.1 for these variable definitions). Business Features include the ability to read and 
write text word documents, spreadsheets, presentations, pdfs, print from the phone, send 
and receive faxes, use email client software, etc. As an alternative measure, Full Office 
Suite, takes the value of 1 if the phone can view and edit spreadsheets, documents, and 
presentations.  
I also include four entertainment related dependent variables. Camera Features 
captures features that enhance the photography capability of the phone, such as smile 
detection (see Table 4.1). Screen Performance summarizes the smartphones screen quality 
and functionality.118 I base the measure on the idea that better screen quality is preferred 
for viewing entertainment content such as videos or games. Sound & Video Features counts 
the number of sound features and browser features related to watching video or listening 
to music (the measure sums Browser Features and Music/Video Features from Table 4.1). 
Finally, Video Camera takes the value of one if a video camera is included and zero 
otherwise.  
                                                 
117 Business oriented complementary products categories include Communications Systems Software, File 
Management Software, Office Automation, and Email Systems. Entertainment oriented product categories 
include Internet Multi-media, Internet Search, and Music/Media Platforms.  
118 The features included in the calculation are size of the screen in inches, screen to body ratio, resolution 
in ppi, number of colors, and whether it has a special protective glass. To summarize the information, I use 
Gowers distance measure, the same formula used to calculate Technical Performance.  
  149 
Table 4.8 provides estimates of these models using the same sample and set of 
control variables as used in Table 4.5. I begin by analyzing the business related dependent 
variables. In Model 1, I regress Business Features on the two complementary product 
variables and controls using a pooled negative binomial model.119 Complementary 
Products-Business is positive (APE 0.512) and significant (p-value 0.000), which supports 
Hypothesis 2. Complementary Products-Entertainment is negative (APE -0.414) and 
significant (p-value 0.000), which supports Hypothesis 3. Firms with business related 
complementarities include significantly more business-related features in their smartphone 
designs, while firms with entertainment related complementarities include significantly 
less.  
Model 2 (Full Office Suite as dependent variable) yields similar support for both 
Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3. Having business related complementarities increases the 
likelihood of including a  Full Office Suite in the smartphone by 17 percentage points, 
while having entertainment related complementarities decreases the probability by 31 
percentage points. 
Model 3-6 estimate firms’ choice of entertainment related features. Model 3 
displays the estimates for Camera Features. I find a positive and significant effect for 
Complementary Products-Entertainment (APE 0.484; p-value 0.001), which supports 
Hypothesis 2; and a negative effect, significant at the 10% level for Complementary 
Products-Business (APE -0.50; p-value 0.062), which supports Hypothesis 3. In the model 
for Screen Performance (Model 4) I find a positive and significant effect for 
Complementary Products-Entertainment and a negative and significant effect for 
Complementary Products-Business, which supports both hypotheses.  
                                                 
119 Note that there is no over dispersion so the model can be reduced to a Poisson specification. A Pooled 
Poisson model yields the same results.  
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I find mixed results in Models 5. The model of Sound & Video Features (Model 5) 
shows that a negative and significant Complementary Products-Business, which supports 
Hypothesis 3. However, Complementary Products-Entertainment is not significantly 
positive. Firms without complementarities began to increase their sound and video features 
mid-way through the sample period as third party music and video content providers arose. 
This may explain the insignificant effect of Complementary Products-Entertainment.  
In Model 6, I find entertainment related complementary products increase the 
likelihood of video camera inclusion by 21.3 percentage points (0.213; p-value 0.001 for 
Complementary Products-Entertainment). I find a negative but insignificant effect for 
Complementary Products-Business. Video ability, while not widely included in 
smartphones from firms with business-related complementarities, was not entirely absent.  
The analysis in this section demonstrates that firms include feature and components 
that fit with their complementarities, which supports Hypothesis 2 and 3. To tie back to the 
findings in the previous sections, omission of features that do not function with their 
complementarities only account for a portion of the lower Technical Performance. I want 
to emphasize that firms with complementarities do significantly lag firms without 
complementarities on many other major component performance metrics.  
 
Firm Performance Analysis  
 In this section, I investigate the relationship between competition of complement 
products and market performance. From my theoretical argument, I conject that holding 
technical performance of the new product constant, complementarity provides a benefit in 
market competition, thus should enhance firm performance. While this may not be a 
surprise, finding support for this conjecture will underscore the value firms gain in a new 
market by having complementary products.  
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To control for the technical performance of the firm’s products, I calculate the 
firm’s average Technical Performance (Average Technical Performance) across all its 
smartphones released in year t.120 I then estimate both the impact of Average Technical 
Performance and Complementary Products on Market Share simultaneously using a 
fractional logit regression. In Model 1 of Table 4.9, I estimate the effect of Average 
Technical Performance and Complementary Products without controlling for other 
relevant resources. I find that Complementary Products is positive (APE 0.01) and 
significant (p-value 0.013), and that Average Technical Performance is positive (APE 
0.213) and significant (p-value 0.039). However, once I control for firms’ resources (Model 
2), Complementary Products stays positive (APE 0.044) and significant (p-value 0.019), 
while Average Technical Performance stays positive (APE 0.056), but becomes 
statistically insignificant (p-value 0.591). Adding one complementary product increases 
market share by almost 5 percentage points. 
To make the comparison more precise, I match firms with and without 
complementary products based on their Average Technical Performance across all its 
smartphones released in year t. I then use a nearest-neighbor matching model, matching 
firms with complementary products to one or more firms without complementary products 
based on Average Technical Performance and Year.121 I find that firms with 
complementary products have 4.30 percentage points greater market share, and that the 
difference is statistically significant (p-value 0.000).  
The prior analysis assumes that there is no selection effect related to having 
complementarities that might cofound the market share analysis. To suppress potential 
selection effects, I use a nearest-neighbor matching model to match firms based on factors 
                                                 
120 Results remain the same if I use a firm’s maximum Technical Performance (i.e. best performing phone) 
in year t. 
121 I match the firms with complementary products to firms without based on the lowest Mahalnobis 
Distance on the matching variables.   
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that affect the likelihood of having Complementary Products. To create counterfactuals for 
the firms with Complementary Product, I match each firm with Complementary Products 
(i.e. ‘treated’ firm) to firm(s) without (i.e. ‘control’ firms) using the following variables 
that predict the likelihood of having Complementary Products or that might otherwise 
influence Market Share: Firm Size, Business Segments, Product Breadth, Patent Scope, 
R&D, Firm Size, PDA Manufacturer, and Year.122 To suppress differences in Average 
Technical Performance, I run the procedure on two samples. The first sample is constrained 
to firms with below median Average Technical Performance, while the second sample is 
constrained to firms with above median Average Technical Performance. In the low 
Average Technical Performance sample (Model 1 of Table 4.10), I find that the ATET is 
positive (5.71 percentage points) and significant (z-statistic of 4.66). I find similar results 
in the high technical performance sample (Model 2). These results suggest that, accounting 
for product technical performance and suppressing some of the endogeneity related to 
complementary products, conditional on entering the market, complementary products 
have a positive impact on market share in the new market.  
My theory also suggests that firms with complementary products can enter the 
market with inferior technical performance and achieve at least a similar level of profit 
(from the new market and through complementary products) as firms that have superior 
product technical performance but no complementary products. To adequately test this 
conjecture, I need to observe profits, both in the new market and in the complementary 
                                                 
122 To apply the method, I use a binary version of Complementary Products. Treated (untreated) firms are 
ones with Complementary Products equal to 1 (0). The idea is to create a counterfactual for treated firm using 
almost identical untreated firm(s), and compare then compare Market Share. To create the counterfactual, I 
match control firms to the treated firm using a set of variables that I describe in the text. I match the treated 
firm to a minimum of one ‘nearest neighbor’ untreated firm within the set, based on the lowest Mahalnobis 
Distance on the matching variables.  Upon creating these matches, I compute the bias-adjusted average 
treatment effect on the treated (ATET) (Abadie and Imbens 2011). This ATET essentially compares Market 
Share between each treated firm and its computed counterfactual. 
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markets. Unfortunately, I am unable to observe product level profits at all and do not 
possess systematically collected data on complementary market performance. Using 
Market Share to compare performance in the new market severely restricts how I can 
interpret the results. A firm with complementary products could have low market share in 
the new market, but entry into this market allows it to be very profitable in the 
complementary market. Therefore, using Market Share, I can find empirical patterns 
consistent with the conjecture. However, lack of a positive Market Share effect does not 
necessarily refute the conjecture.  
With this major caveat in mind, I conduct the following test.  First, I create a treated 
group comprised of firms with inferior products (below the median Average Technical 
Performance in year t) that also have Complementary Products. Next, I create a control 
group of firms with superior products (above the median Average Technical Performance 
in year t) that do not have Complementary Products. Then, I perform a basic t-test and find 
that the difference in means between the two groups (treatment minus control) is 3.45 
percentage points (z-statistic of 2.72). On average, firms with inferior technical 
performance and Complementary Products have higher market share than firms with 
superior technical performance but no Complementary Products. To suppress selection 
effects, I use the nearest-neighbor matching model, matching on the same variables as in 
Model 1 and 2 of Table 4.10. In Model 3, I find a positive and significant ATET (9.29; z-
statistic of 4.10). Therefore, the firm with products that exhibit inferior technical 
performance but has at least one complementary products has a 9.29 percentage point 
greater Market Share than it would have had if it competed with a superior product and no 
complementarities instead.  
All results in this section remain robust if I use Top Five Firms instead of Market 
Share. Overall, the results demonstrate that competing on compatibility positively affects 
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market share. Note that market share is a conservative measure of how complementarities 
affect the firm’s overall performance because market share in the new market does not 
account for the additional increase in profits resulting from the increased sales of 
complementary products.  
 
Identifying Mechanisms  
I proposed two broad reasons that explain the Complementary Product-Technical 
Performance relationship: (1) firms use a compatibility strategy (2) complementarities 
induce the firm to choose speed to market over product performance. Firm performance 
results support the viability of compatibility as a strategy.  
To provide evidence for (2), I run both a Cox proportional hazard model and an 
exponential survival model to identify the effect of complementarities on speed of entry 
(using the same variables from the first stage regression in Table 4.1A.2 of Appendix 4.1). 
In both models, I find that complementarities increase entry speed, which is consistent with 
the idea that firms want to enter early to benefit from network effects. However, if firms 
enter behind the technical frontier only to take advantage of early entry, then there is no 
reason that capable firms should continue to build products with inferior technical 
performance in subsequent periods. Comparing Table 4.5 with Table 4.4, the effect of 
Complementary Products on Technical Performance is not significantly different. If firms 
were only compromising Technical Performance initially, I would expect products to 
increase in relative performance over the first several years and the negative relationship 
between Complementary Products on Technical Performance to weaken.  
To probe the effect further, I extend the three-year sample out an additional three 
years. In the six-year sample, I continue to find a negative effect of Complementary 
Products on Technical Performance. To avoid potential selection effects, I run a cohort 
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analysis, using only firms that were in the market in 2005, and find that the APE of 
Complementary Products on Technical Performance is -0.023 and significant (p-value 
0.000). Thus, evidence suggests that firms employ a strategy based on compatibility 
between the new product and complementary products. While I cannot completely rule out 
that firms may tradeoff technical performance for a quicker time-to-market, this 
mechanism alone does not appear to explain the empirical results.  
 
Additional Analyses 
My main dependent variable, Technical Performance, does not account for how 
users might weigh different smartphone components or attributes differently. To suppress 
this concern, I use a hedonic pricing regression to approximate the marginal willingness to 
pay for each characteristic (Rosen, 1974). I then use this information to weight the elements 
of Technical Performance, and then run the same specified regressions as Model 1 and 
Model 2 of Table 4.5. To create the weights, I regress price on the unit set normalization 
of all components (i.e. all the 𝑠𝑖𝑘𝑡 from equation 1). I apply the normalization so that 
coefficients for all components are in the same unit. The coefficient for a component can 
be thought of as the marginal willingness to pay for being close to the frontier on the 
component. Because of multicollinearity, some components yield a negative price, so I 
drop them from the model.123 Using only the components with positive coefficients, I create 
a willingness-to-pay weighted Technical Performance. Rerunning Model 2 of Table 4.5, I 
find that adding one additional complementary product reduces Technical Performance by 
just under 10 percent (p-value 0.019). Results are robust when using the weighted 
dependent variable.  
                                                 
123 Camera Primary MP, Camera Secondary MP, CPU Speed, Screen Protection, RAM, Scree-to-Body 
Ratio, Screen Size, Business Enterprise Software, Business Features Other all had positive coefficients.   
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 Prior literature finds that firms may view entry and technology choices differently 
in a new market when they make a substitute product (Conner, 1988; Mitchell, 1989). To 
avoid cannibalizing sales, firms with substitute products may limit the functionality of their 
new product. In the smartphone context, firms’ that made a PDA could face similar 
incentives, which if they also have complementary products, could bias the analysis. 
However, in the main design models (Model 2 of Table 4.5), the PDA indicator variable is 
positive and significant, signaling that experience with PDAs benefits firms’ designs. 
Rerunning Model 2 on only firms that made a PDA, I continue to find negative and 
significant results for Complementary Products. While PDA design experience benefits the 
firm’s smartphone design, having Complementary Products tends to induce the same 
strategy—lower technical performance and a reliance on complementarities.  
Successful firms with complementary products, such as Apple, could potentially 
skew the results. I drop Apple and rerun all analyses shown in the paper and results are 
robust. Results remain robust if I drop any one firm in the sample.  
 Another concern might be that firms competing only on price and not on 
compatibility drive the negative effect of Complementary Products on Technical 
Performance. To address this concern, I begin by noting that across nine of the ten price 
tiers, there are phones from firms with and without Complementary Products. I also use 
the price tier fixed effect (see Table 4.5 for example), which allows me to model within 
price tier. If I split the sample at the middle (fifth) price tier and rerun Model 2 of Table 
4.5, I find that the effect of Complementary Products on Technical Performance is negative 
and significant in both the high price and low price subsamples. 
 It is possible that firms with complementary products only attain high market share 
through greater marketing spending. This is consistent with the notion that firms with 
complementary products are diversified marketing-centric conglomerates that target the 
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mass market, while firms with superior designs are boutique technology specialists. 
However, evidence does not support this notion. Results from Table 4.6 show that both 
sets of firms are similar in size. Intangible assets (which account for brand value) are very 
similar across both sets of firms. While I only have data on advertising or selling and 
general administrative expenses for 60% of firms, I find no statistical difference between 
the two sets, with advertising spending slightly larger and selling expenses slightly lower 
for firms with complementary products. In addition, both sets of firms compete in a similar 
fashion and target the same customers in other markets in which they compete.  
Complementarities could be negatively related to technical performance because 
firms with marginal technological resources are induced to enter the market to potentially 
take advantage of their complementarities. Such firms would not otherwise enter the 
market, because competing on their technological resources alone would not yield a 
positive expected profit. While I acknowledge that this could be the case in some instances, 
empirical evidence supports the notion that some firms with high technological resources 
choose to compete on compatibility. First, I find basic evidence that highly capable firms—
strong prior financial performance, large patent totals, high R&D spending, significant 
communications industry knowledge—enter the market with very low technical 
performance. Presumably, these firms could compete on the frontier. Second, controlling 
for many variables related to capabilities, I find strong support for the negative effect of 
complementarities. Third, I show that firms with inferior technical performance and 
complementary products perform better in the smartphone market in terms of market share 
than firms with only superior technical performance. While I cannot rule out that firms 
with marginal capabilities enter because they have complementary products, the evidence 
does not support this explanation.  
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One concern is that consumers choose smartphones based on operating systems, 
and that firms’ operating system choice correlates with Complementary Products in a way 
that cofounds my market share performance estimates. To account for this possibility, I 
rerun the performance analysis on two subsamples. The first subsample is comprised of 
firm-year observations in which firms primarily used Google’s Android operating system. 
The second subsample includes all firm-year observations for firms primarily using non-
Android operating system (i.e. iOS, Symbian, Windows Mobile, etc.). In both subsamples, 
firms with low Technical Performance and Complementary Products outperformed firms 
with high Technical Performance and no Complementary Products. Estimates of 
Complementary Products in both regressions remained positive and significant. 
Conclusions remain the same when accounting for the operating system.   
 I argue that firms strategically choose to exclude some components that do not 
function with their complementary products. However, firms may simply lack the 
capabilities to do so, which partially undermines my logic behind Hypothesis 3. I note that 
more than half of the firms with business-related complementarities that excluded camera 
features concurrently produced a digital camera. Similarly, about half the firms that 
exclude a full office suite or sound features produced other products that included such 
features. Sound software and mobile office software could be acquired in the typical 
smartphone producers supply chain. Take Hewlett Packard for instance. Hewlett Packard’s 
first smartphone release omitted a camera altogether, while subsequent releases were well 
behind the curve in terms of camera features. At the same time, they designed and 
manufactured had digital cameras. Hewlett Packard also include most of the sound and 
video features in its laptops and desktops that it omitted from its smartphones. Overall, 
evidence for why firms with complementarities excluded features is more consistent with 
the strategic decision interpretation than with a lack of capabilities or access interpretation.  
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DISCUSSION  
In this paper, I suggest that a firm’s position in other markets in the ecosystem 
influences its product strategy in nascent markets. The main message is that we need to 
account for how the firm is applying its existing capabilities in these markets, as cross-
market complementarities will affect product development decisions. Firms that can 
benefit from complementary products are more likely to enter a new market with products 
exhibiting lower technical performance relative to firms without complementary products. 
In addition, firms will tradeoff features based on whether they function with their 
complementary products.  
My empirical results support these predictions. Firms with complementarities build 
products with significantly lower technical performance. I use various measures of a 
product’s broad technical performance as well as specific attributes (e.g. speed, camera 
quality, etc.) to demonstrate the robustness of the core finding. My results remain robust 
as I attempt to suppress endogeneity related to selection into the market or selection into 
complementarities. Support for my feature tradeoff hypotheses also support my overall 
argument. Firms strategically design new products with their complementarities in mind.   
I also provide some tentative evidence that complementarities impact market share 
in the new market. To better investigate performance, however, I need profit information 
on products in both the new market and complementary markets. Employing such data 
could allow for a more adequate test of whether the firm should rely on complementarities 
and enter behind the frontier when it could choose a different strategy. Moreover, I cannot 
rule out the possibility that differences in performance in the new market will disappear 
once I account for entry.  
Research on how entry into one market affects performance in complementary 
markets can provide further support for my theory. Firms that enter the new market should 
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experience a positive benefit in complementary markets relative to other competitors that 
do not enter. Analysis across multiple complementary market-new market cases could 
explore the heterogeneity in cross-market complementarities, compare demand and supply 
side complementarities, and derive more precise boundary conditions. Research in this 
direction could add to our knowledge of diversification and product portfolio management 
as well as better connect research on product design to the corporate strategy literature. I 
leave this to future study.  
My theory differs from other perspectives existing in the literature. Cognitive views 
suggest that the firm, when faced with uncertainty, may select features based on its industry 
peer group. I separate my logic by controlling for industry and then showing that within 
the peer group, firms intentionally select features that correspond to their complementary 
products. Similarly, a firm’s resource base may cause it to be inert, which could influence 
its entry strategy. I suggest and find that firms with substantial overlap in their resource 
base may differ in their product strategy because of even one potentially complementary 
product, which makes the inertia hypothesis less plausible in this context.  
Furthermore, supply-side complementarities, either upstream economies of scope 
or downstream commercialization assets, could affect product strategy. However, neither 
supply-side mechanism suggests that the firm will exclude features in its new market 
product that do not function with its complementarities, especially when it includes these 
features in products in other markets. Empirical evidence is not consistent with supply-side 
interpretations.  
It is worth reemphasizing that my arguments in this paper concern product design 
in a nascent market, prior to the formation of easily observable consumer preferences and 
well defined market segments. As a market matures, consumers’ preference for certain 
features become known and markets segment. I would not expect a firm to release products 
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that do not meet certain levels of technical performance for the segment that they target. 
Therefore, the usefulness of my theoretical argument will likely diminish as the market 
becomes more mature.  
However, the market segmentation process can be linked with my argument. 
Market segmentation may occur as firms attempt to capture cross-product 
complementarities. Firms, by designing their new market products to serve their customers 
currently using their complementary products, initiate the segmentation process.  
 
CONCLUSION 
To conclude, my findings highlight the importance of taking a systemic perspective 
of the firm’s portfolio. Firms with complementarities have a different set of incentives than 
firms without complementarities. Complementarities in the firm’s portfolio not only 
improve success in the new product market, but also offer additional means to appropriate 
value from market entry, and thus are a valuable resource. They also provide a useful 
contingency to explain why otherwise similar firms may enter the market at different times, 
choose different technological trajectories, grow a new market by targeting non-typical 
customer segments, and perform differently under a variety of circumstances. Accounting 
for complementarities in product design helps provide a more complete understanding of 
a firm’s entry strategy and how such entry fits into the its overall strategy. Doing so, I 
contribute to the literature on market entry, product design, and complementarities.  
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Figure 4.1. Worldwide smartphone sales trend 
 
 
Data sourced form Gartner, IDC, and Wonk.  
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Table 4.1. Smartphone specifications and features for technical performance calculation 
 
Descriptives For A Sample of Smartphones From Firms' First Three Years In Market. 
Design Element Description Mean
Standard 
Deviation Max
Data Speed (megabytes per second)
Data download speed., a function of the network and the 
communication technology inside phone. 9.73 16.54 150
CPU Speed (clock rate in megahertz) Measure of processor performance 921 506 2,500
CPU Core (count) Number of processor cores. 1.00 0.85 2
RAM (megabytes) Random-access memory. 795 7,678 256,000
Graphics Processor (indicator) Does phone have separate graphics processor 0.73 0.45 1
Memory Storage Included (megabytes) Total memory capacity included at sale 18,150 15,812 32,000
Memory Expansion (megabytes) Total expandable memory 23,419 22,412 128,000  
Absolute Screen Size (square inches) Total screen size, bigger screens are desirable 3.70 1.16 7
Screen to Body Ratio (%) Proportion of body that is made up of screen. 47.74 19.19 100
Screen Resolution (pixels per inch)
Resolution in pixels per square inch, measures quality of 
screen 212.17 78.39 534
Screen Color (thousand) Greater number of colors, the better the image quality 7,245 7,942 16,000
Camera Primary (megapixels) Image quality of main camera 5.047 3.86 23.79
Camera Secondary (megapixels) Image quality of secondary camera 0.938 1.71 16
Camera Features (count)
Features: autofocus, red eye detection, rotating lenses, 
LED flash, dual LED flash, optical zoom, smile detection, 
geo-tagging, panorama ability 2.34 2.05 7
Video Quality (width resolution of pixels) Measures video's resolution 654 939 3840
Browser Features (count)
Count of different formats handled, which include: 
HTML, WAP, XHTML, Flash, Java 2.20 1.50 5
Weight of Phone (grams) Lighter the phone, the more desirable 108.34 60.43 375
Standby Time (hours)
Number of hours phone can be on without use before 
battery is depleted 269 208 1,500
Talk Time (hours)
Number of hours phone can be used in talk mode before 
batter is depleted 379 339 3,420
Music-Video Features (count)
Count of features: has music player, high end sound 
(Dolby), number of audio/video formats handled, (AVI, 
AAC, SS, AACP, AMP, AMR, AACPP, EAACP, HIFI, 
M4A, MFI, MPEG4, MP3, MP4, VDO, WAV, WMA) 5.52 1.48 9
Business Enterprise Software (indicator)
Includes package with advanced word processing, 
spreadsheet, presentation, and email client software 0.16 0.37 1
Business Features Other (count)
Count of other features: fax ability, pdf reader, direct print 
ability, projector, document reader, can handle 
customized java applications, can sync with PC 0.65 0.49 2
Advanced Features (count)
Count of features: predictive text, photo editing, QR 
reader, specialized social media applications, voice 
control and speech recognition 0.84 0.58 3
Basic Features (count)
Count of features: WLAN, Bluetooth, radio, USB, 3mm 
jack, wireless charging, flashlight, calculator, calendar, 
optical character recognition, organizer software) 4.63 1.01 7
Message Features (count)
Message features: ams, ems, smtp, im, push mail, email, 
rss, sms, specialized message application 2.02 0.29 4
GPS (indicator) Contains GPS ability 0.72 0.44 1
Health Application Ability (indicator) 
Has sensors for health based apps (like step counting 
and heart monitoring) 0.002 0.04 1
Television Receiver (indicator) Has Digital TV service 0.05 0.21 1
Advanced Screen Protection / Glass (indicator) Has specialized protective glass 0.13 0.34 1
Data range from 2005 to 2010 and include smartphones for firms' first three years in the market. Weight is reverse coded in the 
calculation so that lighter is better. 
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Table 4.2. Details on phone-related patent calculation 
 
 
Technology classifications come from United States Patent Office and National Bureau of 
Economic Research.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Description
Technology 
Class Variable Description
Technology 
Class (nclass)
Electrical computers: arithmetic processing and calculating 708
Computer graphics processing and 
selective visual display systems 345
Electrical computers and digital processing systems: 
multicomputer data transferring 709
Incremental printing of symbolic 
information 347
Electrical computers and digital processing systems: 
processing architectures and instruction processing (e.g., 
processors) 712
Liquid crystal cells, elements and 
systems 349
Electrical computers and digital processing systems: 
support 713
Image analysis 382
Wave transmission lines and networks 333 Photography 396
Communications: electrical 340 Electrophotography 399
Communications: directive radio wave systems and devices 
(e.g., radar, radio navigation) 342
Communications: radio wave antennas 343 Demodulators 329
Facsimile and static presentation processing 358 Amplifiers 330
Communications, electrical: acoustic wave systems and 
devices 367 Oscillators 331
Multiplex communications 370 Modulators 332
Error Detection/Correction and Fault Detection/Recovery 371
Electrical audio signal processing 
systems and devices 381
Pulse or digital communications 375 Coded data generation or conversion 341
Telephonic communications 379
Optical waveguides 385
Telecommunications 455
Data processing: speech signal processing, linguistics, 
language translation, and audio compression/decompression 704
Semiconductor Device Manufacturing: Product 437
Semiconductor device manufacturing: process 438
Superconductor technology: apparatus, material, process 505
Data processing: design and analysis of circuit or 
semiconductor mask 716
Hardware Patents:
Communications Patents:
Semiconductor Patents:
Screen Patents:
Photo Patents:
Audio Patents: 
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Figure 4.2. Comparing firms with and without complementary products on the technical 
performance of various smartphone features 
 
 
 
Table 4.3. Descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations for product design sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Mean SD (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
(1) Technical Performance 0.25 0.09 1
(2) Complementary Products 0.59 0.97 -0.08 1
(3) Firm Size 69.97 63.95 0.16 -0.07 1
(4) R&D 1,784 2,077 0.19 0.29 0.59 1
(5) Phone Patents 108.49 354.87 -0.21 0.24 0.17 0.28 1
(6) ln(Standards Disclosures) 2.15 2.76 -0.21 0.22 0.15 0.46 0.24 1
(7) Prior Feature Phones 31.35 43.80 -0.20 -0.09 0.15 0.34 -0.08 0.41 1
(8) Distribution Capability 0.00 0.06 0.05 0.29 -0.07 -0.06 -0.02 -0.03 -0.06 1
(9) Manufacturing Capability 0.76 0.43 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.21 0.10 0.22 0.20 0.02 1
(10) Computer Maker 0.36 0.48 0.24 -0.15 0.27 -0.03 -0.08 -0.46 -0.23 0.08 0.26 1
(11) PDA 0.48 0.50 0.34 0.16 -0.13 0.00 0.29 0.01 -0.28 0.06 0.32 0.22 1
(12) Business Segments 3.38 2.40 0.31 0.06 0.67 0.58 0.14 0.21 0.22 0.03 0.14 0.10 0.13 1
(13) Product Breadth 7.06 5.52 0.16 0.62 0.29 0.51 0.23 0.34 -0.01 0.23 0.22 -0.02 0.25 0.35 1
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Figure 4.3. Histogram of Technical Performance 
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Table 4.4. Technical performance regressions for firms’ first smartphone upon entry 
 
 
MP stands for megapixels. Robust p-values are reported in parentheses.  Scale parameter 
for Beta regression is 5.7. Significant (two-sided test) at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Dependent Variable:
Technical 
Performance
Technical 
Performance
Technical 
Performance
Data 
Speed/Max(Data 
Speed)
Camera 
MP/Max(Camera 
MP)
Model: Fractional Logit Fractional Probit Beta Fractional Logit Fractional Logit
Information Shown:
Average Partial 
Effects
Average Partial 
Effects
Average Partial 
Effects
Average Partial 
Effects
Average Partial 
Effects
Complementary Products -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.004** -0.011***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.022) (0.003)
Firm Size (in millions) -0.041 -0.053 -0.043 -0.009** -0.010
(0.617) (0.496) (0651) (0.034) (0.230)
R&D (in billions) 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.0003 0.00008
(0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.174) (0.187)
Phone Patents (in thousands) -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0003 -0.0001
(0.773) (0.746) (0.787) (0.386) (0.704)
ln(Standards Disclosures) -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.015*** 0.001 -0.007***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.481) (0.006)
Prior Feature Phones 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 -0.0006* 0.0004
(0.344) (0.359) (0.335) (0.0057) (0.230)
Distribution Capability 0.084** 0.084** 0.085** -0.077*** 0.045
(0.017) (0.014) (0.013) (0.000) (0.275)
Manufacturing Capability 0.032 0.030 0.032* -0.004 0.056***
(0.100) (0.102) (0.098) (0.566) (0.000)
Computer Maker 0.013 0.012 0.013 -0.0003 -0.012
(0.340) (0.350) (0.343) (0.880) (0.287)
PDA -0.019 -0.017 -0.018 0.017** 0.010
(0.289) (0.312) (0.312) (0.047) (0.484)
Price Tier Dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Year Entry Dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 52 52 52 52 52
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Table 4.5. Technical performance regressions for firms’ first three years in the market 
 
 
MP stands for megapixels. P-values calculated from robust standard errors that account for 
within firm clustering are reported in parentheses. All results remain robust if logit 
transformed dependent variables are used, either in a pooled model or with random effects. 
Significant (two-sided test) at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Dependent Variable:
Technical 
Performance
Technical 
Performance
Tech. 
Performance For: 
{Data Speed, 
RAM, CPU 
Speed, CPU 
Cores, GPU}
Data 
Speed/Max(Data 
Speed)
Camera 
MP/Max(Camera 
MP)
Model:
Pooled Fractional 
Logit
Pooled Fractional 
Logit
Pooled Fractional 
Logit
Pooled Fractional 
Logit
Pooled Fractional 
Logit
Information Shown:
Average Partial 
Effects
Average Partial 
Effects
Average Partial 
Effects
Average Partial 
Effects
Average Partial 
Effects
Complementary Products -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.012*** -0.002*** -0.010***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.001) (0.000)
Firm Size (in millions) -0.056 -0.097 -0.3340*** 0.001 -0.024
(0.338) (0.128) (0.008) (0.198) (0.620)
R&D (in billions) 0.0004* 0.0004* 0.015*** 0.0001 0.0001
(0.072) (0.075) (0.000) (0.432) (0.475)
Phone Patents (in thousands) 0.00002 0.00002 -0.0001 0.001 -0.0003
(0.981) (0.708) (0.928) (0.172) (0.136)
ln(Standards Disclosures) -0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.0001 0.0005
(0.119) (0.150) (0.649) (0.383) (0.550)
Prior Smart Phones 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.0003 0.00005* 0.0004
(0.000) (0.000) (0.605) (0.066) (0.117)
Manufacturing Capability -0.002 0.0007 0.024 0.003 -0.004
(0.865) (0.949) (0.173) (0.243) (0.685)
Computer Maker 0.003 0.009 -0.001 -0.0004 0.001
(0.659) (0.229) (0.953) (0.676) (0.845)
PDA 0.016*** 0.014*** -0.015 0.0001 0.011
(0.009) (0.068) (0.324) (0.926) (0.139)
Distribution Capability 0.110*** 0.108*** 0.111*** 0.007*** 0.013
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.115)
Industry Dummies NO YES YES YES YES
Price Tier Dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Year Entry Dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 415 415 415 415 415
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Table 4.6.  A comparison of smartphone makers with and without complementary products 
 
 
 
Table 4.7. Inverse probability weighted regression adjustment analysis of technical 
performance 
 
 
 
Variable
 Complementary 
Products
No 
Complementary 
Products
t -statistic 
(unequal 
variance) p-value
Total Assets 32,913 28,970 0.31 0.76
(53,771) (30,663)
Intangible Assets 5,940 7,893 -0.31 0.76
(12,905) (23,639)
R&D 1,877 1,096 1.37 0.18
(1,822) (1,870)
Patent Total (3-Year Window) 887 378 1.11 0.28
(1530) (1408)
Business Segments 4.27 4.33 0.08 0.94
(3.17) (2.50)
Product Breadth 9.7 4.32 2.10 0.05
(9.1) (5.30)
ROA 0.14 0.13 0.45 0.66
(0.09) (0.08)
Operating Margin 0.10 0.07 1.26 0.22
(0.08) (0.10)
CAPX Intensity 0.05 0.09 -1.60 0.12
(0.06) (0.06)
Mean (standard deviation)
Dependent Variable: Technical Performance
Average 
Treatment Effect 
on Treated 
A.I. Robust 
Standard 
Errors
Z-
statistic p-value N
Model 1. (Base Propensity Score) -0.07 0.03 -2.09 0.037 291
Model 2. (Flexible Form) -0.09 0.04 -2.03 0.04 291
Model 3. (Sample: Coarsened Matches Only) -0.15 0.06 -2.35 0.02 129
The sample for Model 3 is restricted to observations from a coarsened exact matching procedure in 
which observations were matched using R&D, Product Breadth, and Patent Scope. Standard errors are 
calculated using Abadie–Imbens standard errors (see Abadie and Imbens, 2006). Significant (two-sided 
test) at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4.8. Analysis of product design tradeoffs by complementary product type 
 
 
Distribution Capability is omitted due to collinearity with Industry dummy variables. P-
values calculated from standard errors that are robust and account for within firm clustering 
are reported in parentheses. Average partial effect in brackets. Significant (two-sided test) 
at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Dependent Variable (DV): Business Features
Full Office Suite 
Included Camera Features
Screen 
Performance
Sound & Video 
Features 
Video Camera 
Included 
DV Mean: 0.79 0.31 1.51 0.23 4.54 0.35
DV Standard Deviation: 0.59 0.46 1.69 0.15 1.41 0.48
DV Range: 0-3 0-1 0-7 0-0.69 0-7 0-1
Description::
Pooled Neg. 
Binomial Pooled Probit
Pooled Neg. 
Binomial
Pooled Fractional 
Logit
Pooled Neg. 
Binomial Pooled Probit
Information Shown:
Average Partial 
Effects
Average Partial 
Effects
Average Partial 
Effects
Average Partial 
Effects
Average Partial 
Effects
Average Partial 
Effects
Complementary Products-Business (0/1) 0.512*** 0.171* -0.500* -0.020*** -1.01** -0.092
(0.000) (0.058) (0.062) (0.001) (0.041) (0.207)
Complementary Products-Entertainment (0/1) -0.414*** -0.307*** 0.484*** 0.017** 0.200 0.213***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.042) (0.609) (0.001)
Firm Size (in millions) -1.68** 0.187 1.452 -0.128** -0.784 0.056
(0.000) (0.779) (0.3111) (0.011) (0.783) (0.908)
R&D (in billions) 0.075*** -0.057*** -0.095** 0.002 -0.041 0.003
(0.000) (0.000) (0.016) (0.112) (0.389) (0.793)
Phone Patents (in thousands) -0.171 -0.00002 0.304* -0.003 0.426 0.086
(0.101) (0.998 (0.064) (0.650) (0.163) (0.247)
ln(Standards Disclosures) -0.014 -0.037* -0.033* -0.0001 0.038 0.014*
(0.224) (0.053) (0.086) (0.872) (0.603) (0.059)
Prior Smart Phones 0.002 0.003 0.012 0.002*** 0.025** 0.012***
(0.615) (0.194) (0.102) (0.000) (0.049) (0.000)
Manufacturing Capability -0.699*** -0.390*** 0.715*** 0.024* -1.13** 0.250***
(0000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.051) (0.047) (0.004)
Computer Maker -0.037 0.184*** 0.030 -0.029** 0.398 -0.069
(0.6591) (0.011) (0.852) (0.013) (0.163) (0.159)
PDA 0.559*** 0.455*** -0.028 -0.002 0.144 -0.154**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.868) (0.774) (0.701) (0.015)
Distribution Capability (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
Alpha (dispersion parameter) 0.000 n/a 0.000 0.000 0.000 n/a
Industry Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Price Tier Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year Entry Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 380 359 380 380 380 357
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.39 0.15 0.15 0.20 0.35
Business Related Entertainment Related
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Table 4.9. Market share regression models 
 
 
Global Smartphone Sales measure the total number of smartphone units sold in the year 
across all firms. Results are robust if the firm's maximum Technical Performance (i.e., 
firm’s smartphone with highest Technical Performance in that year) is used instead of its 
average across its smartphones in the year. Firms with no market share data have less than 
1% so are set at 0.5%. Results are similar if I use Top 5 instead of Market Share. P-values 
calculated from robust standard errors that account for within-firm clustering in 
parentheses. Significant (two-sided test) at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Model 1 Model 2
Dependent Variable: Market Share Market Share
Specification: Fractional Logit Fractional Logit
Information Shown: Average Partial Effect Average Partial Effect
Average Technical Performance 0.213** 0.056
(0.039) (0.591)
Complementary Products 0.010** 0.044**
(0.013) (0.019)
Global Smartphone Sales (in millions) -0.00005* -0.00005
(0.071) (0.136)
Firm Size (in millions) -0.067
(0548)
R&D (in billions) 0.007***
(0.004)
Phone Patents (in thousands) 0.022
(0.398)
Distribution Capability 0.074*
(0.069)
Manufacturing Capability 0.070**
(0.056)
Computer Maker 0.033
(0.166)
PDA 0.017
(0.516)
Product Breadth -0.007***
(0.004)
Business Segments 0.008***
(0.007)
Observations 448 200
Industry Dummies YES YES
Year Dummies YES YES
Pseudo R-Square 0.10 0.37
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Table 4.10. Market share analysis using nearest-neighbor matching  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Market Share
Average Treatment Effect on 
Treated (%)
A.I. Robust 
Standard Errors Z-statistic N
5.71 1.23 4.66*** 78
3.28 1.13 2.91*** 122
9.29 2.27 4.10*** 92
Treated: High Tech. Performance & Comp. Products                          
Control: High Tech.  Performance & No Comp. Products
Model 3
Treated: Low Tech. Performance & Comp. Products                            
Control: High Tech. Performance & No Comp. Products
The  models use different treated and control samples. Observations in the sample 
(treated & control) are matched using Firm Size, Business Segments, Product Breadth, 
Patent Scope, R&D, Firm Size, PDA Manufacturer, and Year. I match the treated firm 
to a minimum of one ‘nearest neighbor’ untreated firm within the set, based on the 
lowest Mahalnobis Distance on the matching variables.  Comp. is short for 
Complementary. Low Tech. Performance denotes that the firm has, on average across 
all of its phones, a below median Technical Performance in the given year, while High 
Tech. Performance denotes above median Technical Performance. Results are robust 
if the firm's maximum Technical Performance (i.e., firm's  smartphone with highest 
Technical Performance in that year) is used instead of its average across its 
smartphones in the year. Matching method accounts for bias when matching on two 
or more variables using Abadie–Imbens bias correction, and standard errors are 
calculated using Abadie–Imbens method (see Abadie and Imbens, 2006). Significant 
(two-sided test) at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Model 1
Treated: Low Tech. Performance & Complementary Products                   
Control: Low Tech. Performance. Frontier & No Complementary Products
Model 2
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Appendix 4.1. Sample Selection Criteria for Firms at Hazard of Entry 
Because entry is a strategic choice and firms that enter likely believe they can build 
effective products, I model the firm’s entry decision using a sample of firms at hazard of 
entering the smartphone market. To create a sample of firms that might be at hazard of 
entering the smartphone market, I begin with a cross-section of global firms in 2005, which 
marks the beginning of the nascent smartphone market (see Figure 1). The sample is 
comprised of a broad sample of global firms that satisfies any of the following criteria: (1) 
patented in one of the phone related patent classes in the prior five years (see Table 2); (2) 
main four-digit SIC code description relates to computers, communications, or electronics; 
(3) Corp-Tech database listed the firm as a maker of computer hardware, computer 
software, telecommunications and internet products, or electrical components. The result 
is a sample of 3,245 firms, 57% of which are U.S. headquartered. I code, Entry, as equal 
to 1 if the firm enters the smartphone market in 2005 or the following five years. To avoid 
reverse causality or simultaneity between Complementary Products and Entry, I measure 
Complementary Products based on information from 2003.124 Table A1 contains 
descriptive statistics and correlations for this sample. Overall, 2.1% of firms enter the 
smartphone market. Approximately 6% of firms in the sample compete in at least one 
complementary product category, and of those that do, they tend to compete in 1.8 different 
complementary categories on average.  
To analyze selection into the market, I use Heckman Selection model estimated via 
Full Information Maximum Likelihood.125 To use this method, I need to transform the 
fractional dependent variable, Technical Performance, into a variable that is suitable for 
                                                 
124 For example, a firm might enter a complementary product category as it launches a smartphone. To 
avoid this, I use information from two years prior. Antidotal evidence suggests that the time from 
development to launch was approximately 20 to 28 month on average. 
125 The model combines a first stage probit with a second stage linear model and uses Full Information 
Maximum Likelihood. Results are robust using the two-step, limited information maximum likelihood 
procedure.  
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linear regression.126 I do this using the logit transformation: ln[y/(1-y)], where y is 
Technical Performance (Wooldridge, 2010).127 To identify the first stage, I use an 
instrument partially correlated with entry, but that does not bear on Technical Performance. 
The instrument, Broadband, counts how many millions of customers have broadband 
internet service in the firm’s home country during the year. In 2005, Broadband access was 
thought to be a substitute for fast wireless data standards, which could potentially limit 
market potential and therefore, discourage entry.128  
Model 1 in Table A2 provides a basic ordinary least squares regression of the 
logistically transformed Technical Performance on Complementary Products and controls. 
Complementary Products is negative and significant as predicted by Hypothesis 1. Models 
2 displays the Heckman estimates. Broadband is negative and significant in the first stage 
and Complementary Products is negative and significant in the second stage (coefficient -
0.090; p-value 0.000), supporting Hypothesis 1. In Model 3, I add Price Tier Dummies in 
place of Wireless Standard Dummies and find similar results.129 Note that sample selection 
does not appear to be an issue. Rho is low (0.285) and a Wald test that rho is 0 cannot be 
rejected (Chi-square p-value of 0.23). Also note that the coefficients from the basic 
regression (Model 1) and the outcome regressions from the Heckman model (Models 2 and 
3) are relatively stable.  
Because U.S. firms comprise a large portion of the sample, using a country level 
instrument in the first stage could result in biased predictions. Therefore, I re-estimate the 
                                                 
126 Otherwise, I would need to use a fractional logit or probit model and build the first stage selection model 
into the likelihood function.  
127 The transformed dependent variable appears normally distributed, with a mean of -1.28, standard 
deviation of 0.43. A skewness/kurtosis test for normality cannot reject normality (chi-square p-vale of 
0.36). 
128 I use a country level measure because I can find no firm or industry level measure that could affect entry 
but is not potentially correlated with Technical Performance.  
129 The sample size is too small to control for both wireless standard and price of the phone. All results in 
Table 4 are robust using either specification.  
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model by first randomly cutting U.S. firms from the sample until the U.S. share of the total 
sample is the same as the second largest country’s share, which removes 876 U.S. firms 
(see Model 3). Rerunning the specification from Model 2, I find robust results. In the first 
stage, Broadband is negative and significant (coefficient -0.014, p-value 0.06). In the 
second stage, Complementary Products is negative and significant (coefficient -0.089, p-
value 0.001).  
The prior analysis assumes that Complementary Products is exogenous. To 
suppress potential selection effects related entry as well as the likelihood of having 
Complementary Products, I combine the Heckman selection model with a propensity 
score-weighting model (Model 5). I begin by running a model that predicts the propensity 
for the firm to create Complementary Products (please see Appendix B for a discussion of 
the variables in the model). Using the inverse propensity scores, I weight the second stage 
of the Heckman model (e.g. the outcome model).130 Combined, the model allows 
endogenous market entry and uses the propensity scores weighting to help control for 
firms’ selection into complementary products. While not shown, Complementary Products 
is negative and significant (coefficient -0.16, p-value 0.000).131 The result supports for 
Hypothesis 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
130 I do not weight the first stage entry model, as I am only interested in testing Hypothesis 1 and want to 
reduce the potential computational burden. 
131 In the previously mentioned models, I use a continuous version of Complementary Products. I also 
estimate the propensity score weighted second stage using an indicator variable (Complementary Products 
0/1), and conclusions are similar (coefficient of -0.17 and p-value of 0.000). 
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Table A4.1.1. Descriptive statistics for firms at hazard of entering the smartphone market 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Mean SD (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
(1) Entry 0.02 0.15 1
(2) Complementary Products 0.10 0.48 0.21 1
(3) Firm Size 5.97 24.27 0.39 0.06 1
(4) R&D 65.38 393.45 0.49 0.20 0.65 1
(5) Phone Patents 7.33 61.05 0.35 0.15 0.46 0.69 1
(6) ln(Standards Disclosures) 0.05 0.49 0.42 0.08 0.41 0.54 0.29 1
(7) Prior Feature Phones 0.26 3.37 0.45 0.20 0.20 0.40 0.24 0.48 1
(8) Distribution Capability 0.00 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 1
(9) Manufacturing Capability 0.40 0.49 0.08 0.01 0.05 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.07 -0.04 1
(10) Computer Maker 0.03 0.18 0.16 0.06 0.08 0.12 0.20 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.22 1
(11) PDA 0.02 0.12 0.58 0.17 0.35 0.45 0.34 0.48 0.39 0.04 0.12 0.20 1
(12) Business Segments 2.08 1.68 0.45 0.00 0.57 0.54 0.38 0.35 0.22 0.09 0.13 0.24 0.41 1
(13) Product Breadth 4.68 4.51 0.26 0.47 0.31 0.43 0.49 0.23 0.30 0.23 0.26 0.34 0.33 0.37 1
(14) Mobile Penetration 72.88 19.78 0.01 -0.02 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.06 -0.02 1
(15) Broadband 30.01 21.15 -0.05 0.11 -0.05 0.00 0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 0.08 0.01 -0.02 -0.15 -0.03 -0.27 1
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Table A4.1.2. Sample selection models of technical performance:  
                  Firms' first smartphone upon entry 
 
 
If firm released more than one phone upon entry, I use the highest performing phone in the 
model. P-values calculated from robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Significant (two-sided test) at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Model 1
Model Type OLS
Sample Full Full Full Full Full Full
U.S. Share 
Reduced
Dependent Variable
Logit 
Transformed 
Technical 
Performance
Logit 
Transformed 
Technical 
Performance Market Entry
Logit Transformed 
Technical 
Performance Market Entry
Logit 
Transformed 
Technical 
Performance Market Entry
Complementary Products -0.100*** -0.090*** 0.906*** -0.082*** 1.238*** -0.090*** 0.891***
(0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Firm Size (in millions) -0.133 -0.967* 0.483** -0.217 6.20** -0.966* 4.31*
(0.173) (0.069) (0.029) (0.643) (0.013) (0.069) (0.052)
R&D (in billions) 0.133*** 0.135*** 0.358 0.008*** 0.186 0.135*** 0.347
(0.002) (0.000) (0.177) (0.004) (0.491) (0.000) (0.192)
Phone Patents (in thousands) -0.158 -0.181 -1.94 -0.150 -1.25 -0.179 -1.90
(0.335) (0.152) (0.132) (0.289) (0.302) (0.155) (0.149)
ln(Standards Disclosures) -0.053** -0.052*** 0.261** -0.076*** 0.351*** -0.052*** 0.280**
(0.0129) (0.000) (0.015) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.030)
Prior Feature Phones -0.003 -0.002 0.224*** 0.001 0.221*** -0.002 0.221***
(0.461) (0.329) (0.001) (0.558) (0.001) (0.330) (0.001)
Distribution Capability 0.688*** 0.646*** 2.099** 0.435** 0.657 0.648*** 2.003**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.028) (0.032) (0.548) (0.000) (0.042)
Manufacturing Capability 0.103 0.092 -0.379 0.151 -1.194*** 0.093 -0.420
(0.302) (0.210) (0.282) (0.156) (0.003) (0.202) (0.246)
Computer Maker 0.089 0.109 0.955*** 0.141* 1.056*** 0.108 0.954***
(0.415) (0.178) (0.001) (0.092) (0.005) (0.180) (0.002)
PDA 0.043 0.082 2.192*** -0.0522 2.572*** 0.079 2.152***
(0.625) (0.280) (0) (0.574) (0) (0.290) (0.000)
Broadband -0.019*** -0.027*** -0.0140*
(0.004) (0.003) (0.060)
Constant -2.113*** -2.181*** -6.524 -2.106*** -6.649 -2.17*** -6.315
(0.000) (0.000) (0.108) (0.000)
Rho 0.285 0.227 0.28
Lambda (Rho*Sigma) 0.039 0.033 0.038
Wald test of null that Rho=0 
(Chi-Sq p-value) 0.23 0.47 0.24
Industry Dummies NO NO YES NO YES NO YES
Wireless Standard Dummies YES YES NO NO NO YES NO
Price Tier Dummies NO NO NO YES NO NO NO
Year Entry Dummies YES YES NO YES NO YES NO
R-Square 0.92 0.71
Pseudo R-Square 0.69 0.76 0.64
Observations 53 51 3,222 48 3,217 48 2,341
Model 4
Heckman FIMLE 
Model 2 Model 3
Heckman FIMLE Heckman FIMLE
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Appendix 4.2. Modeling the Propensity to Create Complementary Products 
In this appendix, I provide the estimates of two different first stage propensity score 
models. I include a set of variables that might influence the firm to both create 
Complementary Products and enter the market. First, I include two measures of 
diversification, Business Segments and Product Breadth, because diversified firms are 
more likely to both have complementarities and to enter new markets as part of their 
diversification strategy. I include proxies for the firm’s knowledge, scope of knowledge, 
and innovative effort using Total Patents, Patent Scope, and R&D.132 Firms with high debt 
may be unable to create Complementary Products, to account for this, I include Leverage, 
measured as the firm’s debt to equity ratio. Firms with poor performance may attempt to 
diversify into more product areas to reverse their poor results, and by chance, enter areas 
that are complementary. To account for this I include the firm’s Operating Margin.133 
Finally, I control for whether the firm is headquartered in the U.S., as proximity to U.S. 
consumers that were early adopters of smartphones could lead the firm to both create 
Complementary Products and enter the market. Model 1 of Table B1 provides the basic 
estimates of the propensity score model using the sample from Table 5. In Model 2, I add 
squared terms of several key variables to capture any nonlinear effects, and thus yield a 
better prediction (Wooldridge, 2010). I estimate both models using a logit specification.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
132 Patent Scope measures the breadth of the firm’s knowledge, and thus its likelihood of potentially 
creating links between these knowledge elements. It is calculated as 1 minus the concentration ratio (also 
known as the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index). Using information of the number patents and technology 
classes, I make the following calculation:1 −  ∑ (
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑖𝑛  𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚  𝑘 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑒−𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤 𝑡
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡
)𝐾𝑘=1
2
. I use a 
three-year window to capture the firm’s recent innovative efforts, though a one-year window or five-year 
window yield similar results.  
133 Operating Margin is calculated as operating income over total revenues. Note that other measures of 
performance, such as ROA, yield the same results.   
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Table A4.2.1. Predicting the propensity to have complementary products 
 
 
Coefficients and p-values in parentheses shown. Significant (two-sided test) at *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Complementary Product (0/1) Model 1 Model 2
(1) (2)
R&D 0.0001 0.0062***
(0.519) (0.000)
R&D Squared -2.99e-07*
(0.000)
Patent Scope 3.621*** 1.949
(0.000) (0.122)
Total Patents -0.000103 0.00127
(0.651) (0.189)
Total Patents Squared -1.31e-07
(0.272)
Product Breadth -0.636*** -0.430
(0.000) (0.542)
Product Breadth Squared -0.0545
(0.496)
Business Segments -0.340*** -0.408***
(0.095) (0.107)
Leverage -4.913*** -7.986***
(0.001) (0.000)
CAPX Intensity -2.858 -0.831
(0.438) (0.866)
Liquidity 9.04e-05 0.0001
(0.187) (0.228)
Operating Margin 1.300* 1.249*
(0.060) (0.077)
US Company -5.831**
(0.0222)
Constant 1.063* 1.248
(0.090) (0.333)
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CHAPTER 5 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 The objective of my dissertation is to examine how complementarities within the 
firm’s portfolio of technologies and products influence its technology strategy. Through 
three essays, I highlight the influential role that complementarities play in several important 
settings.  
In Chapters 2 and 3, I study value creation and capture strategy in compatibility 
standards. I find that firms only experience positive cumulative abnormal stock returns 
from disclosing technology to standards when they own technologies complementary to 
their disclosed technology. Firms leverage their disclosures to SSOs to increase the value 
of their technology portfolio. The larger the complementary technology portfolio, the more 
the firm can enhance its position in the technological ecosystem surrounding the standard, 
and the more the firm should be willing to bear the costs of disclosure.  
At the technology level, I also find that complementary technologies increase in 
value after they become compatible with the standard. Patents covering these technologies 
experience an increase in citations. Complementary patents also experience a significant 
increase in the likelihood of litigation after their complementary standard essential patents 
are disclosed. The jump in the litigation rate highlights the important role complementary 
patents play in the firm’s post-standard value appropriation strategy.   
The findings and arguments from Chapters 2 and 3 have direct implications for 
several literature streams. I add to the literature on free revealing and disclosure (Allen 
1983; Harhoff et al. 2003; Henkel, 2006) by identifying a mechanism that drives firms to 
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disclose IP—complementarities in the firm’s portfolio. By identifying complementary 
technologies as a way to capture value from disclosures on other technologies, I shed light 
on why firms may disclose or give away IP for little or no direct financial reward. I also 
add to the empirical work on disclosure, a literature that has thus far been weighted toward 
case studies and theoretical work. 
My findings add to the literature on compatibility standards. Prior work focuses on 
the standard setting process (Farrell, 1996; Chiao et al., 2007; Farrell and Simcoe, 2012; 
Simcoe, 2012) and standard essential technology (Rysman and Simcoe, 2008; Simcoe, 
Graham, Feldman, 2009; Bekkers et al. 2011), but rarely explicitly theorizes about firms’ 
standard setting strategy. The scant work on standard setting strategy investigates how 
firms select a SSO (Lerner and Tirole, 2006) or how participation in standard setting 
activities fits with firm’s networking strategy (Leiponen 2008; Bar and Leiponen, 2014; 
Ranaganathan and Rosenkopf, 2014). I extend our knowledge on standards strategies by 
explicitly considering how firms utilize standards for financial gain and by documenting a 
strategy in which they employ.  
My work also informs the literature on standards policy. From a consumer’s 
perspective, the fact that firms with complementary technologies benefit from disclosure 
is likely a positive finding. These complementary technologies can be used to enhance the 
consumers experience with products that function on the standard. Yet, the research points 
to potential problem: even if a firm’s assertion of market power over its disclosed SEPs is 
curtailed, it may still be able to create socially undesirable lock-ins via its complementary 
technologies that are not disclosed and hence not subjected to oversight. By retaining 
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control these complementary technologies, the firm may create distortions from socially 
optimal equilibrium prices. While I do not offer direct evidence as such, firms’ litigiousness 
surrounding their complementary technologies signals the length they are willing to go to 
defend the advantage these technologies affords them. Overall, my findings do draw a more 
complete picture of firms’ standard-related incentives. Potential standards-related policy 
should not ignore how firms utilize SEPs to capture value in the technological ecosystem 
surrounding the standard.  
These two essays add to the empirical evidence on the importance of 
complementary assets. Prior research on how firms profit from innovation has 
demonstrated the importance of downstream complementary assets in appropriating 
returns from innovations (Teece, 1986; 1996). The role of complementarity between 
technologies has received less empirical inquiry (Teece, 1996; Somaya and Teece, 2006). 
I demonstrate the important role compatibility between two technologies play in value 
creation and appropriation. Compatible technologies can create significant complementary 
value for the firm when one technology holds an important position in the ecosystem (e.g. 
inside a standard) that then enhances the value of the strategic options for the other 
technology.  
 In Chapter 4, I examine the role that product complementarities play in the firms’ 
product strategy as they enter new markets. I find that firms with products complementary 
to the new market are more likely to enter the new market, and will enter the new market 
with products that exhibit lower technological performance than firms without 
complementary products. Complementarities also influence the firms’ design tradeoffs—
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firms design their products to best support the functionality of their complementary 
products. Empirical results also demonstrate that firms can achieve high market 
performance by relying on complementarities in lieu of high technical performance. 
My findings extend our knowledge of market entry and post-entry strategy. Prior 
literature typically either focuses on the antecedents of entry or post-entry survival, while 
leaving what firms do when they enter a market relatively unexplored. I show that 
complementarities not only are an antecedent to entry, they play an important role in 
describing post-entry behavior. Complementarities shape what consumers the firm will 
target and how it will position itself in the market. For instance, firms can rely on 
complementary products to avoid competition at the technological frontier. The 
relationship between either a firm’s product strategy and its overall technological 
capabilities will be contingent on whether the firm has complementary products.   
This work also expands our view of product design. I propose that demand-side 
complementarities influence feature selection and overall technical performance. Doing so, 
I highlight how the potential for bundling (i.e. complementary product and new product) 
influences design. For example, firms can focus on selecting features and attributes that fit 
with their existing complementarities and cut costs by excluding ones that do not. This 
adds to the existing supply-side arguments that focus on upstream economies of scope or 
downstream commercialization assets.  
Overall, this dissertation contributes to our knowledge of complementarities and 
strategic advantage. Prior research highlights three broad ways in which complementarities 
impact the firm. First, complementarities among knowledge elements expand 
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combinatorial possibilities, leading to more innovation. Second, complementary assets 
help support appropriation from these innovations. Third, the ownership of complementary 
assets impact innovation incentives—increasing both the overall incentive to innovate and 
the direction of innovation. I expand this literature to include how complementarities 
among technologies or products in the firm’s portfolio offer different avenues for value 
creation and capture. By doing so, I identify complementarities as a unique and potentially 
hard to imitate source of advantage that can both create different strategic options and 
increase firm performance.  
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APPENDIX 
 
 Glossary of Information and Communication Industry Terms 
 
CDMA: Code division multiple access, a 2nd and 3rd generation wireless communication 
multiplexing technology which optimizes bandwidth by allowing numerous signals to 
occupy the same transmission channel. 
GPRS: General Packet Radio Service. A mobile data packet service for GSM. 
GSM: Global System for Mobile communication. A 2nd generation digital mobile wireless 
communications network standard that relies on TDMA multiplexing. 
HSPA: High speed packet access, a protocol for sending data on a WCDMA based 
network. 
LTE: Long-Term evolution standard for wireless mobile communication.  
MPEG-4: Moving Picture Experts Group’s agreed upon method for compression of audio 
and visual digital data.  
TDMA: Time-division multiple access. A method for frequency sharing by allocating 
different users different time slots on the same frequency.  
UMTS: Universal Mobile Telecommunications System. A 3rd generation wireless 
communication network standard that extended the GSM network and utilized W-CDMA 
technology.  
WCDMA: Wideband Code Division Multiple Access. An evolution of CDMA that uses a 
pair of 5 megahertz wide channels.  
Wi-Fi: A trademarked name for the IEEE 802.11 wireless local area networking standard 
that allows various devices to exchange data.  
